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ABSTRACT: Pharmaceutical companies often replace prescription drugs that 
are already on the market with modified versions that have the same active 
pharmaceutical ingredient. On the surface, such activity seems benign and 
perhaps even salutary. Nonetheless, antitrust litigation has revealed that 
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firms sometimes modify existing drugs not because new formulations would 
demonstrably improve health outcomes, but principally because so-called 
secondary patents covering the new version of the drug enable them to 
maintain some effective market power over the active ingredient for which 
original, primary patent protection has expired. This “product hopping” 
strategy runs counter to the goal of the legislative framework for regulating 
branded and generic drug approvals, which is to create appropriate incentives 
for discoveries that elevate the quality of patient care and human health by 
providing a period of reward for the brand followed by timely and effectual 
generic entry.  
In this Article, I explain that the rules and institutions involved in 
determining the validity of patents on chemical inventions, certain features 
of drug regulation under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and 
unique market forces in the pharmaceutical sector combine to allow strategic 
product hopping. To address this problem, I propose a novel regulatory scheme 
that would empower the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to induce 
pharmaceutical companies to generate comparative data indicative of 
therapeutic distinctiveness between related forms of small-molecule drugs. I 
explain that the FDA is institutionally well-positioned to serve as an 
information intermediary that can help increase transparency with respect to 
drug changes, and show that the relevant disclosures can be presented in a 
manner that is useful to patients, prescribers, and payers. The proposed 
framework would then enable these market participants to identify and reject 
strategic drug product changes, reducing the manufacturer’s incentive to 
pursue such modifications. Ultimately, the FDA’s new authority for 
comparative data development could lead to improvements in patient care 
and promote downstream clinical research based on scientific evidence 
gathered under the directives of the proposed scheme.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Polarized views engulf the pharmaceutical industry. “Big pharma,” as the 
sector is often called, has drawn both praise for supplying the world with life-
saving drugs and scorn for keeping the prices of some of those drugs high and 
occasionally engaging in questionable business practices.1 As one 
commentator noted, “despite the undisputed fact that for over a century the 
industry has made a major contribution to human wellbeing and the 
reduction of ill health and suffering, it is still regularly identified by the public 
in opinion surveys as one of the least trusted industries.”2 Although the 
pharmaceutical industry continues to make remarkable advancements in the 
field of drug development,3 controversies ranging from the behavior of the 
 
 1. For examples of recent leading works on the two sides of the debate, see generally DAVID 
HEALY, PHARMAGEDDON (2012); THOMAS P. STOSSEL, PHARMAPHOBIA: HOW THE CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST MYTH UNDERMINES AMERICAN MEDICAL INNOVATION (2015). Even the titles are telling. 
 2. David Taylor, The Pharmaceutical Industry and the Future of Drug Development, in 
PHARMACEUTICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT 1, 1 (R.E. Hester & R.M. Harrison eds., 2015). 
 3. See, e.g., Sarah Knapton, First Migraine Drug in 20 Years Can Half Number of Attacks, Study 
Shows, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 30, 2017, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2017/11/ 
30/first-migraine-drug-20-years-can-half-number-attacks-study-shows.  
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“pharma bro”4 to the alleged role of the industry in the opioid epidemic5 
continue to stoke negative opinions of drug makers and lead to calls for 
governmental interventions.  
One pharmaceutical industry practice that has attracted the attention of 
regulators, courts, and the public is so-called “product hopping.”6 A product 
hopping strategy generally unfolds as follows. After receiving approval from 
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), a brand pharmaceutical 
company typically markets a drug product exclusively, i.e., without any 
competition over that product from other manufacturers, thanks to patents 
covering the drug.7 As these “primary” or “pioneering” patents approach 
expiration, the company obtains new patents covering the drug’s 
modification—for example, so-called “extended-release” tablets—and secures 
a separate FDA approval for this version.8 The company then begins to 
advertise the new product heavily, while de-emphasizing the one that is about 
to go off-patent.9 In the more aggressive cases, the brand company might 
disparage the original form of the drug or even take it completely off the 
market, thereby forcing a switch to the modification.10  
 
 4. Laura Lorenzetti, Here’s Why Turing Pharmaceuticals Says 5,000% Price Bump Is Necessary, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 22, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/21/turing-pharmaceuticals-martin-
shkreli-response.  
 5. Alana Semuels, Are Pharmaceutical Companies to Blame for the Opioid Epidemic?, ATLANTIC 
(June 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/06/lawsuit-pharmaceutical-
companies-opioids/529020. 
 6. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 12.05, 15.03B[1] (3d ed. 2017); see also 
New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 643 n.2 (2d Cir. 2015) (tracing the 
origin of the term “product hopping”); Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: 
A New Framework, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 168–69 (2016) (contending that product hopping 
is driven by the phenomenon of a “price disconnect”).  
 7. Although FDA-approved drug products can also be supported by non-patent 
exclusivities, product hopping is most often tied to patent expiration followed by new patenting. 
See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.  
 8. For a leading example from the case law, see Actavis, 787 F.3d at 646–47. Extended-
release versions of drugs differ from their immediate-release counterparts in that—as the 
respective terms suggest—the former are, generally speaking, engineered so as to discharge the 
active pharmaceutical ingredient (i.e., the working part of the drug) into the bloodstream more 
slowly than the latter. See Ali Nokhodchi et al., The Role of Oral Controlled Release Matrix Tablets in 
Drug Delivery Systems, 2 BIOIMPACTS 175, 175–78 (2012). 
 9. See, e.g., In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., No. 15-cv-12730-DJC, 2016 WL 4083333, at *2–5 
(D. Mass. July 20, 2016) (describing a product hopping scheme involving both so-called “soft” 
and “hard” switches), further proceedings, 233 F. Supp. 3d 247 (D. Mass. 2017); Walgreen Co. v. 
AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 150–52 (D.D.C. 2008) (describing a product 
hopping scheme involving a soft switch). 
 10. See, e.g., Actavis, 787 F.3d at 647–49; In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 
3d 307, 349–54 (D.R.I. 2017); In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and Naloxone) 
Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2445, 2017 WL 3967911, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2017), further 
proceedings, 2017 WL 4910673, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2017); Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, 
Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 420, 423–24 (D. Del. 2006); see also Asacol, 2016 WL 4083333,  
at *3–4 (describing a product hopping scheme involving both soft and hard switches).  
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After the patents that protect the pioneering product expire, other 
companies—after undergoing their own, shortened FDA approval 
processes—can offer “copies” of the original product as relatively cheap, 
“generic” alternatives pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).11 This regime is reinforced by generic 
substitution laws, adopted in some form in every state, which essentially 
authorize pharmacists to supply patients with a generic version of a drug even 
when physicians prescribe the more expensive brand.12 But a product 
hopping strategy can render the original, off-patent form of the drug obsolete 
and cause a permanent shift to the newly patented, more expensive 
modification.13 Due to various defects in the market for prescription drugs, 
these follow-on versions may—and have—achieved significant penetration 
without credible evidence of any kind of therapeutic improvement over, or 
even meaningful clinical difference from, their predecessors.14 It has been 
argued, therefore, that product hops can contribute to drug prices that are 
unnecessarily high.15  
Some product hops, particularly those involving so-called “forced” or 
“hard” switches—terms that refer to removal of the original product from the 
market—have prompted antitrust challenges. In one well-known case, New 
York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
 
 11. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2018). See generally Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,  
21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399h. 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 115–21 (describing the variety of generic substitution 
laws); see also Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need a 
Re-Designed Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 293, 309–14 (2015) 
(tracing the evolution of generic substitution laws). 
 13. The generic, however, does not lose the approval to market the “copy” when the brand 
pulls the product from the shelves—unless that had to be done for safety or effectiveness reasons. 
21 C.F.R. § 314.122(a) (2018). 
 14. See, e.g., Peter Mansfield et al., Single-Enantiomer Drugs: Elegant Science, Disappointing 
Effects, 43 CLINICAL PHARMACOKINETICS 287, 287 (2004) (“Patent protection and a perception of 
superiority based on promotion rather than evidence will maintain price premiums for single 
enantiomer drugs that are not justified on the basis of clinical performance.”); see also Ismayil 
Ahmet et al., Fenoterol Enantiomers Do Not Possess Beneficial Therapeutic Properties of Their Racemic 
Mixture in the Rat Model of Post Myocardial Infarction Dilated Cardiomyopathy, 26 CARDIOVASCULAR 
DRUGS & THERAPY 101, 106 (2012) (“While the ineffectiveness of SS-enantiomer in our study was 
fully anticipated, and in fact it was intended as a negative control, the lack of effectiveness on the 
part of RR-enantiomer contradicts the hypothesis promoted in the reports based on recording of 
its effect on contraction of single cardiomyocytes.”); William James Deardorff & George T. 
Grossberg, A Fixed-Dose Combination of Memantine Extended-Release and Donepezil in the Treatment of 
Moderate-to-Severe Alzheimer’s Disease, 10 DRUG DESIGN, DEV. & THERAPY 3267, 3276 (2016) 
(“[T]here does not appear to be compelling, high-quality evidence that an FDC would substantially 
improve clinical outcomes over lower cost regimens, such as generic donepezil and memantine 
IR. Whether or not the added cost of the FDC is justified will likely be made on a case-by-case 
basis.”). But see, e.g., Pascal Auquier et al., Comparison of Escitalopram and Citalopram Efficacy: A Meta-
Analysis, 7 INT’L J. PSYCHIATRY CLINICAL PRAC. 259, 265–66 (2003) (providing a counterexample). 
 15. See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States: 
Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 864–65 (2016). 
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Circuit upheld a district court’s determination that the defendant brand 
pharmaceutical company likely violated § 2 of the Sherman Act, which 
prohibits actual or attempted single-firm monopolization.16 The court based 
this conclusion in part on a finding that the company stopped selling the 
pioneering version of an Alzheimer’s drug called Namenda shortly before 
patents covering it expired and replaced it with a follow-on purely for strategic 
reasons.17 Specifically, the record revealed that the firm engineered the switch 
from the immediate-release (“IR”) to the extended-release (“XR”) form of 
Namenda so as to prevent generic entrants from gaining market share that 
would have been possible thanks to patent expiration and generic 
substitution.18  
The court determined that, having been compelled to make the switch 
to the XR version, physicians would be unwilling to revert to the cheaper 
generic IR due to the sensitivity of the Alzheimer’s patient population to 
continued shifts in their therapeutic regimens.19 In addition, the court noted 
that constraints associated with the generic companies’ business model 
—which depends on generic substitution rather than marketing—would 
make it difficult for generics to “cost-efficient[ly]” convince prescribers and 
patients to re-adopt the pioneering form of the drug in any event.20 But the 
switch may have necessitated these inefficient marketing outlays after generic 
entry because, although no clinical difference between old and new versions 
of Namenda was demonstrated,21 pharmacists could not legally give patients 
the former when doctors prescribed the latter because the shift to the XR 
form precluded the application of generic substitution.22 Consequently, after 
faulting the brand for “withdrawing a successful drug from the market and 
introducing a reformulated version of that drug, which has the dual effect of 
forcing patients to switch to the new version and impeding generic 
competition, without a legitimate business justification,”23 the court upheld a 
 
 16. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018); New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638,  
658–60 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 17. Actavis, 787 F.3d at 658–60. The court concluded that the plaintiff was likely to succeed 
on both monopolization and attempted monopolization claims. Id. at 651, 660. 
 18. Id. at 654–55, 658.  
 19. Id. at 656. 
 20. Id. at 655. 
 21. See infra notes 274–77 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 126–27 and accompanying text. But cf. Arti K. Rai & Barak D. Richman, 
A Preferable Path for Thwarting Pharmaceutical Product Hopping, HEALTH AFF.: HEALTH AFF. BLOG 
(May 22, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180522.408497/full (proposing 
an approach that would allow generic substitution in such circumstances). 
 23. Actavis, 787 F.3d at 659. By “reformulated” here, the Second Circuit is of course not 
referring to a change in an inactive ingredient that does not affect the original drug. Instead, the 
reformulation has led to a change in dosing, resulting in a “new drug” under the FDCA. See infra 
notes 123–27 and accompanying text. 
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preliminary injunction ordering the company to continue selling the original, 
IR form of the drug.24 
As a matter of antitrust doctrine, “product hopping” monopolization 
theories have drawn a mixed reception from commentators. Some have 
offered qualified praise to the Second Circuit for providing a remedy against 
conduct that appears to sidestep the regulatory frameworks intended to foster 
cost savings from the introduction of generic drugs.25 Others, however, have 
criticized the court’s approach for arrogating to the judiciary the power to 
police pharmaceutical product markets and even giving courts a seemingly 
unsuitable task of comparing health benefits of different drug products.26 
Later decisions have followed Actavis with some caution, allowing antitrust 
claims to proceed in hard switch scenarios based on ostensible “consumer 
coercion,”27 but generally dismissing cases in which plaintiffs alleged only a 
“soft switch”—that is, when defendants de-emphasized the old product but 
did not actually withdraw it from the market.28  
Thus, courts have been unwilling to use antitrust law to broadly condemn 
product hopping practices, perhaps out of concern that doing so might put 
them into an awkward quasi-regulatory role.29 Indeed, although antitrust can 
have an important function even in a highly regulated industry such as 
pharmaceuticals,30 decisions from the Supreme Court have recognized that 
in deciding whether to impose antitrust liability, “careful account must be 
 
 24. Before finding an antitrust violation, the court had to determine the relevant market, 
which it concluded to be memantine. Actavis, 787 F.3d at 646–52; cf. Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Warner 
Chilcott PLC, 838 F.3d 421, 433–34 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding no antitrust violation because there 
were other drugs available in the relevant market, precluding the defendant from attaining a 
dominant market position). 
 25. See, e.g., Leigh Oliver, It Is All About the Facts: Commentary on the Current State of Antitrust 
Enforcement in Health Care, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 821, 823–24 (2017); see also ROBIN FELDMAN  
& EVAN FRONDORF, DRUG WARS: HOW BIG PHARMA RAISES PRICES AND KEEPS GENERICS OFF THE 
MARKET 69–78 (2017) (describing courts’ attempts to deal with product hopping strategies); 
Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 6, at 198–200 (discussing the Namenda antitrust litigation);  
cf. Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing Dimension of 
Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1011, 1017–18 (2010). 
 26. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg et al., Product Hopping and the Limits of Antitrust: The Danger 
of Micromanaging Innovation, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON., Dec. 2015, at 1, 4–5; 
Joanna Shepherd, Deterring Innovation: New York v. Actavis and the Duty to Subsidize Competitors’ 
Market Entry, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 663, 668, 707 (2016). 
 27. See, e.g., In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 3d 307, 353 (D.R.I. 2017). 
 28. See, e.g., Mylan Pharm., 838 F.3d at 440–41. 
 29. See Hillary Greene, Muzzling Antitrust: Information Products, Innovation and Free Speech,  
95 B.U. L. REV. 35, 77–79 (2015) (noting that, as a matter of practice, antitrust courts rarely engage 
in balancing of pro-competitive benefits versus anti-competitive harms of innovation); cf. John M. 
Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 681, 726–28 (2012) 
(arguing that certain product redesigns should and do give rise to viable antitrust claims). 
 30. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 
685, 709 (2009) (noting how FDA regulation of the pharmaceutical industry “presents a perfect 
storm” for product hopping). 
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taken of the pervasive federal and state regulation characteristic of the 
industry.”31 To be sure, an antitrust intervention may well be warranted when 
a regulatory regime is not “an effective steward of the antitrust function.”32 
But even if this is so, a question worth asking is whether the regime can be 
fixed so as to reduce ex ante the prevalence of conduct that might otherwise 
draw antitrust scrutiny and to avoid enlisting courts as ex-post fixers of 
regulatory flaws.33 Moreover, substantive, procedural, and practical 
constraints on antitrust actions further limit meaningful and timely inquiry 
into whether a product hop was problematic.34  
But what precisely is the problem prompting the need for a regulatory 
fix? A business model based on the strategy of product substitution seemingly 
for its own sake, with a new version exhibiting no proven clinical distinction 
from the original, presents an issue of potential public concern that the 
antitrust cases have uncovered. In Actavis, for example, the defendants’ CEO 
stated that “[w]e need to transition volume to XR to protect our Namenda 
revenue from generic penetration in 2015 when we lose IR patent 
exclusivity.”35 In another case, In re Asacol, it was alleged that the brand 
engineered an “unnecessary modification” that ended up making the new 
version of the drug tougher to swallow for some patients and undertook a soft, 
 
 31. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411 
(2004) (quoting United States v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 91 (1975)).  
 32. Id. at 413. 
 33. See Dennis W. Carlton et al., Does the FTC’s Theory of Product Hopping Promote Competition?, 
12 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 495, 502 (2016) (explaining that “the regulatory solution should 
be to fix Hatch-Waxman, rather than misuse antitrust law to impose an obligation on firms to 
assist rivals’ efforts to free-ride”); Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Anticompetitive Innovation and the 
Quality of Invention, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 51 (2012) (“[P]olicymakers should not distort well-
established antitrust rules in order to solve what is, at heart, a regulatory problem.”); Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg & Daniel A. Crane, Patent Punting: How FDA and Antitrust Courts Undermine the Hatch-
Waxman Act to Avoid Dealing with Patents, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 197, 244–45 
(2015) (arguing for greater involvement of the FDA in evaluating patent-related issues); Joseph 
Fielding, Note, From Pay-for-Delay to Product Hopping: The Limited Utility of Antitrust Law in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1915, 1945 (2017) (advocating for Congress to 
empower the FDA to play a greater role in patent-related matters); see also Matthew Sipe, Patent 
Privateers and Antitrust Fears, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 191, 195–96 (2016) 
(contending that antitrust law should be a measure of last resort when regulatory alternatives are 
available); cf. C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory 
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553 (2006) (explaining how another lacuna in FDA drug 
regulation allows for anti-competitive settlements); Jacob S. Sherkow, Administrating Patent 
Litigation, 90 WASH. L. REV. 205, 214–15, 250–53 (2015) (calling for a greater role for the FDA 
to police certain conduct by owners of pharmaceutical patents). 
 34. See Cynthia M. Ho, Should All Drugs Be Patentable?: A Comparative Perspective, 17 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 295, 320 (2015) (explaining that “[a]lthough . . . actions [like those by Actavis] 
properly prompt antitrust disputes, the need for such actions may still result in a delay in generic 
competition”); Rai & Richman, supra note 22.  
 35. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 658 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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and then a hard, switch away from the more convenient original to the more 
expensive follow-on.36  
To some of the more transparently strategic hops of this sort, prescribers 
and patients have responded by largely continuing to use the original—at 
least until the hard switch.37 But in other cases, significant shifts to new and 
more expensive products took place without any data that might justify the 
change.38 Such shifts can occur because of information gaps and other flaws 
in the market for pharmaceuticals, to be discussed throughout the Article, 
that antitrust law probably cannot fully correct.39 Thus, leaving aside the 
threat of antitrust liability in particularly aggressive cases, incentives are in 
place for firms to modify existing products without also developing evidence 
tending to show that the change makes sense for patients.  
The statutory frameworks that have pushed some pharmaceutical 
companies toward strategic product hopping encompass patent law and food 
and drug law. Patents are powerful rights, but when an existing drug is 
modified, a showing of clinical improvement, or even distinctiveness, is 
generally not needed to obtain a new patent.40 For example, the utility 
requirement of § 101 of the Patent Act does not demand that the applicant 
show that the new invention is in any way better or more useful than what is 
already available,41 and the requirement that a patent claim be non-obvious 
under § 103 focuses mainly on whether the claim embodies a sufficiently 
inventive cognitive leap over what is in the public domain.42  
 
 36. In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., No. 15-cv-12730-DJC, 2016 WL 4083333, at *4–5 (D. Mass. 
July 20, 2016), further proceedings, 233 F. Supp. 3d 247 (D. Mass. 2017). 
 37. Id.  
 38. See Mansfield et al., supra note 14, at 288–89; see also FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 
25, at 71–74 (providing examples of drug product changes unaccompanied by proven benefits 
for any patients). 
 39. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 26–28, 159–64 (1982); see also 
Howard A. Shelanski, Justice Breyer, Professor Kahn, and Antitrust Enforcement in Regulated Industries, 
100 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 494 (2012) (“Breyer . . . identified several regulatory tasks for which 
antitrust would be inadequate, notably the correction of moral hazard and information 
asymmetry problems . . . .”).  
 40. See, e.g., In re Sichert, 566 F.2d 1154, 1159–61 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (illustrating the minimal 
requirements of effectiveness and safety needed to establish patentable utility). 
 41. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018); Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) 
(No. 8568) (Story, Circuit Justice); see also ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, 
PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 201 (7th ed. 2017) (noting the limited role of 
the utility requirement); Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 6, at 181 (“The granting of a patent by 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office . . . certainly does not guarantee, or even suggest, that the 
reformulated product is superior in any way to existing products.”). See generally W. Nicholson 
Price II, The Cost of Novelty (2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (explaining 
that the law generally does not require a better product for patentability).  
 42. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966); Custom Accessories, 
Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 960 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see Gregory N. Mandel, 
A Nonobvious Comparison: Nonobviousness Decisions at the PTAB and in the Federal Courts, 24 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 403, 404–07 (2016). See generally Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The 
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Somewhat in tension with these aspects of patent doctrine,43 results made 
possible by the patented invention that are unexpected in view of what was 
known in the field (e.g., the therapeutic profile of the previous version of the 
drug),44 as well as other types of evidence that might stand in for 
improvements in patient care, can and do come into the non-obviousness 
analysis.45 But patent applications are filed early in the research process46 
—before much, if any, comparative data that can speak usefully to these issues 
has been developed.47 Thus, the combination of established doctrinal rules 
and the often limited quality of the data available during the patent 
acquisition process (the official term for it is “patent prosecution”) ensures 
that examiners at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) do not see 
a full clinical picture of the difference between pioneering drugs and their 
follow-on versions.48  
To be sure, assuming the patent issues, the picture might become 
somewhat more complete by the time the validity of the patent is litigated in 
court.49 And while some of the newly developed evidence can bolster the case 
for patentability, the adversarial process can also reveal flaws in prosecution 
 
Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590 (2011) (arguing for the use of the 
economic inducement standard to judge non-obviousness of patent claims). 
 43. See infra Section III.B. 
 44. See, e.g., In re Merchant, 575 F.2d 865, 868–69 (C.C.P.A. 1978); see also Tamsen Valoir, 
Six Methods of Preserving Market Exclusivity, 18 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 12, 14 (2006) 
(“[R]esearchers may plan ahead to collect comparative data, showing that the improved product 
has unexpected advantages over the product disclosed in the original application. Thus, a 
particular species of drug with a particular activity level might be patentable, even though the 
genus of drugs was disclosed earlier. Any showing of unexpected advantages can be used to 
counter an obviousness rejection, and incorporating follow-on applications into a patent strategy 
early will allow scientists to design their research path accordingly.”). 
 45. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18 (discussing secondary considerations); see also Arctic Cat Inc. 
v. Bombardier Recreational Prods. Inc., 876 F.3d 1350, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that 
secondary considerations cannot be ignored in the non-obviousness analysis).  
 46. See Shashank Upadhye, To Use or Not to Use: Reforming Patent Infringement, the Public Use 
Bar, and the Experimental Use Doctrine as Applied to Clinical Testing of Pharmaceutical and Medical Device 
Inventions, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 4 (2002) (explaining how the public use bar encourages 
early filings). See generally Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341 (2010) 
(arguing for a new type of patent right as a driver for increasing commercialization and reducing 
the prevalence of patented inventions that are not commercially exploited). 
 47. See Jonathan J. Darrow, Pharmaceutical Gatekeepers, 47 IND. L. REV. 363, 403 (2014) 
(“[T]he evidence needed to ascertain a drug’s true efficacy in humans is not usually available at 
the time of patenting, which occurs relatively early in the research and development process.”). 
 48. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Pharma’s Nonobvious Problem, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 375, 
396–400 (2008); see also Greg Reilly, Decoupling Patent Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 551, 577 (2017) (“In 
practice, secondary considerations are rarely relied on during patent acquisition both because of 
the difficulty for examiners in identifying and developing evidence of real world activities (as 
opposed to printed materials) and because secondary considerations tend to be ex post factors 
that only arise after the patent is granted and the invention publicized and marketed.”).  
 49. See infra notes 173–76, 217–23 and accompanying text (discussing the Seroquel example). 
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and lead to the patent’s invalidation.50 Indeed, litigation between brand and 
generic companies results in invalidation of patents covering follow-on drugs 
with some frequency,51 allowing the generic entrants to make and sell the 
follow-on form. The brand-generic litigation process, however, can take a 
significant amount of time until final resolution of generic company liability.52 
Thus, even if the generics ultimately succeed in invalidating the asserted 
patents, the brand effectively enjoys a period of erroneously granted 
exclusivity while those patents are still in force.53 This is yet another feature of 
the regulatory mix that can make patents the paramount inducer of drug 
reformulation efforts. Finally, it bears emphasizing that even if the decision-
makers were to have perfect and timely evidence before them and could make 
patentability decisions with a high degree of accuracy, the fact remains that 
the relationship between non-obviousness and relative product quality is not 
a straightforward one as a matter of substantive patent law.54 
For its part, the FDA typically does not evaluate comparative advantages 
or disadvantages of new drug versions—and brand companies, sometimes 
referred to as “sponsors,” do not have to develop such information and 
 
 50. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,  
1500–08 (2001).  
 51. See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective 
Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327, 332–36 (2012); see also Shine Tu, 
Invalidated Patents and Associated Patent Examiners, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 135, 153 (2015) 
(finding that the Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry technology center of the PTO is 
responsible for the highest percentage of invalidated patents of all the technology centers). 
Although selection effects certainly influence the rate of invalidation, the fact remains that there 
is a significant rate of erroneous patent grants in the pharmaceutical space.  
 52. Challenges to patentability at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”), however, can 
lead to relatively quick invalidations—assuming the challenger can get past the hurdle of the PTO’s 
discretionary institution of a post-issuance review. See Joanna Shepherd, Disrupting the Balance: The 
Conflict Between Hatch-Waxman and Inter Partes Review, 6 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 14, 37 (2016).  
 53. See, e.g., Bayer Healthcare Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 713 F.3d 1369, 1377 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (reversing two lower court decisions and holding invalid a patent originally 
granted in 1998 and reissued in 2002, and which began to be litigated in 2007), rev’g Bayer 
Schering Pharma AG v. Watson Pharm., Inc., Nos. 2:07-CV-01472-KJD-GWF, 2:08-CV-00995-KJD-
GWF, 2012 WL 1079551 (D. Nev. Mar. 30, 2012), and Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Lupin Ltd., 
No. 2:10-CV-01166-KJD-RJJ, 2012 WL 1080296 (D. Nev. Mar. 30, 2012). As part of the reversal, 
the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court erred in crediting the patentee’s unexpected 
results evidence. Compare id. at 1374–77, with Bayer, 2012 WL 1079551, at *22 (“[T]he 
undisputed evidence demonstrates three unexpected results of Bayer’s invention . . . .”). The 
Federal Circuit, to be sure, granted an emergency stay of the injunction against one of the 
defendants’ ANDA approvals in a related appeal a month prior to issuing the decision reversing 
the judgment that the patents are not invalid. See Order at 2, Bayer Healthcare Pharm., Inc. v. 
Sandoz, Inc., No. 13-1207 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 13, 2013), ECF No. 57.  
 54. See infra Section III.B; see also Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. Chisum, Enabling Patent 
Law’s Inherent Anticipation Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1154–57, 1163–64 (2008) (explaining 
why another patent law doctrine, inherent anticipation, is ill-suited to address strategic behavior 
by brand pharmaceutical companies). 
KARSHEDT_PP_TO_AU (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2019  10:12 AM 
1140 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:1129 
provide it to the agency.55 Modified drugs,56 like all others, are generally 
governed by the standard approval requirement of proof of safety and 
efficacy57 over a placebo.58 The agency typically does not ask the sponsor to 
furnish any data suggestive of clinical distinctiveness between a drug’s new 
form and its previous one, and such data is often completely unavailable when 
the new version enters the market.59 The FDA does have at its disposal some 
 
 55. See Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 6, at 179, 221; Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The 
Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1956 & n.180 (2013); Russell 
Korobkin, Comparative Effectiveness Research as Choice Architecture: The Behavioral Law and Economics 
Solution to the Health Care Cost Crisis, 112 MICH. L. REV. 523, 550–51 (2014). For suggestions to 
incorporate comparative effectiveness analysis in the FDA approval process, see G. Caleb Alexander 
& Randall S. Stafford, Does Comparative Effectiveness Have a Comparative Edge?, 301 JAMA 2488,  
2488–89 (2009); Alec B. O’Connor, Building Comparative Efficacy and Tolerability into the FDA Approval 
Process, 303 JAMA 979, 979–80 (2010). For a proposal to make comparative efficacy a general 
requirement of drug approvals in Europe, see generally Corinna Sorenson et al., Evidence of 
Comparative Efficacy Should Have a Formal Role in European Drug Approvals, 343 BRIT. MED. J. 514 (2011). 
 56. The FDA treats modifications involving changes in dosage and the like formally as new 
drugs. See infra Part II.  
 57. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2018). As part of this requirement, the sponsor must provide 
“evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical 
investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be 
concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have 
under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed 
labeling thereof.” Id. § 355(d). To support this claim, the sponsor must submit “full reports of 
investigations which have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether 
such drug is effective in use.” Id. § 355(b)(1)(A). Although those terms are often used 
interchangeably, the literature distinguishes efficacy, which refers to “the effect of the treatment 
under optimal conditions,” i.e., in the course of clinical trials, from effectiveness, which refers to 
“the effect of the treatment in routine clinical practice.” GRETCHEN A. JACOBSON, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL34208, COMPARATIVE CLINICAL EFFECTIVENESS AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS 
RESEARCH: BACKGROUND, HISTORY, AND OVERVIEW 4 (2007). Nonetheless, pre-approval studies 
can, subject to various qualifications due to their limitations, provide the kinds of results that 
allow such studies to serve as proxies for effectiveness in actual clinical practice. See generally 
Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters 
the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419 (2010) (discussing evidentiary challenges for 
proving drug efficacy and safety). 
 58. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b) (2018) (setting forth placebo and no-treatment controls as 
sufficient for meeting the statutory requirements for approval). There are some exceptions. See, 
e.g., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH (CDER) & CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION  
& RESEARCH (CBER), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NON-
INFERIORITY CLINICAL TRIALS TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVENESS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2016), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/UCM202140.pdf (providing guidelines for 
non-inferiority trials of antibiotic drugs) [hereinafter NON-INFERIORITY CLINICAL TRIALS TO 
ESTABLISH EFFECTIVENESS]. 
 59. See Nicholas S. Downing et al., Clinical Trial Evidence Supporting FDA Approval of Novel 
Therapeutic Agents, 2005–2012, 311 JAMA 368, 373–74 (2014) (“Comparative effectiveness 
information, which is not required as part of FDA approval and involves comparison of an 
intervention with an active control, was available for less than half of indications, consistent with 
prior research, but leaving uncertainty about the benefits and safety of these medications when 
compared with other available therapeutic agents.”). Sometimes, a sponsor does make certain 
comparisons, but they end up not being relevant to any kind of demonstrable distinctiveness 
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regulatory exclusivity mechanisms that could encourage and reward sponsor 
studies generating information of potential relevance to comparative safety 
and efficacy of the two drug forms.60 However, the lengthy term of patent 
protection and regulatory benefits that come with drug patents61 can dwarf 
any reward that the FDA is currently empowered to provide.62 As a result, 
exclusivities based on the submission of data to the FDA can be rendered 
unnecessary for brand companies that have acquired patents covering 
reformulated products.  
Given these features of the Patent Act and the FDCA, drug product 
changes can sometimes be driven not by increased clinical benefits or even 
clinical distinctiveness, but principally by the possibility of obtaining patent 
protection for the drug’s new version.63 This is unfortunate because 
incremental pharmaceutical innovation, if properly channeled,64 can be 
crucial for health outcomes.65 Sometimes, for example, extended-release 
formulations can offer the same therapeutic benefit from a smaller number 
of tablets than immediate-release, which can in turn help increase patient 
compliance.66 Moreover, such modifications can offer other comparative 
 
between the two products. See infra notes 274–75 and accompanying text (discussing comparative 
experiments performed for Namenda IR and XR); cf. Jitendra Ganju & Dror Rom, Non-Inferiority 
Versus Superiority Drug Claims: The (Not So) Subtle Distinction, 18 TRIALS 278, 279–81 (2017) 
(contrasting statistical and clinical superiority).  
 60. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii)–(iv) (providing for a three-year market exclusivity 
for drug modifications for which the sponsor conducted certain new clinical investigations 
essential to approval). This exclusivity, however, does not require comparative analysis.  
 61. See infra Part II (cataloguing benefits that Orange Book listings provide).  
 62. This analysis assumes that so-called “secondary” patents have terms extending 
significantly beyond expiration of the terms of so-called “primary” patents, a scenario that often 
holds in practice. For a discussion of primary and secondary patents, see infra Part III. 
 63. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 658–60 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(providing an example of such a pretextual change). 
 64. See Mueller & Chisum, supra note 54, at 1106 n.12 (“Drawing the line between improper 
attempts at evergreening and legitimate incremental innovation is a broad and difficult problem in 
patent law . . . .”). As Professor John Thomas has noted, “‘[p]atent evergreening’ is a potentially 
pejorative term” that refers to practices that include strategic product hopping. See JOHN R. THOMAS, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40917, PATENT “EVERGREENING”: ISSUES IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 
1 (2009); supra note 51 and accompanying text; infra note 491 and accompanying text.  
 65. Joshua Cohen & Kenneth Kaitin, Follow-On Drugs and Indications: The Importance of 
Incremental Innovation to Medical Practice, 15 AM. J. THERAPEUTICS 89, 89 (2008); Linda J. Wastila 
et al., The World Health Organization’s Essential Drug List: The Significance of Me-Too and Follow-On 
Research, 3 J. CLINICAL RES. & DRUG DEV. 105, 106 (1989); Albert I. Wertheimer & Thomas M. 
Santella, Pharmaceutical Evolution: The Advantages of Incremental Innovation in Drug Development, 
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, Apr. 2009, at 1, http://cei.org/sites/default/files/ 
Wertheimer%20and%20Santella%20-%20Pharmaceutical%20Evolution.pdf; see also infra note 
342 and accompanying text (providing specific examples). 
 66. See, e.g., S. Scott Sutton et al., Impact of Pill Burden on Adherence, Risk of Hospitalization, and 
Viral Suppression in Patients with HIV Infection and AIDS Receiving Antiretroviral Therapy,  
36 PHARMACOTHERAPY 385, 392–95 (2016). See generally Nokhodchi et al., supra note 8, at 175–76 
(discussing various potential advantages of extended-release formulations). 
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health benefits over “regular” versions—for example, reduced side effects due 
to the fact that the body is not “flooded” with the drug.67 But for certain drugs, 
XR versions could also exhibit reduced efficacy compared to their immediate-
release counterparts, potentially without offering any proven patient 
compliance or other benefits.68 Comparative evidence, therefore, can play the 
critical role of informing the market by demonstrating advantages or 
disadvantages of the new drug product over the old.  
In general, motivations for modifying existing drugs are straightforward 
enough to state—to better the pioneering drug in some specific dimension, 
such as improving compliance, ameliorating side effects, and so on. 
Nonetheless, as noted,69 the sponsor does not have to actually demonstrate to 
the FDA that the modification would offer any of those advantages generally, 
or even for some particular patient sub-population. Furthermore, the fact that 
comparative pre-market data that may counsel for or against a drug switch is 
lacking can be obscured by forceful advertising, which can deepen the 
aforementioned information gaps.70 To the extent that litigants and courts 
may help bridge them through antitrust law,71 they can only do so some time 
after the modified product was introduced. More importantly, given the 
coercion rationale, only the hard-switch scenario has been found 
actionable72—so antitrust has so far played little, if any, information-forcing 
role in soft-switch cases. Thus, even if antitrust law were an effective tool for 
comparing benefits of drug products and fixing the information gaps,73 the 
timing of the inquiry and the focus on coercion limit antitrust’s role in this 
area.  
Although the FDA appears to lack the authority to request comparative 
data from sponsors,74 its value and importance have not been lost on FDA 
officials. In a speech to the Controlled Release Society made in 1993, Dr. 
David Kessler, then the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, exhorted his 
audience to “[t]hink in terms of clinical outcomes. Demonstrated, 
 
 67. Nokhodchi et al., supra note 8, at 175; see Gilbert Block et al., Comparison of Immediate-
Release and Controlled Release Carbidopa/Levodopa in Parkinson’s Disease, 37 EUR. NEUROLOGY 23, 26 
(1997); Marilou Powers Cramer & Samuel R. Saks, Translating Safety, Efficacy and Compliance into 
Economic Value for Controlled Release Dosage Forms, 5 PHARMACOECONOMICS 482, 484 (1994). 
 68. See, e.g., Nokhodchi et al., supra note 8, at 176. See generally David A. Kessler, Comm’r of 
Food & Drugs, Remarks at a Controlled Release Society Meeting (July 27, 1993), in 4 FOOD  
& DRUG REP. (FOOD & DRUG LAW INST.) 437 (1993) (summarizing potential problems that can 
be introduced when drugs are changed from IR to XR formulations).  
 69. See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.  
 70. See infra Part IV. 
 71. But cf. BREYER, supra note 39, at 159–64 (expressing doubts about antitrust law’s role as 
a tool for bridging information gaps and favoring regulation for fixing such problems).  
 72. See supra notes 19–28 and accompanying text. 
 73. See supra notes 29–34 and accompanying text.  
 74. Cf. infra Section V.D (exploring some possible sources of such authority in the current statute). 
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documented, and rigorously established improvements to patient care.”75 At 
a public meeting in 2017, Dr. Kathleen Uhl, the Director of the FDA’s Office 
of Generic Drugs, asked an industry representative whether a showing of some 
clinical benefit from a drug modification, such as increased patient 
compliance, would be a good idea.76 These statements evince these officials’ 
concern that, in the absence of a regulatory nudge, brand companies may not 
always focus on patient benefits when modifying existing drugs. 
There may be some authority, after all, for the FDA to weigh in indirectly 
on such matters. For example, one fairly obscure provision of the FDCA 
empowers the agency to respond to PTO requests “to furnish full and 
complete information with respect to such questions relating to drugs as the 
Director may submit concerning any patent application.”77 Although the PTO 
has apparently never taken advantage of this subsection, it theoretically allows 
for FDA vetting of comparative data that a drug company submitted to the PTO 
in an effort to establish the patentability of a claimed formulation, perhaps 
under the “unexpected results” theory.78 This provision even states that “[t]he 
Secretary is further authorized, upon receipt of any such request, to conduct 
or cause to be conducted, such research as may be required”79—a power that 
the PTO most certainly does not have.  
Nonetheless, leaving aside the inherent challenges of generating 
comparative information given early patent filings, one wonders if this 
subsection’s apparent goal to enlist the FDA in the task of examining 
pharmaceutical improvements might be better served by another mechanism 
enabling the FDA to request and analyze the data directly. In a sense, we 
currently have it backwards: Instead of the FDA, it is the PTO, which is “a 
primarily technical agency with expertise in invention but not in the clinical 
trials that produce evidence of efficacy,”80 that is charged with the 
responsibility of processing the information (if any) relevant to the relative 
 
 75. Kessler, supra note 68, at 438. 
 76. See Comment Letter from James C. Stansel, Executive Vice President & Gen. Counsel,  
& David E. Korn, Vice President of Intellectual Prop. & Law, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am., to 
Dockets Mgmt. Staff (HFA-305), Food & Drug Admin. 18 n.87 (Nov. 17, 2017), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2017-N-3615-0108 (“When you were talking 
about post-approval changes, you said about the ability to improve tolerability, adherence—I 
believe you had four specific examples that you used. So my question is should there be a 
requirement to demonstrate any or all four of those when the agency approves any postmarketing 
type changes to the innovator?” (quoting a question from Dr. Kathleen Uhl, Director for the Office 
of Generic Drugs at the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research)). The other two examples 
of improvements that the industry representative gave were convenience and efficacy. Id. at 18. 
 77. 21 U.S.C. § 372(d) (2018); see Darrow, supra note 47, at 402 (“The stated purpose of 
§ 372(d), as described in the accompanying 1962 Senate Report, was unambiguously to reduce 
the number of patents issued on therapeutically questionable drugs . . . .”). 
 78. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text; see also Darrow, supra note 47, at 401–03 
(commenting on the lack of utilization of § 372(d) by the PTO).  
 79. 21 U.S.C. § 372(d). 
 80. Darrow, supra note 47, at 401.  
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utility of the new form of the drug.81 Although the legal questions that the two 
agencies ask are different, the ultimate goal of their respective efforts in the 
pharmaceutical space is improved quality of health care. Given that 
information relating to differences in clinical effect between two related drug 
products is clearly relevant to this general goal, it is surprising that the FDA 
—the agency with recognized expertise in data analysis and experimental 
design—is sidelined when it comes to such comparisons. 
In this Article, I argue that rather than rely mainly on the backstop of 
antitrust litigation, completely rework patent law or patent institutions, or 
leave the matter exclusively to market forces, policymakers should consider 
addressing the phenomenon of product hopping through FDA-administered 
information-forcing and -transferring strategies. At present, drug 
modifications are driven largely by the carrot of patentability,82 but the 
regulatory mix lacks an effective stick against firms that undertake drug 
changes that are, at best, questionable in terms of their marginal clinical 
benefits.83  
A mild variation of a potential regulatory remedy for this omission could 
simply take the form of an FDA request that brand firms submit comparative 
pre-market drug data that would be relevant to prescriber decisions.84 If the 
data is provided, the FDA would review the study, summarize it, and have the 
information thus revealed added to the drug package insert, a part of the 
drug’s “labeling,” for doctors, patients, and payers to peruse.85 This scheme 
 
 81. See, e.g., In re Carabateas, 345 F.2d 1013, 1017 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (explaining that, 
“[w]hen considering that minor advances in activity are eagerly sought in pharmaceutical 
chemistry, a showing of nine and six times more activity than the most active compound of the 
art is indeed most significant, representing a different order of magnitude, and is proof of 
unobviousness and unexpected beneficial properties in a new compound”). In theory, courts 
deciding antitrust cases might also engage in comparative product analysis, though they rarely do 
so in practice. See supra text accompanying note 29.  
 82. See Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals—Do We Really 
Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 419, 443–70 (2012) (proposing a reduced 
emphasis on patents in setting exclusivity-based incentives for so-called “biologics,” or large-
molecule drugs); see also Daniel Gervais, The Patent Option, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2019) 
(manuscript at 3–4), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266580 (challenging reliance on patents as the 
primary regulatory driver in the pharmaceutical industry); cf. Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without 
Patents: The New Frontier of FDA Regulation for Genetic Materials, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1399, 1454–64 
(2013) (proposing FDA-regulatory instead of patent-based mechanisms for incentivizing certain 
inventions). See generally John R. Thomas, The End of “Patent Medicines”? Thoughts on the Rise of 
Regulatory Exclusivities, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 39 (2015) (contending that FDA-administered 
exclusivities have come to play a bigger role than patent protection in incentivizing 
pharmaceutical innovation).  
 83. See Ian Ayres & Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Sticks: The Limited Case for Penalizing Failures 
to Innovate, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1781, 1789–811 (2015).  
 84. See infra Section V.B.  
 85. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (2018); Labeling Information for Drug Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/DevelopmentResources/Labeling/ 
default.htm (last updated Nov. 18, 2016) (providing informational resources on drug labeling). 
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would thus help create a centralized repository of disclosures of potentially 
high value to the market. In contrast, if no comparative study data is provided, 
the agency would require the appropriate labeling notation, putting the 
relevant audiences on clear notice of this fact (and on alert that a strategic 
product change might be afoot). While perhaps not a particularly powerful 
stick, this approach could still add value: Under the current regime, 
prescribers and patients are often left without adequate data to make 
informed treatment decisions (e.g., whether to adopt a new version of a drug, 
switch back from the modified version to the original as a generic, and so on), 
and payers may likewise be uncertain whether to cover the cheaper off-patent 
version of the drug, the more expensive patented modification, or both.86 
If this solution proves too mild, more significant interventions to 
differentiate between companies that attempt to develop clinically valuable 
drug improvements and those that do not are conceivable. For example, an 
important regulatory benefit afforded to brand owners is the listing of patents 
protecting the FDA-approved drug in the so-called Orange Book.87 Orange Book 
listings give brands certain advantages during patent litigation and can, 
effectively, slow down the generics’ path to market—even if the patents are 
ultimately invalidated.88 This variation of the regulatory solution proposed in 
this Article, and fully developed in Part V, would empower the FDA with 
discretion to deny Orange Book listings to sponsors who fail to provide the 
relevant data to the FDA.89 More so than clear labeling alone, the stick of 
denial of an Orange Book listing should generate incentives for sponsors to 
produce pre-market comparative information and perhaps ultimately lead to 
drug modifications that are more likely to offer added value for at least some 
patients. 
The rest of the Article proceeds in five parts. Parts II through IV set the 
stage for this Article’s proposal for the FDA’s novel regulatory authority to 
induce the generation of comparative drug data from pharmaceutical firms, 
while the proposal itself is laid out in Part V and further discussed in Part VI, 
which addresses objections. Part II describes the federal statutory regime for 
the approval of branded and generic drugs, and also covers state generic 
substitution laws and their role in realizing cost savings associated with generic 
entry. Part III explains the function of patents in incentivizing the 
development of both pioneering and follow-on drugs, provides relevant 
background on patent law, and explains why substantive patent doctrine and 
systemic features of the patent system can lead to incomplete evaluations of 
relative drug product quality as a potential proxy for patentability. Part IV 
 
 86. See infra Part IV. 
 87. See Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,  
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm (last 
updated Oct. 2018) [hereinafter Orange Book]. 
 88. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 30, at 710–11. 
 89. See infra Section V.B.  
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describes various forces that interfere with efficient functioning of 
pharmaceutical markets, enabling strategic product hops driven by secondary 
patenting.  
Focusing on clear labeling, Part V develops two related approaches for 
enlisting the FDA’s expertise to induce pharmaceutical companies to 
generate comparative data between closely related versions of drugs that they 
market. This Part also discusses prior examples of statutory or regulatory 
schemes under which the FDA has engaged in comparative analyses of drugs, 
sets forth mechanisms for implementing this Article’s proposal, and 
catalogues both immediate and downstream benefits of its adoption. Before 
the Article concludes, Part VI considers and answers some objections to the 
expanded role of the FDA in the inducement of comparative drug data 
development.  
II. THE FEDERAL HATCH-WAXMAN REGIME AND STATE-LAW  
GENERIC SUBSTITUTION 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, an 
amendment to the FDCA often referred to simply as the Hatch-Waxman Act,90 
is a statutory scheme for regulating small-molecule drugs under which the 
FDA and the PTO play distinct but interrelated roles. The purpose of the Act 
is to balance incentives for the discovery and development of drugs against 
the goal of making those medicines available to consumers at reasonable 
prices.91 The Act contemplates two types of actors: brand and generic 
manufacturers.92 In short, the Hatch-Waxman Act, in conjunction with the 
Patent Act, provides for exclusive rights for brand companies to market new 
drugs that they develop, while also facilitating the entry of generic equivalents 
of the branded drugs once the exclusivities expire.93  
This general scheme reflects the relative burdens faced by brand and 
generic manufacturers. The brands do the work of identifying promising drug 
targets, synthesizing candidate chemical compounds in useful quantities and 
fully characterizing them, conducting in vitro and in vivo studies as well as 
several phases of human clinical trials to prove the drug’s safety and 
effectiveness by “substantial evidence,”94 engaging in the back-and-forth with 
the FDA in order to secure approval,95 and establishing a market for the drug 
 
 90. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 
§ 101, 98 Stat. 1585, 1585–92 (1984).  
 91. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–15 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647. 
 92. Id. at 19–20. 
 93. Id. at 15–17.  
 94. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2018). See generally DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: 
ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 465–543 (2010) 
(detailing the organizational politics around reviews of new drugs). 
 95. See New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/ 
Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplicat
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through extensive promotion and sampling to doctors and patients.96 The 
task of the generics is simpler: They must make (or contract to have made) 
drug products that are essentially the same as those approved by the FDA and 
marketed by brand companies, while adhering to good manufacturing 
practices and passing certain tests confirming that their product is 
“bioequivalent” to the brand.97 Crucially, generics need not conduct extensive 
clinical trials, and can simply rely on data developed by the brands as evidence 
that the product they are marketing is safe and effective. The difference 
between brands and generics is reflected in the respective monikers of the 
filings that these actors typically make with the FDA: Brands file New Drug 
Applications (“NDAs”), while generics file Abbreviated New Drug Applications 
(“ANDAs”).98 As even these terms suggest, the showings that generics must 
make are significantly less onerous than those of the brands.  
In order to limit generic “free-riding” and thus provide incentives for 
brand companies to innovate, NDA sponsors are entitled to certain benefits. 
Under Hatch-Waxman, they receive FDA-enforced exclusivity for any new 
 
ions/NewDrugApplicationNDA/default.htm (last updated Mar. 29, 2016) (providing an 
overview of the approval process for new drugs); see also Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, 
Effective Patent Life in Pharmaceuticals, 19 INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. 98, 103–04 (2000) (describing the 
FDA regulatory process).  
 96. Chie Hoon Song & Jeung-Whan Han, Patent Cliff and Strategic Switch: Exploring Strategic 
Design Possibilities in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 5 SPRINGERPLUS 692, 699–700 (2016); see also 
Nina Kathleen Stinson, Note, Trademarks and “Look-Alike” Drugs, 15 IND. L. REV. 733, 743–44 n.58 
(1982) (“Because of the nature of research within the drug industry, the innovator manufacturer 
is often the only source of information regarding the uses and precautions, as well as the physical 
and pharmacological properties of a new drug. Therefore, physicians and pharmacists rely heavily 
upon the manufacturers, especially for initial information and clinical studies pertaining to the 
new drug.” (citing DRUG DEVELOPMENT AND MARKETING 124, 182–86 (R. Helms ed., 1975))). 
On the role of trademark law in the drug marketing effort, see Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter 
Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1481–493 
(2002). For further discussion of drug marketing and advertising, see infra Sections IV.B–.C and 
accompanying text.  
 97. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.127 (2018) (setting forth the prerequisites 
for ANDA approval); FDA Ensures Equivalence of Generic Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/emergencypreparedness/bioterrorismanddrugpreparedness/ucm13
4444.htm (last updated Aug. 21, 2015) (explaining that brand-name and generic versions of a 
drug product must be bioequivalent and therapeutically equivalent). Brand and generic 
products, to be sure, need not be exactly chemically equivalent—there is some tolerability in the 
difference in the generic’s composition relative to the brand that would still allow bioequivalence. 
See 21 C.F.R. § 210.3(b)(2), (10); see also Janet Freilich, The Paradox of Legal Equivalents and 
Scientific Equivalence: Reconciling Patent Law’s Doctrine of Equivalents with the FDA’s Bioequivalence 
Requirement, 66 SMU L. REV. 59, 78–87 (2013) (describing cases in which differences between 
brand and generic products, such as variations in inactive ingredients, did not bar a finding of 
bioequivalence). Besides being a requirement for ANDA approval, bioequivalence is critical 
because, along with pharmaceutical equivalence (e.g., same dosing), it is an essential prerequisite 
to therapeutic equivalence—and therefore to generic substitution. See infra notes 123–24 and 
accompanying text. 
 98. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)–(b), with id. § 355(j).  
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chemical entity approved to be marketed as a drug,99 intended largely to serve 
as a backstop in the circumstances when patents are not available.100 During 
this period, which runs five years from the date of NDA approval, the FDA is 
barred from considering ANDAs on drugs containing the new chemical 
entity, and generic manufacturers are thereby prevented from relying on the 
brands’ clinical trial data during this time to obtain approval for their copies 
of the branded drug.101  
Longer exclusivity can be achieved with patent rights, and that aspect of 
the drug-regulation regime constitutes the crux of this Article. In a PTO 
proceeding that is independent from the FDA drug approval process,102 
sponsors may acquire patents covering, for example, chemical compositions 
embodying the newly invented drugs or new methods of using known 
chemicals to treat the indicated health conditions. For various reasons, brands 
apply for patents early in the development and drug approval process, which 
means that the drug is normally marketed for a period of time much shorter 
than the full patent term.103 Although the term of one of the patents 
protecting a drug containing a particular active pharmaceutical ingredient 
can be extended to account for FDA regulatory delays, the extension is 
capped at five years, and in no event can effective patent life be longer than 
14 years from the date of the FDA approval of the NDA.104  
The Hatch-Waxman Act mandates that sponsors submit information 
regarding certain patents covering their approved drugs, which the agency 
then lists in the Orange Book.105 The Orange Book embodies a mechanism that 
constitutes a critical link between patent and FDA-regulatory aspects of 
 
 99. Id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).  
 100. On the significance of these exclusivities, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA 
in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 355–56 (2007); Yaniv Heled, 
Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299, 317–18 (2015). See also Robin Feldman, 
Regulatory Property: The New IP, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 53, 55 (2016) (describing the value of 
regulatory approvals to brand companies); Anna B. Laakmann, A Property Theory of Medical 
Innovation, 56 JURIMETRICS J. 117, 119–21 (2016) (explaining how regulatory property, such as 
data generated in the process of drug approvals, interacts with information dissemination). 
 101. When the underlying patents, if any, are challenged by ANDA applicants, that period is 
shortened to four years. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).  
 102. As noted above, see supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text, there is a statutory 
provision that authorizes the PTO to request information with respect to drugs from the FDA, see 
21 U.S.C. § 372(d), but it has not been used very often, see Darrow, supra note 47, at 402–03. For a 
proposal to increase interagency cooperation in the healthcare arena beyond the PTO, see 
Rachel E. Sachs, Administering Health Innovation, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1991 (2018).  
 103. See infra Part III. 
 104. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(A), (c)(3) (2018); see also infra note 425 and accompanying text 
(discussing the statutory extension provisions in more detail). The standard patent term is twenty 
years from the effective date of the filing of a patent application. Id. § 154(a)(2). On the issue of 
variation in patent term based on various statutory and non-statutory provisions, see Stephanie 
Plamondon Bair, Adjustments, Extensions, Disclaimers, and Continuations: When Do Patent Term 
Adjustments Make Sense?, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 445, 451–68 (2013).  
 105. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); see Orange Book, supra note 87.  
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pharmaceuticals.106 Thus, the Act requires generic manufacturers wishing to 
market a drug under an ANDA to certify to the FDA that either no relevant 
patent information was submitted by the sponsor (Paragraph I) or, for each 
applicable patent, that the patent has expired (Paragraph II), will expire by 
the time the generic aims to market the drug (Paragraph III), or “is invalid or 
will not be infringed by the” commercialization of the generic drug 
(Paragraph IV).107 
For the purposes of this Article, the most interesting paragraph is 
Paragraph IV. A Paragraph IV certification indicates the generic’s wish to 
market its copy of the branded drug product under an ANDA before 
expiration of all the patents listed in the Orange Book as protecting the 
branded drug, which is possible only if the patent claims are invalid or not 
infringed by the ANDA-approved product. The filing of a Paragraph IV 
certification is deemed by statute to be an act of patent infringement that 
allows the parties to initiate a lawsuit in order to litigate the issue of the 
generic’s liability,108 which in turn triggers an automatic 30-month stay against 
the approval of the ANDA.109 If the generic obtains a judgment of invalidity 
or non-infringement of the relevant Orange Book-listed patents, it earns 
permission to market its product before the patents expire.110  
The stakes of patent litigation built into the Hatch-Waxman regime are 
high. A finding of no patent infringement liability allows for generic entry and 
leads to smaller market shares and, typically,111 lowered prices of branded 
drugs, causing significantly reduced profit margins for the sponsor firm.112 
 
 106. On the concept of “linkage” between patents and regulatory drug approvals, see 
generally Ron A. Bouchard et al., Empirical Analysis of Drug Approval-Drug Patenting Linkage for High 
Value Pharmaceuticals, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 174 (2010). 
 107. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV). 
 108. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A). 
 109. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). To be entitled to the 30-month stay, the brand must file 
the infringement lawsuit within 45 days of the generic’s Paragraph IV notice. Id. § 355(b)(3)(C). 
After 30 months, the FDA will approve the generic, though it might still be kept off the market if 
the patent litigation is ongoing. In addition, generic firms have the option to challenge 
patentability of the brand’s patents at the PTAB, which generally makes decisions more quickly 
than the courts. See generally Shepherd, supra note 52 (arguing that the post-grant review process 
at the PTAB conflicts with the Hatch-Waxman scheme). At the PTAB, the preponderance of the 
evidence standard (after a grant of a petition for so-called Inter Partes Review or Post Grant 
Review) is used to determine whether the challenged claims are unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 
325(e). In contrast, issued patents are accorded the presumption of validity in district court 
litigation, and invalidity therefore must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 282(a); 
see Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011). The PTAB, however, has the 
discretion to deny institution of review of an issued patent for any reason, and that decision is 
non-appealable. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(d); Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 
LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1371 (2018). 
 110. The stay is lifted if the litigation concludes before the 30-month period ends. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355 (j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)(aa). 
 111. Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 95. 
 112. See Song & Han, supra note 96.  
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Indeed, a judgment invalidating the Orange Book patents could be financially 
devastating for the firm unless it has other drugs in the pipeline.113 A similar 
result may follow when the patent covering a blockbuster drug expires, a 
phenomenon sometimes described as the “patent cliff.”114  
Moreover, once the generics enter, the brand’s losses are cemented by 
the generic substitution laws mentioned in the Introduction.115 Although 
their details vary by state, the basic aim behind these laws is to have 
pharmacists fill a prescription with a generic even when the doctor prescribes 
the more expensive brand, whether out of habit, loyalty,116 belief that the 
brand is somehow better,117 or for some other reason.118 In many states, 
substitution laws take a permissive form119—in other words, pharmacists may 
fill a prescription for a brand with a generic—but in some states, the switch is 
mandatory unless explicitly overridden by doctor’s orders.120 An analogy 
outside the drug context illustrates just how odd this scheme is: Suppose a 
customer wishes to buy a Softsoap-brand liquid hand soap at CVS and brings 
a bottle of it to the counter, only to have the cashier substitute Softsoap with 
the CVS house brand, Total Home.  
Nonetheless, generic substitution laws are firmly entrenched, and they 
reinforce the intuition that prescription drugs operate in a market that is 
nothing like the market for normal products like liquid hand soap. These laws 
are motivated in part by some peculiar economics of brand-generic 
 
 113. See id.  
 114. See Nathan Jessop, Responding to the Patent Cliff, PHARMTECH.COM (July 1, 2013), http:// 
www.pharmtech.com/responding-patent-cliff. This term can also refer to the phenomenon of a 
number of blockbuster drug patents expiring at nearly the same time. See Samantha DiGrande, 
Second Patent Cliff Lies Ahead for Pharma With $251 Billion in Sales at Risk by 2024, CTR. FOR 
BIOSIMILARS (June 7, 2018), https://www.centerforbiosimilars.com/news/second-patent-cliff-
lies-ahead-for-pharma-with-251-billion-in-sales-at-risk-by-2024.  
 115. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
 116. Ernst R. Berndt & Murray L. Aitken, Brand Loyalty, Generic Entry and Price Competition in 
Pharmaceuticals in the Quarter Century after the 1984 Waxman-Hatch Legislation, 18 INT’L J. ECON. 
BUS. 177, 178 (2011); Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price 
Competition in Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J. L. & ECON. 331, 332–34 (1992).  
 117. Given the requirement of therapeutic equivalence for generic substitution, the belief is 
typically not justified. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. See generally Livio Garattini  
& Katelijne van de Vooren, Safety and Quality of Generic Drugs: A Never Ending Debate Fostered by 
Economic Interests?, 13 APPLIED HEALTH ECON. HEALTH POL’Y S3 (2015) (explaining that the 
Hatch-Waxman Act has made it easier for pharmaceutical manufacturers to make generic drugs 
without reducing quality). 
 118. See infra note 320 and accompanying text (providing examples of studies of patient and 
other pressures on prescribers). 
 119. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-619 (2018) (permitting generic substitution unless the 
prescriber or purchaser states otherwise). 
 120. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 465.025 (2018) (mandating generic substitution unless the 
prescriber states otherwise). 
KARSHEDT_PP_TO_AU (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2019  10:12 AM 
2019]  IMPROVEMENT PATENTS, DRUG MODIFICATIONS, AND THE FDA 1151 
“competition,”121 and reflect the view that it is unrealistic to expect generic 
firms to conduct their own advertising given the commodity-like nature of 
generic drugs and the possibility that other generic entrants might free-ride 
on the efforts of competitor generic firms that decide to advertise. Although 
the ultimate result seems harsh on the sponsor, it does reinforce a result 
contemplated by the Hatch-Waxman scheme—lower drug prices.122 The idea 
is that at the expiration of all of the brand’s valid exclusivities, the innovator 
has received all the reward that it was due, and the public can enjoy cost 
savings from generics.  
Significantly, the states tie pharmacists’ ability to substitute generics for 
brands to the FDA’s determination that the two are “therapeutic equivalents,” 
which is normally the case for brands and generics.123 This standard requires, 
among other things, “identical amounts of the same active drug ingredient in 
the same dosage form and route of administration.”124 One corollary of this 
requirement is that if, for example, the dosing is different between the two 
drug products, they are no longer therapeutically equivalent and substitution 
is therefore not allowed.125 Returning to this Article’s central example of 
extended- versus immediate-release forms of Namenda, the drug 
modification that led to the Actavis antitrust case, one observes that the two 
are not substitutable because of the difference in dosing. IR was indicated for 
a twice-a-day 10-milligram (mg) dose administration (for a 20 mg total of the 
 
 121. See Jianfei J. Guo & Christina M.L. Kelton, Competition Between Brand-Name and Generic 
Drugs, in PHARMACEUTICAL PUBLIC POLICY 181, 186 (Thomas R. Fulda et al. eds., 2016).  
See generally Emily Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition Under the Hatch-
Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245 (2012) (arguing that the notion 
of brand-generic competition under Hatch-Waxman is misconceived).  
 122. Although many states had passed generic substitution laws before the FDCA was 
amended to usher in the current federal brand-generic regime, the role of state law as a 
complement to modern federal drug regulation has been recognized after the amendments. See 
generally ALISON MASSON & ROBERT L. STEINER, FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC SUBSTITUTION AND 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION LAWS 
(1985), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-substitution-prescription-
drug-prices-economic-effects-state-drug-product-selection-laws/massonsteiner.pdf (discussing the 
role of generic substitution laws in realizing cost savings from generics). 
 123. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.  
 124. See Orange Book Preface, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ 
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079068.htm (last updated May 2, 2018). 
 125. But cf. Rai & Richman, supra note 22 (proposing a way around this rule using so-called 
“suitability petitions” at the FDA). Even if the two versions are substitutable under state law 
pursuant to the proposal made by Professors Rai and Richman, however, the problem would 
remain that prescribers, patients, and payers lack information about the difference between the two 
drug products. In addition, physicians might balk at a rule that allows (or, in some states, even 
mandates) their prescriptions to be filled with a drug that, though not proven distinct from the 
earlier version, has a different dosing profile. Although generic substitutions can always be explicitly 
overridden by a physician’s orders, there may be unknown and unpredictable dangers from 
substitutions that would disfavor making them “automatic” unless specifically contraindicated.  
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active drug a day), while XR was indicated for a once-daily 28-mg dose,126 
rendering the two therapeutically distinct under the FDA’s rules.127 The 
product hopping strategy discussed in the Introduction, then, is born of an 
interplay between state and federal drug regulatory regimes—but, as we will 
see in the next Part, is ultimately made possible by patent law. It is to patents, 
then, that this Article now turns. 
III. DRUGS, PATENTS, AND PRODUCT CHANGES  
A. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PATENTS 
  The conventional wisdom has it that patents play a critical role in drug 
development and, more generally, that chemical and pharmaceutical patents 
are the success story of the patent system.128 Because the pharmaceutical 
industry is one that typically requires a high amount in upfront investments, 
a drug maker’s ability to recoup those outlays by charging supracompetitive 
prices made possible by patent exclusivity is critical for preserving incentives 
for pharmaceutical innovation.129 Indeed, because many drug candidates fail 
to make it past the FDA approval process, brand companies’ ability to “cash 
in” on those products that do get through and end up being blockbusters can 
offset the losses associated with drug candidates that are unsuccessful.130 
While the FDA’s regulatory five-year new chemical entity exclusivity serves as 
a backstop that provides some reward when no patent can be obtained,131 by 
many accounts this period may simply be too short to give pharmaceutical 
companies sufficient return on investment132—especially when the particular 
drug discovery effort is expected to demand considerable research and 
development expenditures.133  
 
 126. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 656 & n.32 (2d Cir. 2015).  
 127. See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text (explaining the prerequisites for 
generic substitution). 
 128. See Iain M. Cockburn et al., Patents and the Global Diffusion of New Drugs, 106 AM. ECON. 
REV. 136, 137–39 (2016); Mark Schankerman, How Valuable Is Patent Protection? Estimates by 
Technology Field, 29 RAND J. ECON. 77, 77–79 (1998); see also DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, 
THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 49–50 (2009). 
 129. Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 95, at 98–99. 
 130. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D 
Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 21–22 (2016). 
 131. See Heled, supra note 100, at 339.  
 132. See, e.g., Eric Budish et al., Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence from Cancer 
Clinical Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044, 2045–46 (2015); Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 95, 
at 102; Erika Lietzan, The Drug Innovation Paradox, 83 MO. L. REV. 39, 40–46 (2018). 
 133. See, e.g., Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals, 5 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 849, 851–52 (2002); Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 91, 96–101 (2016); Laura M. McNamee et al., Timelines of Translational Science: From 
Technology Initiation to FDA Approval, 12 PLOS ONE e0177371, May 8, 2017, at 1–3. 
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In many cases, though not all,134 new drugs represent significant advances 
in both science and health care. These products are frequently protected by 
broad patent claims directed to the newly discovered molecules135—though, 
to be sure, such claims are certainly not guaranteed.136 Generally speaking, 
though, patents that do cover new active drug ingredients tend to be fairly 
robust, and their validity is rarely challenged successfully by generics in Hatch-
Waxman litigation.137 Thus, the principal threat to the exclusivity these 
patents provide to brand companies entails the passage of time. On the front 
end, it is time lost in the process of FDA approval, when the patent clock is 
ticking but the product cannot yet be marketed.138 On the back end, it is of 
course patent expiration.139  
Whether, even with statutory extensions, useful term length of brands’ 
“pioneering” patents serves as an adequate incentive in the face of long 
research timelines and regulatory delays is an issue of considerable 
controversy. Indeed, some recent empirical work has shown that the patent 
term is probably too short to offer an adquate reward, particularly for certain 
difficult-to-develop drugs.140 Several commentators have, therefore, proposed 
tying the length of the patent term to R&D expenditures, or at least to the 
amount of time needed to bring a product to market, so as to preserve 
incentives for long-term research in particular.141 In addition, and more 
 
 134. See, e.g., Aidan Hollis, Me-Too Drugs: Is There a Problem? 1–2 (Dec. 13, 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/Me-tooDrugs_Hollis1.pdf.  
 135. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven Sampat, Drug Patents at the Supreme Court, 339 SCI. 
1386, 1386 (2013).  
 136. For example, the chemical compound that functions as the active pharmaceutical 
ingredient is sometimes known, which relegates the brand owner to less powerful patents, such 
as those directed to methods of use. For a well-known example, see generally Burroughs 
Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (upholding the validity of method 
patents directed to treating HIV-AIDS with a drug called AZT). Indeed, Professor Benjamin Roin 
argued that difficulties in obtaining patent protection for drugs that are similar to those already 
known have led to diminished incentives in the areas in which innovations useful for human 
health are likely to be discovered. Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of 
Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 504–05 (2009). 
 137. See Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 51, at 337. 
 138. Shamnad Basheer, The Invention of an Investment Incentive for Pharmaceutical Innovation, 
15 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 305, 309 (2012); Lietzan, supra note 133, at 110; Song & Han, supra 
note 96, at 694. 
 139. Song & Han, supra note 96, at 692–93. 
 140. See Budish et al., supra note 132, at 2060–61. 
 141. See Basheer, supra note 138, at 315–16; Budish et al., supra note 132, at 2045–46; 
Lietzan, supra note 133, at 110–12; Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based 
on Time-to-Market, 61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 729–30 (2014); Mark D. Shtilerman, Pharmaceutical 
Inventions: A Proposal for Risk-Sensitive Rewards, 46 IDEA 337, 364–67 (2006); see also Son Le  
& Neel U. Sukhatme, Risk, Return, and Suboptimal Innovation in Pharmaceuticals 3 (Aug. 10, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/Le%20and%20Sukhatme 
%20Risk%20Return%20and%20Suboptimal%20Innovation%20in%20Pharmaceuticals%208
-10-17.pdf (“[S]cholars and policymakers believe R&D generates positive externalities and 
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closely related to this Article’s proposal, Professors Gregg Bloche, Neel 
Sukhatme, and John Marshall suggested that patent term should be tied to 
the therapeutic value of the underlying drug.142 
But what about patents on follow-on products, such as extended-release 
versions of drugs? Consistent with the incremental nature of the innovation 
these products normally embody, brand companies tend to protect them with 
patents that are narrower than those directed to the pioneering versions. This 
dynamic is captured in the terminology that refers to patents on the original 
drug as “primary” and those on the follow-on as “secondary.” Secondary 
patents, sometimes also referred to as “improvement patents,”143 tend to be 
weaker than primary patents, and empirical research shows that they are 
challenged and invalidated more frequently in litigation.144 Moreover, 
because these patents by definition cover a variation of an already-approved 
drug, the approval of the underlying product generally does not take up 
nearly as much research and development time (and cost) as that of the 
drug’s pioneering form.145 But because it is a foundational principle of patent 
law that the length of the patent term does not vary depending on the patent’s 
“strength” or the nature of the patented innovation,146 even if those attributes 
could be somehow quantifiable, secondary pharmaceutical patents get the 
same term of twenty years from the effective date of the application as all 
 
knowledge spillovers for other firms and society at large, there is concern that R&D might not be 
produced in sufficient quantities.”). 
 142. Gregg Bloche et al., Health Policy’s Gordian Knot: Rethinking Cost Control, HEALTH AFF.: 
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog2017 
0426.059805/full. 
 143. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(contrasting patents on “pioneer inventions” with “improvement patents”); see also In re Braat, 
937 F.2d 589, 593 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing “improvement patents” in the context of the 
obviousness-type double patenting doctrine). On the concept of pioneer patents generally, see 
Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 389–94 (2012).  
 144. See Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 51, at 334, 336–37. But see Christopher M. Holman, 
In Defense of Secondary Pharmaceutical Patents: A Response to the UN’s Guidelines for Pharmaceutical 
Patent Examination, 50 IND. L. REV. 759, 761 (2017) (contending that many secondary patents 
embody valuable pharmaceutical inventions). 
 145. See Himanshu Gupta et al., Patent Protection Strategies, 2 J. PHARM. BIOALLIED SCI. 2, 3–4 
(2010); see also John F. Duffy, A Timing Approach to Patentability, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 343, 
366 (2008) (contending “that the grant of improvement patents to a pioneer patentee may 
present issues different from the canonical situation in which many similarly situated inventors 
are seeking patents conferring immediate market exclusivity”).  
 146. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,  
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 868–84 (1990) (questioning whether this established feature of patent law 
always serves the purposes of innovation policy); see also THOMAS, supra note 64, at 8 (explaining 
that “statutory standards [of patentability] are applied neutrally to each kind of invention, whether 
it may be characterized as an ‘original’ (such as a medication that has never been previously 
approved by the FDA) or an ‘improvement’ (such as a new formulation of a known medication)”). 
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others.147 Also, like primary patents,148 these patents are listed in the Orange 
Book (as covering the follow-on drug) and receive associated FDA-
administered benefits, including both the requirement of a Paragraph IV 
certification if a generic wishes to market the new product before patent 
expiration and, normally, a 30-month stay after the brand-generic litigation 
commences.149 
To be sure, the very division of patents into primary and secondary 
categories is somewhat arbitrary—a patent is a patent, and it does not issue 
from the PTO with an ordinal label.150 In the pharmaceutical space, though, 
a clear pattern of patenting has emerged that makes the distinction 
appropriate as a heuristic matter.151 A broad patent, often containing claims 
to a group of chemical compounds that includes the active ingredient of the 
drug, is followed some years later by a patent with new claims directed to the 
active ingredient mixed with so-called polymeric carriers, tablets containing 
the active ingredient that have certain dissolution rates, specific crystalline 
forms of the active ingredient, and the like.152 Although such claims can face 
an uphill battle at the PTO, brand companies devote significant resources to 
their prosecution and often overcome the initial rounds of rejections by 
patent examiners to obtain allowance. The issuance of the new patents is, in 
 
 147. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018). Such patents, to be sure, do not qualify for regulatory 
delay extensions under 35 U.S.C. § 156. See also infra note 435 and accompanying text (using this 
feature of the statute as an example of statutory “discrimination” between different patent types).  
 148. Although certain types of patents that might be described as secondary, such as those 
covering metabolites, cannot be listed in the Orange Book, there is no general prohibition against 
the listing of secondary patents. See infra notes 451–52 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. However, if the patent issues and is 
asserted after the ANDA has already been approved, then a 30-month stay may not be granted. 
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (covering only ANDAs submitted “for a drug claimed in a patent or 
the use of which is claimed in a patent”); cf. Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC, 12 Civ. 
8115 (TPG), 2016 WL 1732751, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2016) (additional docket numbers 
omitted) (explaining the significance of the effective date of the ANDA relative to the patent 
issuance date for purposes of relief under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) in Hatch-Waxman cases), aff’d 
on other grounds sub nom. Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 731 F. App’x 962, 967 n.4 
(Fed. Cir.) (nonprecedential), vacated in part on other grounds, 729 F. App’x 936, 937 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (nonprecedential).  
 150. See generally Christopher M. Holman et al., Patentability Standards for Follow-On 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 37 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 131 (2018) (arguing that patent law should 
not treat follow-on pharmaceutical innovations in an unfavorable manner). But cf. Dmitry 
Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56 B.C. L. REV. 949, 1021–24 (2015) 
(proposing a limited patent right for certain inventions that may not be patentable at all under 
current law).  
 151. See Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 135, at 1386. The FDA, too, implicitly recognizes 
the difference between primary and secondary products via NDA classification codes. See infra 
notes 443–44 and accompanying text. 
 152. See generally Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug? 
Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299 
(2010) (discussing the role that patents play in the development of pharmaceutical drugs and 
the trend of an increasing number of patents per drug). 
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turn, sometimes accompanied by a strategic product hop. This pattern has 
appeared time and again: Even though the term “product hopping” was 
coined by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp in the previous decade,153 Dr. 
Kessler expressed concerns about the practice in the 1990s.154  
For a concrete example of the primary-secondary patent dynamic, 
though one that could not be fairly characterized as a strategic product hop 
because the modification resulted in a provably better product,155 let us 
consider a “simple” patent claim that appeared in an actual secondary patent: 
“A sustained release formulation comprising a gelling agent and 11-[4-[2-(2-
hydroxyethoxy)ethyl]-1-piperazinyl]dibenzo-[b,f] [1,4]thiazepine or a 
pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, together with one or more 
pharmaceutically acceptable excipients.”156 This claim was representative of 
those asserted in AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals v. Anchen Pharmaceuticals, a case 
to which I will return in the next Section.157 The phrase of particular note in 
this claim is “a gelling agent,” the addition of which constitutes one of the 
reasons that it is patentable. The gelling agent makes it possible for the drug 
containing the active chemical ingredient quetiapine, a member of the so-
called “thiazepine” class of chemicals, to function as a “sustained,” i.e., 
extended, release formulation.158 In contrast, the corresponding primary 
patent was much broader: It covered the quetiapine recited in the secondary 
patent as well as related thiazepine compounds, but without the gelling agent, 
and it supported exclusivity for the marketing of immediate-release 
quetiapine.159  
In patent terminology, the two patents have a “genus-species” 
relationship,160 whereby the subject matter claimed in the narrower, 
secondary “gelling agent” patent is a “species” of the various embodiments 
encompassed by the broader, primary “genus” patent claims lacking the 
“gelling agent” limitation. Significantly, the extended-release combination of 
quetiapine and the gelling agent is covered by both the primary and the 
secondary patent belonging to the sponsor. Therefore, competitors are 
 
 153. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 15.03; see Alan Devlin, Exclusionary Strategies in the 
Hatch-Waxman Context, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 631, 658. 
 154. Kessler, supra note 68, at 437 (“What seems to be driving many corporate decisions to develop 
[extended-release forms of drugs], however, is not convenience or compliance but economics.”). 
 155. See infra notes 173–76, 217–23 and accompanying text (explaining the advantages of 
Seroquel XR over IR).  
 156. U.S. Patent No. 5,948,437 col. 14 ll. 56–60 (filed May 28, 1997). 
 157. See AstraZeneca Pharm. LP v. Anchen Pharm., Inc., No. 10-cv-1835 (JAP)(TJB), 2012 
WL 1065458, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2012) (additional docket numbers omitted), aff’d per curiam, 
498 F. App’x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 158. Id. at *4–8. 
 159. See id. at *55. 
 160. See, e.g., Dmitry Karshtedt, Limits on Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions: Process Elements and 
Biotechnology’s Compliance with the Enablement Requirement, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 109, 127–33 
(2011) (describing genus-species dynamics in pharmaceutical patent claims).  
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prevented from marketing both the XR version and the IR version of the 
quetiapine drug during the life of the first patent.161 After the first patent 
expires, the competitors can market the IR—though not XR,162 unless the 
second patent is invalidated or adjudged non-infringed. 
This story is complicated somewhat by a subsection of the Patent Act that 
relieves firms from infringement liability for research “solely for uses 
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under 
a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs,”163 such 
as compliance with the FDCA required to receive FDA approval.164 This 
provision, by its terms, can pertain to research designed to gain approval of a 
new (and perhaps improved) version of a branded pioneering drug by a 
company other than that drug’s sponsor. Although this research exemption 
does not permit a competitor to actually market a drug product covered by 
someone else’s patent,165 the competitor is nonetheless allowed to obtain its 
own secondary patents166 and use them to support the marketing of the 
reformulated product when the primary patents expire167—as long as the 
 
 161. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 146, at 860–68 (discussing the concept of so-called 
“blocking” patents). See generally Douglas L. Rogers, Double Patenting: Follow-On Pharmaceutical 
Patents that Suppress Competition, 14 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 317 (2017) (questioning the 
policy of allowing such patents).  
 162. To be sure, a generic is sometimes able to “design around” the secondary patent and 
make a product that is bioequivalent to the brand (and ultimately substitutable), but not 
infringing. See generally Freilich, supra note 97 (discussing the prospects for designing around the 
brand’s patent claims while still maintaining equivalence); see also Holman et al., supra note 150, 
at 137–38 (explaining that narrow claims may allow for non-infringing alternative formulations). 
Nonetheless, given the stringent requirements for therapeutic equivalence, such a strategy is 
often unsuccessful unless the brand’s secondary patent claims are badly drafted—and even then, 
the patentee might still succeed proving infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., 
Intendis GmbH v. Glenmark Pharm. Inc., USA, 822 F.3d 1355, 1358–63 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Still 
another possible way out for a follow-on researcher is the filing of a special NDA under a 
§ 505(b)(2) application, which is something of a hybrid between an ANDA and an NDA. Such 
an application can, for example, allow the applicant to seek approval of a drug with a strength 
different from that of the original drug with less clinical trial data than a full NDA. See 21 U.S.C.  
§ 355(b)(2) (2018). Still, a well-drafted patent claim combined with a product hopping strategy can 
limit the marketing of drugs approved under § 505(b)(2) in the same way that such a claim can limit 
the marketing of drugs under ANDAs. See Chelsea E. Ott, Comment, The Evolution of Pharmaceutical 
Regulatory Gaming Practices, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 849, 851–54 (2017); see also supra note 97 and 
accompanying text (introducing the concept of bioequivalence as it relates to patent infringement). 
 163. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
 164. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005); Classen 
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that 
the “[statutory] purpose of § 271(e)(1) [is] to facilitate market entry upon patent expiration”). 
 165. See Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA Inc., 809 F.3d 610, 621 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
 166. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Elan Pharm., Inc., 786 F.3d 892, 898 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (“Filing a patent application is generally not an infringement of a patent. It is not the 
making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing of an invention.”).  
 167. But cf. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., 903 F.3d 1310, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (“[S]uch a potential innovator might or might not be willing to research in the blocked 
space without a license to a blocking patent—even if the research itself is within the safe harbor 
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sponsor of the original drug does not itself acquire secondary patents 
covering that particular modification. 
Typically, however, the original drug’s sponsor will control both the 
pioneering drug and its improvements along with the corresponding 
patents.168 Putting to one side the role of the dominant primary patent, this 
state of affairs likely stems from the fact that the discoverer of the new active 
chemical ingredient underlying the drug normally has an immense head start 
over others. In particular, the sponsor is often in possession of a great deal of 
know-how and data that remains undisclosed even as the relevant patent 
applications and other descriptions of the product, such as those in scientific 
articles, become public.169 Accordingly, potential competitors face formidable 
obstacles in developing modifications that would threaten the original 
sponsor’s market position with respect to follow-on products.170 This Article’s 
proposal does not concern the scenario in which a competitor develops the 
modification171—by definition, this cannot be a product hop. Instead, the 
examples discussed in the Article, including Asacol, Namenda, and Seroquel, 
all involve the more typical set of facts in which the pioneer and the follow-on 
are marketed by the same firm or by closely related entities, such as wholly-
owned subsidiaries.172  
 
provided by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)—and wait until it has already developed and patented its 
aimed-at improvement to negotiate for a cross-license with the blocking patent’s owner to share 
the profits from the improvement.”); see also id. at 1340–41 (explaining that blocking patents can 
deter competitor research). 
 168. See, e.g., Simone Ghislandi, Product Hopping and Pre-emptive Cannibalization in 
Pharmaceuticals 1 (Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi Econpubblica Centre for Research on 
the Public Sector, Working Paper No. 169), http://www.econpubblica.unibocconi.it/files/WP_ 
169_2012.pdf (concluding that follow-on product changes take place “mainly between products 
of the same firm”); cf. Acorda, 903 F.3d at 1341 & n.18 (accepting this intuition). Professor 
Jonathan Darrow has written about a notable exception. Jonathan J. Darrow, The Patentability of 
Enantiomers: Implications for the Pharmaceutical Industry, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, at *13 
(providing the example of Sepracor, a company specializing in the development of so-called 
“enantiomer” forms of drugs made by others); see also infra notes 445–49 and accompanying text 
(discussing enantiomers).  
 169. See W. Nicholson Price II, Expired Patents, Trade Secrets, and Stymied Competition, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1611, 1620–32 (2017) (noting this dynamic and explaining why it can be 
particularly salient in the pharmaceutical industry); see also W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating 
Secrecy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1769, 1799–802 (2016) (arguing that secrecy in the brand’s 
manufacturing methods may unduly slow down generic entry); cf. W. Nicholson Price II & Arti 
K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023 (2016) 
(discussing similar issues with the manufacturing of so-called “biologic” drugs). 
 170. See infra Section V.B (explaining the impact of this feature of the market on advertising).  
 171. For another recent counterexample of sorts, see Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Price,  
869 F.3d 987, 994–95 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (addressing a scenario in which another firm developed an 
alternative version of a drug in spite of a regulatory-exclusivity protection in place for the brand). 
 172. As to the question of the standard for determining when a firm is sufficiently related to 
the sponsor of the prior product for the “same firm” regime to apply, the FDA has faced a similar 
issue in the interpretation of the “same sponsor” provision in the Biologics Price Competition 
and Innovation Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k) (2018); see also Comment Letter from Jeffrey S. Peters, 
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In the case of Seroquel, immediate-release quetiapine was a novel drug 
type that turned out to be particularly effective for bipolar depression, as well 
as for other conditions like schizophrenia and psychosis.173 The version with 
the gelling agent, as the claim indicates, is the “sustained release,” otherwise 
described as “extended-release,” form of quetiapine.174 The extended-release 
patent from which the representative claim above is drawn expired in 2017, 
while the pioneering patent on quetiapine expired in 2012.175 The courts 
have upheld the validity of the secondary, Seroquel XR patent based partly on 
evidence that the switch from IR to XR has led to certain therapeutic 
improvements.176 To understand the relevance of such information on 
patentability—and to draw a further connection between secondary patents 
and the product hopping phenomenon—some background on the relevant 
aspects of substantive patent law is necessary.  
B. PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTING AND PRODUCT CHANGES 
1. The Sponsor’s Non-Obviousness Challenge and “Unexpected Results” 
Before returning to the substantive provision of the Patent Act of 
principal relevance to secondary patenting, it is useful to briefly review patent 
prosecution procedures. To obtain patent rights, inventors—or, more 
commonly, the firms those inventors work for—begin by filing patent 
applications with the PTO.177 An application contains one or more claims, 
 
Deputy Gen. Counsel, Health Biotech. Indus. Org., to Div. of Dockets Mgmt. (HFA-305), Food 
& Drug Admin. 13 (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/BIO%20Comment% 
20Letter%20Biological%20Product%20Reference%20Product%20Exclusivity%2010%2006%
202014.pdf (analyzing FDA proposals for changes in licensure exclusivity determinations); infra 
notes 488–89 and accompanying text. This issue should be resolvable under general corporate 
law principles. For example, one of the firms involved in the marketing of the new form of 
Namenda, Actavis, now owns the firm that marketed the prior version, Forest, as a wholly owned 
subsidiary. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 2015). Such 
a relationship should be sufficiently close for the owner of the drug’s new version to qualify as 
the “same sponsor.”  
 173. See Michael E. Thase, Quetiapine Monotherapy for Bipolar Depression, 4 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC 
DISEASE & TREATMENT 21, 22–23 (2008). 
 174. See generally Approval Letter from Thomas Laughren, Dir., Div. of Psychiatry Prods., Food 
& Drug Admin., to Gerald Limp, Dir., Regulatory Affairs, AstraZeneca Pharm. LP (May 17, 2007), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2007/022047Orig1s000Approv.pdf (granting 
FDA approval for AstraZeneca’s drug Seroquel XR). See U.S. Patent No. 5,948,437 col. 14 l. 56 
(filed May 28, 1997). 
 175. See AstraZeneca Pharm. LP v. Anchen Pharm., Inc., Nos. 10-cv-1835 (JAP)(TJB), 2012 
WL 1065458, at *4, *55 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2012) (additional docket numbers omitted), aff’d per 
curiam, 498 F. App’x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  
 176. See generally id. (noting physician testimony that XR improved patients’ course of treatment 
in comparison to IR). For a comparative study in the academic literature, see generally Lars Eriksson 
et al., Use of Quetiapine XR and Quetiapine IR in Clinical Practice for Hospitalized Patients with Schizophrenia: 
A Retrospective Study, 2 THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES IN PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 217 (2012). 
 177. CHRIS P. MILLER & MARK J. EVANS, THE CHEMIST’S COMPANION GUIDE TO PATENT LAW 
21 (2010). 
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such as the illustrative “gelling agent plus quetiapine” claim above, desired by 
the applicant.178 A patent examiner assesses the claims for compliance with 
the various requirements of patentability, typically a time-consuming process 
that involves multiple iterations of arguments between the applicant and the 
examiner.179 Frequently, the claims as filed in their initial form are amended 
during this process.180 The amendments usually narrow the claims, often 
enabling the applicant to overcome the examiner’s objections to 
patentability.181 If the patent issues, the brand can use it to keep generics out 
until judicial invalidation (or adjudication of non-infringement), a 
determination of unpatentability in a PTO post-issuance review, or 
expiration.182 
Of the requirements of patentability, the one most difficult to overcome 
for the drug sponsor seeking to acquire a secondary patent is usually non-
obviousness, codified in 35 U.S.C. § 103. While the novelty requirement of 
§ 102 prohibits patents on subject matter that has become part of the public 
domain,183 non-obviousness under § 103 essentially bars patents on claims 
that, although not identically disclosed by prior publications or activities, are 
so close to what is already known184—the universe of references sometimes 
collectively described as “the prior art”—as to be within the public’s grasp.185 
In relevant part, this section states: 
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, 
notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically 
disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the 
claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed 
invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective 
filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill 
in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.186 
 
 178. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2018). 
 179. MILLER & EVANS, supra note 177, at 37–46. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text. 
 183. 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 184. Id. § 103. 
 185. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989). The policy 
of the non-obviousness requirement has sometimes been cast in terms of economic inducement 
embodied in the grant of a patent. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 42; Edmund W. Kitch, 
Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 301 (“[A] patent 
should not be granted for an innovation unless the innovation would have been unlikely to have 
been developed absent the prospect of a patent.”). Nonetheless, some authorities have 
maintained that the inducement standard “in most individual cases would not be administrable.” 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND 
PATENT LAW AND POLICY 11 (2003). 
 186. 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
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Because the term “obvious” is not self-defining, the structure of the § 103 
inquiry had to be developed by courts. Three of the four so-called Graham 
factors that guide analysis of patentability under § 103, set forth in the 
foundational Supreme Court case of Graham v. John Deere Co., are “the scope 
and content of the prior art[,] . . . differences between the prior art and the 
claims at issue[,] . . . and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.”187 The 
ultimate question is whether, given those differences, the fictitious “person 
having ordinary skill in the pertinent art” would readily bridge them,188 either 
by combining multiple prior art references or modifying a reference to arrive 
at the claimed invention. Further glosses by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court with exclusive jurisdiction over 
patent appeals, have established that those challenging claims on obviousness 
grounds must typically show some motivation to combine or modify the 
relevant prior art to make the claimed invention,189 and also demonstrate that 
the person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a reasonable 
expectation of success” in discovering the patented subject matter at the time 
the application was filed.190  
In addition, as the fourth Graham factor, decision-makers evaluating 
patentability under § 103 consider “[s]uch secondary considerations as 
commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others”191 and 
other pieces of evidence, such as industry praise and licensing,192 that are also 
sometimes collectively called “objective indicia of nonobviousness.”193 
Because, at the time when a patent application is pending before the PTO, a 
commercial product might not yet exist, such evidence typically plays a bigger 
role during litigation as opposed to prosecution.194 In the Seroquel case, for 
 
 187. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
 188. See id. at 14. 
 189. See Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Prods. Inc., 876 F.3d 1350, 1359–61 
(Fed. Cir. 2017); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (“Often, it will 
be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of 
demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background 
knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art, all in order to determine 
whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by 
the patent at issue.”).  
 190. See In re Stepan Co., 868 F.3d 1342, 1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Intelligent Bio-
Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
 191. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. See generally Jonathan J. Darrow, Secondary Considerations: A 
Structured Framework for Patent Analysis, 74 ALB. L. REV. 47 (2010–11) (arguing that the secondary 
considerations doctrine is underdeveloped and providing a more robust framework for deploying 
this Graham factor). 
 192. See Natalie A. Thomas, Note, Secondary Considerations in Nonobviousness Analysis: The Use 
of Objective Indicia Following KSR v. Teleflex, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2076–77 n.31 (2011). 
 193. In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 
1063, 1076 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1311 
(Fed. Cir. 2006)); see Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538–40 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 194. See Reilly, supra note 48, at 577.  
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example, proof of Seroquel XR’s commercial success and the long-felt need 
for effective treatments of bipolar depression were significant factors in 
convincing the trial court to uphold the validity of the XR patent.195 
Secondary considerations evidence can generally only help the patentee,196 
although the patentee must show some connection between the evidence and 
the patented invention to establish its relevance to a claim’s non-
obviousness.197 For example, if the commercial success of the claimed 
invention’s embodiments is attributable mainly to marketing rather than to 
the technical quality of the improvement over the prior art, then it may not 
help the applicant show that the claims are non-obvious.198 
The admissibility of secondary considerations, which reflect the 
experiences of pharmaceutical market participants, is somewhat in tension 
with the oft-stated principle that patent law is not concerned with the creation 
of inventions that work better than those already on the market.199 In 
particular, case law interpreting the utility requirement of patentability, 
codified in § 101, includes forceful statements like “[a]ll that the law requires 
is, that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, 
good policy, or sound morals of society. . . . If it be not extensively useful, it 
will silently sink into contempt and disregard.”200 When it comes to the non-
obviousness requirement, however, while some decisions hold that the case 
for obviousness based on the first three Graham factors can overwhelm 
secondary considerations,201 the latter can sometimes still make a 
 
 195. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP v. Anchen Pharm., Inc., Nos. 10-cv-1835 (JAP)(TJB), 2012 WL 
1065458, at *48–55 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2012) (additional docket numbers omitted), aff’d per curiam, 
498 F. App’x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 196. The one secondary consideration that can help the defendant is near-simultaneous 
invention of the claim’s subject matter by multiple inventors. See, e.g., Geo M. Martin Co. v. 
Alliance Mach. Sys. Int’l LLC, 618 F.3d 1294, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 197. See ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1220–22 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 198. See, e.g., In re Mageli, 470 F.2d 1380, 1384 (C.C.P.A. 1973); see also Geo M. Martin,  
618 F.3d at 1305 (“Industry praise must also be linked to the patented invention.” (citing Power-
One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010))); Ormco Corp., 463 F.3d 
at 1311–13 (“[I]f the feature that creates the commercial success was known in the prior art, the 
success is not pertinent.”); Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic 
Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 860–61 (1988). 
 199. See generally Price, supra note 41 (explaining that the law generally does not require a 
better product for patentability); see also Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 6, at 181 (“The granting 
of a patent by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office . . . certainly does not guarantee, or even 
suggest, that the reformulated product is superior in any way to existing products.”). 
 200. See Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568) (Story, Circuit 
Justice); see also MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 41, at 201 (outlining the limited role of the utility 
requirement). For a proposal for a re-invigorated “commercial utility” requirement, see Michael 
Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195, 1240–41. But cf. Sean B. Seymore, Making 
Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1048–50 (2014) (contending that the utility requirement, 
as currently enforced, has been applied in a highly subjective manner and should be eliminated). 
 201. See, e.g., Cubist Pharm., Inc. v. Hospira, Inc., 805 F.3d 1112, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The 
court weighed the secondary consideration evidence against the other evidence of obviousness 
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considerable difference in bolstering the patentee’s case.202 Thus, proponents 
of patentability often introduce real-world data, which are often purported to 
speak to the objective qualities of the claimed invention in contradistinction 
to what came before, in order to develop secondary considerations in 
litigation or prosecution.203 
Another way such data can come in is under the doctrine of unexpected 
results, which is of particular significance to this Article’s proposal for eliciting 
comparative drug information.204 This doctrine, which occupies the murky 
space in the law of § 103 between the first three Graham factors and secondary 
considerations,205 holds that the case for patentability is strengthened when 
 
and concluded that the secondary consideration evidence was not sufficiently strong to overcome 
the showing of obviousness arising from an analysis of the prior art.”); Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 
480 F.3d 1348, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Although secondary considerations must be taken into 
account, they do not necessarily control the obviousness conclusion.”); see also Am. Innotek, Inc. 
v. United States, 706 F. App’x 686, 686–87 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential) (citing Apple Inc. 
v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc)) (holding that secondary 
considerations must be considered in every case where relevant but can be overcome by other 
Graham factors).  
 202. See, e.g., Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., 724 F.3d 1343, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Because 
evidence pertaining to objective considerations raises genuine issues of material fact, the district 
court’s decision [to grant summary judgment that the asserted claims would have been obvious] 
is reversed as to all the asserted claims in this case.”).  
 203. See Apple, 839 F.3d at 1048–49, 1052–57; see also Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. 
Glenmark Pharm. Inc., 748 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The jury could reasonably have 
relied on the testimony of the Plaintiffs’ expert, that persons skilled in the art in 1986 would not 
have predicted the longer-lasting hypertension control demonstrated by the double-ring structures 
of quinapril and trandolapril in combination with calcium antagonists, because of the widespread 
belief that double-ring inhibitors would not fit the pocket structure of the [biological target].”). 
 204. See, e.g., Prometheus Labs., Inc. v Roxane Labs., Inc., 805 F.3d 1092, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (“The genus-species distinction may have particular relevance in the field of personalized 
medicine, where, for example, a particular treatment may be effective with respect to one subset 
of patients and ineffective (and even harmful) to another subset of patients. Singling out a 
particular subset of patients for treatment (for example, patients with a particular gene) may 
reflect a new and useful invention that is patent eligible despite the existence of prior art or a 
prior art patent disclosing the treatment method to patients generally. An obviousness rejection 
likely would not be appropriate where the new patient subset displayed unexpected results.” 
(citation omitted)); see also Sanofi v. Watson Labs., Inc., 875 F.3d 636, 647–50 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
(upholding non-obviousness of patent claims based on the lack of a reasonable expectation of 
success of the drug in the claimed populations).  
 205. See Sanofi-Aventis, 748 F.3d at 1360–61 (appearing to treat unexpected results as part of 
the motivation inquiry); see also Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 748 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014) (discussing unexpected results without mentioning “secondary considerations” or 
“objective indicia”); Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293, 1301–03 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (similar); cf. In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (“[A] compound 
and all of its properties are inseparable . . . .”). But see Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharm. 
USA, Inc., 752 F.3d 967, 976–77 (Fed. Cir.) (calling unexpected results “a secondary 
consideration”), reh’g en banc denied, 769 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (mem.); Transocean 
Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1351–53 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (similar); Pfizer, 480 F.3d at 1372 (similar); see also Millennium Pharm., Inc. v. Sandoz 
Inc., 862 F.3d 1356, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (referring to “evidence of objective indicia” of 
unexpected results). The literature has noted this tension. Compare Frederick G. Vogt, Comment, 
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“the claimed invention exhibits some superior property or advantage that a 
person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have found surprising or 
unexpected.”206 Such evidence, presumably,207 can counter an assertion that 
 
Unexpected Results: The Current Status of Obviousness Determinations for Pharmaceutical and 
Biotechnology Patents, 29 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 305, 318 (2010) (“Judge Rader noted that 
unexpected results serve as ‘independent evidence of nonobviousness[,]’ going beyond just a 
secondary or confirmatory consideration.” (quoting Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., 
Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008))), with id. at 308 (noting that unexpected results have 
been classified as “secondary factors”), and Thomas, supra note 192, at 2095–96 (noting that 
“[t]he classification of unexpected-results evidence as a secondary consideration existed prior to 
KSR and has continued since then” and explaining that this approach has been criticized). It is 
notable that a Federal Circuit judge sitting by designation as a trial judge in a high-profile case 
focused on § 103 issues declined to address whether unexpected results are generally a part of 
the inquiry under the first three Graham factors or the fourth, suggesting that the issue is 
unsettled. See Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4803941, 
at *47 n.37 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) (Bryson, J.) (“Allergan characterizes ‘unexpected results’ 
as a secondary consideration. In the Court’s view, however, in a case such as this one that factor 
is more appropriately viewed not as a secondary consideration, but as part of the initial stage of 
the obviousness analysis. For that reason, the Court has analyzed the unexpected results 
argument in part I.A., rather than as one of the objective considerations discussed in part  
I.B. . . . [R]egardless of how the unexpected results issue is characterized, the Court has 
considered the evidence on that issue, as well as the evidence of the (other) objective indicia of 
nonobviousness, together with all of the other evidence pertaining to the obviousness inquiry, as 
the Federal Circuit has instructed.” (citation omitted)), aff’d per curiam, 742 F. App’x 511 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018); see also Bristol-Myers Squibb, 769 F.3d at 1352–59 (Taranto, J., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc) (pointing out tensions in the Federal Circuit’s approaches to the doctrine 
of unexpected results and other aspects of the non-obviousness inquiry and calling for en banc 
action to resolve them).  
 206. In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1995). But cf. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-
Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 960 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Finding that an invention is an 
‘improvement’ is not a prerequisite to patentability. It is possible for an invention to be less 
effective than existing devices but nevertheless meet the statutory criteria for patentability.”). 
 207. But cf. Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Patent Law and the Sociology of Innovation, 2013 WIS. L. 
REV. 813, 851–54, 870–72 (questioning the evidentiary value of unexpected results discovered 
after filing with respect to the question of motivation in the non-obviousness inquiry); id. at 854 
(“[T]he fact that one of these enantiomers was unexpectedly found to have none of the toxic 
effects with all the therapeutic effects—while unexpected—would likely have been noticed by any 
independent scientist pursuing this research program. In addition, the low likelihood of finding 
one enantiomer with all the therapeutic benefits and none of the toxic effects did not ex ante 
discourage the line of research that would attempt separation of the enantiomers. In other words, 
the label ‘unexpected results’ in this case does not serve as a proxy for identifying a risky line of 
research that requires patent inducement.”). See generally Mark A. Lemley, Expecting the Unexpected, 
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1369 (2017) (maintaining that, when unexpected results discovered 
after filing conflict with the conclusion that the claimed invention would have been obvious to 
try, the former should give way, and the claims should be held obvious); Douglas L. Rogers, 
Obvious Confusion Over Properties Discovered After a Patent Application, 43 AIPLA Q.J. 489 (2015) 
(exploring this problem in depth). The Federal Circuit currently accepts ex-post unexpected 
results to show non-obviousness. See, e.g., Sanofi-Aventis, 748 F.3d at 1360–61; see also Bristol-Myers 
Squibb, 769 F.3d at 1340–41 (Dyk, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing for a 
contrary rule). One treatise has usefully explained the dual evidentiary function of unexpected 
results. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 77 (3d ed. 
2015) (“The relevance of evidence of comparative utility is in part direct and in part inferential. 
It is direct that the new function is part of the inventive concept, the ‘subject matter as a whole,’ 
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an ordinary artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in 
developing a particular drug modification, such as a new formulation.208 
According to one commentator, unexpected results are “the most prevalent 
form of evidence of nonobviousness relied on by patent applicants during 
patent examination.”209 In one case, though affirming the PTO’s rejection of 
a claim to a modification of a prior art chemical compound as obvious, the 
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals210 explained:  
When considering that minor advances in activity are eagerly sought 
in pharmaceutical chemistry, a showing of nine and six times more 
activity than the most active compound of the art is indeed most 
significant, representing a different order of magnitude, and is proof 
of unobviousness and unexpected beneficial properties in a new 
compound.211 
 
which must be obvious under Section 103. It is inferential in the sense that the prior art’s failure 
to reveal the claimed invention despite its advantageous qualities tends to confirm that it was 
unexpected and unobvious. It would be contrary to normal economic incentives for obvious, 
advantageous subject matter to remain dormant.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Allergan, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 796 F.3d 1293, 1306–07 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 209. Harris A. Pitlick, Some Thoughts About Unexpected Results Jurisprudence, 86 J. PAT.  
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 169, 169 (2004). Thus, while the Patent Act does not require 
superiority of the claimed invention to prior products for patentability, Ryco, Inc., v. Ag-Bag 
Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1988), in practice the evidence of an unexpectedly 
improved product can be critical in overcoming the § 103 hurdle. This evidence is likely to be 
especially salient in secondary-patent cases, when there may be a strong case for motivation to make 
the claimed formulation that could be potentially overcome with unexpected results. See, e.g., 
Prometheus Labs., 805 F.3d at 1098 (explaining that unexpected results in new patient populations 
can bolster the case for non-obviousness); Senju Pharm. Co., v. Lupin Ltd., 780 F.3d 1337, 1351–53 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (analyzing an argument that a new formulation provides an unexpected result); 
Hoffman-La Roche, 748 F.3d at 1334 (analyzing an argument that a new dosage provides an 
unexpected result); see also Vogt, supra note 205, at 314–22 (providing several other examples).  
 210. Decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are binding precedent on the 
Federal Circuit. See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc). 
 211. In re Carabateas, 345 F.2d 1013, 1017 (C.C.P.A. 1965). Interestingly, the court also 
noted:  
When a new compound so closely related to a prior art compound as to be 
structurally obvious is sought to be patented based on the alleged greater 
effectiveness of the new compound for the same purpose as the old compound, clear 
and convincing evidence of substantially greater effectiveness is needed. 
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). The court held that, while such evidence was present 
in the record, it was overcome by evidence of increased analgesic activity of other prior art 
compounds that have undergone a similar modification to the compounds claimed by the 
applicant. Id. at 1018; see also In re May, 574 F.2d 1082, 1092–95 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (concluding 
that unexpected non-addictive properties of an analgesic render the claims non-obvious). To be 
sure, an assertion of unexpected results does not always relate to comparative clinical utility. For 
a discussion of unexpected results based on increased chemical stability and other 
manufacturing-type improvements, see infra text accompanying notes 451–53.  
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Notably, a showing of unexpected results must be made in a comparison 
with “the closest single prior art reference.”212 In a typical secondary-patent 
case raising the possibility of product hopping, the closest prior art against 
the desired claims will often constitute the patentee’s own disclosures related 
to the subject matter of the primary patent, if not the primary patent itself.213 
Intimate familiarity with the prior art that it must overcome in order to obtain 
the secondary patent, and the concomitant ability to shape the presentation 
of any relevant comparative information,214 likely gives the sponsor a 
significant leg up in the process215—and may yet be another reason that 
competition for the development of follow-on drug versions is rarely 
observed.216 The challenge of overcoming one’s own prior art was, indeed, 
the general setting for both Seroquel and Namenda extended-release patents, 
but there are important contrasts between the two sets of product changes in 
terms what data was introduced before the decision-maker in order to develop 
unexpected results. I discuss the Seroquel example in the paragraphs that 
follow and focus on Namenda in the next Section.   
In the Seroquel case, AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals v. Anchen 
Pharmaceuticals, the district court began the analysis of the validity of the XR 
claims under § 103 by determining that the defendants put on fairly weak 
evidence of motivation to make the claimed “gelling agent” formulation.217 
Furthermore, it noted that there were general doubts in the literature that 
 
 212. In re Merchant, 575 F.2d 865, 868–69 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
 213. See generally Rogers, supra note 161 (questioning the legal bases for granting certain 
kinds of secondary patents).  
 214. Cf. Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions, 
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 1010 (2008) (“Under the time and evidentiary constraints the PTO 
faces, examiners may have no choice but to accept . . . affidavits uncritically. This is unfortunate. 
Because these affidavits will not be subject to cross-examination or to rebuttal by an expert proffered 
by an opponent, they will frequently prove to be unreliable evidence, and if they are unrebuttable 
they will make it fairly easy for applicants to establish nonobviousness.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 215. See Vandana Prajapati & Harish Dureja, Product Lifecycle Management in Pharmaceuticals, 
12 J. MED. MARKETING 150, 150 (2012) (“Franchise can be sustained if brand equity (and 
prescriptions) can be transferred to a follow-on or derivative product, even a reformulation or 
new delivery system. This is generally done through secondary patents or second generation 
patent.”). See generally Michael Enzo Furrow, Pharmaceutical Patent Life-Cycle Management After KSR 
v. Teleflex, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 275 (2008) (discussing approaches to overcoming § 103-based 
patentability challenges to pharmaceutical product modification claims); Song & Han, supra note 
96 (describing various techniques pharmaceutical companies employ to maximize period of 
market exclusivity); Valoir, supra note 44 (setting forth strategies for owners of primary patents 
to build a case for unexpected results made possible by inventions covered by secondary patents).  
 216. Cf. Amy Motomura, The Overlooked Significance of Own Prior Art (2018) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (explaining that anticipation of the need to 
overcome one’s own prior art can induce strategic behaviors by inventors); see also Roger Allan 
Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 104–09 (2013) (discussing 
patentees’ informational advantages over defendants with respect to prior art).  
 217. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP v. Anchen Pharm., Inc., Nos. 10-cv-1835 (JAP)(TJB), 2012 WL 
1065458, at *24–26 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2012) (additional docket numbers omitted), aff’d per curiam, 
498 F. App’x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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extended-release versions of psychiatric drugs like Seroquel would be safe and 
effective.218 Thus, AstraZeneca started off with a strong case against 
obviousness, but the unexpected results helped it further. The court found, 
based on the testimony of experts, that “Seroquel XR has a sedation profile 
that is unexpectedly superior as compared to the sedation of Seroquel IR” 
and “is better tolerated than Seroquel IR in the treatment of bipolar 
depression.”219 The court observed that “testimony regarding a reduction in 
sedation when using Seroquel XR is consistent with the results of two trials 
comparing Seroquel IR and Seroquel XR conducted by AstraZeneca,”220 
which were post-marketing safety-focused trials that the FDA opted to require 
for this particular pair of drug products pursuant to its so-called “Phase IV” 
authority to condition approval on such studies in certain circumstances.221  
Notably, the court also credited testimony noting another relative benefit 
of Seroquel XR, which AstraZeneca established before this new form of 
Seroquel went on the market. This testimony related to the fact that XR can 
be more rapidly “titrated,” or ramped up, “to the maximum approved dose” 
than IR.222 The court explained that, “[a]s compared to Seroquel IR, Seroquel 
XR shows a significant improvement in the speed with which it can be titrated 
according to the two drugs’ FDA approved labels.”223 Thus, comparative 
information on titration was developed at the pre-approval stage, reviewed by 
the FDA, and placed on the labeling—steps that are in line with this Article’s 
proposal.  
All this evidence reasonably bolstered the case for the validity of the 
Seroquel XR claims, which the court ultimately upheld.224 The data offered 
in support of the patent that helped Actavis engineer the switch to Namenda 
XR presents a different story, which I cover in detail in the next Section. 
Although the comparative data for Namenda came in during prosecution, not 
litigation, it is still illustrative of what sorts of evidence might tend to support 
the case for unexpected results and, therefore, patentability under § 103. 
More generally, the Namenda XR prosecution history underscores the 
 
 218. Id. at *26–32. 
 219. Id. at *49. 
 220. Id. at *50. 
 221. 21 C.F.R. § 312.85 (2018) (setting forth the FDA’s authority to require so-called Phase 
IV, or post-marketing, studies as a condition of approval in certain circumstances); see also  
21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(B) (2012) (giving the FDA the authority to require post-marketing studies 
in cases of “serious risk” presented by an approved drug). But cf. JACOBSON, supra note 57, at 4 
(“Although conducted after FDA approval, post-marketing (also known as phase IV) studies are 
not necessarily effectiveness studies, and only rarely could be classified as comparative 
effectiveness studies.” (footnotes omitted)). See generally Charles Steenburg, The Food and Drug 
Administration’s Use of Postmarketing (Phase IV) Study Requirements: Exception to the Rule?, 61 FOOD  
& DRUG L.J. 295 (2006) (explaining the history and shortcomings of Phase IV study requirements).  
 222. AstraZeneca, 2012 WL 1065458, at *50. 
 223. Id.  
 224. Id. at *1. 
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complex relationship between product-related data and patentability. It shows 
that the law and institutions involved in determining non-obviousness not 
only fail to uniformly induce the development of comparative information to 
establish patentability, but also allow for strategies that lead to the issuance of 
secondary patents based on questionable assertions of “improvement” made 
to the PTO that the FDA does not evaluate or even see. The next two Sections 
provide a detailed analysis of that history and, then, a further explication and 
evaluation of the legal regime that it illustrates. 
2. Non-Obviousness in the Namenda XR Patent Prosecution 
Forest Laboratories, which a few years ago became a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Actavis, had marketed an Alzheimer’s drug called memantine 
hydrochloride (or simply memantine) under the brand name Namenda IR.225 
Namenda IR was covered by a patent that Forest had exclusively licensed from 
a German company called Merz.226 As noted earlier, this drug was approved 
for twice-daily administration of 10-mg tablets.227 One of the primary patents, 
U.S. Patent No. 5,061,703 (‘703 patent), was listed in the Orange Book228 and 
included claims to “[a] method for the prevention or treatment of cerebral 
ischemia comprising the step of administering, to a patient in need 
thereof,”229 memantine and other, closely related chemical compounds.230 
Although containing method-of-use claims rather than more powerful claims 
on the chemical compositions themselves, the ‘703 patent made it unscathed 
through Hatch-Waxman litigation after Forest settled with several generics 
that challenged its validity.231 Under the terms of the settlement, the generics 
were set to enter the market with their versions of memantine as immediate-
release tablets in early 2015.232  
 
 225. See New York v. Actavis, PLC, No. 14 Civ. 7473, 2014 WL 7015198, at *4, *12 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 11, 2014), aff’d, 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 226. Id. at *10. 
 227. See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text. 
 228. Approval Letter from William P. Rickman for Carol A. Holquist, Acting Deputy Dir., 
Office of Regulatory Operations, Office of Generic Drugs, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, 
to Alpesh Patel, Vice President, Global Regulatory Affairs, Amneal Pharm. (Apr. 10, 2015), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2015/090041Orig1s000Ltr.pdf. 
 229. See U.S. Patent No. 5,061,703 col. 13 l. 52 – col. 14 l. 24 (filed Apr. 11, 1990). This example 
has the feature that both the pioneering and secondary patents are method patents rather than 
composition of matter patents, but that does not materially affect the analysis here.  
 230. See id. 
 231. See, e.g., Stipulation and Order at 4–5, Forest Labs., Inc. v. Cobalt Labs., Inc., No. 08-021 
(LPS) (D. Del. Sept. 27, 2010), ECF No. 502; Stipulation and Order at 5–6, Forest Labs., Inc. v. 
Lupin Pharm., Inc., No. 08-021 (GMS) (LPS) (D. Del. Sept. 1, 2010), ECF No. 500. 
 232. See Ben James, Forest, Merz Wrap Up Namenda Patent Litigation, LAW360 (July 22, 2010, 
6:20 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/182680/forest-merz-wrap-up-namenda-patent-litigation; 
see also Gregory Dolin, Response, Do Patent Challenges Reduce Consumer Welfare?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 
ONLINE 256, 267–68 (2017) (analyzing such settlements). 
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Meanwhile, Forest had filed applications for, and eventually obtained, 
additional patents related to memantine. These patents protect Namenda XR, 
which the FDA separately approved and which Forest currently markets along 
with Actavis. Among others, Forest was granted claims that were essentially 
directed to certain pharmacokinetics—specifically, rates of dissolution and 
absorption—of memantine in the human body. A representative claim in one 
of these new patents, U.S. Patent No. 8,039,009 (‘009 patent) recites “[a] 
method for treating Alzheimer’s disease comprising once daily administration 
of a modified release solid oral dosage form” (i.e., a tablet) that included an 
approximately 28-mg dose of memantine  
and a pharmaceutically acceptable polymeric carrier substantially 
contributing to the modification of the release of the memantine or 
pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, said dosage form 
sustaining release of the memantine or pharmaceutically acceptable 
salt thereof from about 4 hours to about 24 hours following entry of 
said form into a use environment, wherein said dosage form has a 
single phase dissolution rate of less than about 80% after passage of 
about 6 hours following said entry into said use environment.233 
Although it is much more complicated than the quetiapine “gelling 
agent” claim above, the general concept behind this claim is similar. The idea 
is—as the “extended release” phrase suggests—that these patents basically 
claim delayed bioavailability of the active pharmaceutical ingredient, though 
reciting actual dissolution rates.234 The representative claim includes a 
“polymeric carrier,” which—like a gelling agent—controls the release of 
memantine in the “use environment,” i.e., the human body, by metering the 
rate of the tablet’s dissolution over the time periods recited in the claim. As 
will soon become clear, it is also significant that the claim includes a “once 
daily administration” limitation. 
Not unexpectedly, the closest prior art reference the examiner cited 
against Forest during prosecution was authored by scientists at Merz, the 
original assignee of the primary ‘703 patent235—as well as another publication 
describing “sustained” release formulations of closely related drug 
 
 233. U.S. Patent No. 8,039,009 B2 col. 22 ll. 9–21 (filed June 16, 2005). A different set of 
patents protecting Namenda XR has been invalidated for violating the definiteness requirement 
of patentability, 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2018). See Forest Labs., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., C.A. 
No. 14-121-LPS, 2016 WL 54910, at *8–9 (D. Del. Jan. 5, 2016) (additional docket numbers 
omitted), aff’d, 716 F. App’x 987 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential). Forest had licensed this 
second group of patents from another company, Adamas Pharmaceuticals. Kelly Knaub, Fed. Cir. 
Upholds Ruling Axing Forest’s Namenda Patents, LAW360 (Dec. 11, 2017, 9:35 PM), https:// 
www.law360.com/articles/993384/fed-circ-upholds-ruling-axing-forest-s-namenda-patents.  
 234. See generally Cramer & Saks, supra note 67 (noting that controlled release dosage forms 
can improve the value of a drug); Nokhodchi et al., supra note 8 (discussing improvements of 
drug safety and efficacy through new formulations as a focus of pharmaceutical research). 
 235. U.S. Patent No. 5,061,703, at [73] (filed Apr. 11, 1990). 
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compounds.236 The main reference, Hartmann, was a post-marketing study 
that disclosed a therapy for Alzheimer’s with memantine. In the Hartmann 
study, “the majority of patients were treated with 20 mg/day memantine, the 
recommended daily dose,” though larger dosages (30 mg and beyond) were 
used on some patients and were apparently safe and well-tolerated.237 
Although this aspect of the therapy was not explicitly discussed in Merz, the 
study’s authors had to use multiple doses of 10 mg tablets—because, as in the 
United States, immediate-release memantine in Germany was approved as a 
therapy of 10 mg tablets taken twice daily.238  
Relying on Hartmann in combination with the other reference, the 
examiner rejected as obvious an earlier version of Forest’s desired claims 
covering Namenda XR, which recited “[a] modified . . . release solid oral 
dosage form for the treatment of Alzheimer’s disease comprising . . . about 
28mg memantine” after concluding that the publications in totality suggested 
“the practice of the instantly claimed invention with a reasonable expectation 
of success.”239 In an attempt to overcome the rejection with evidence of 
unexpected results, the applicant submitted a declaration from a Forest 
scientist stating that “28 mg memantine modified release was statistically 
significantly superior to placebo”240 in treating patients with moderate to 
severe Alzheimer’s, but the examiner maintained the rejection because 
immediate-release memantine (i.e., Namenda IR) was likewise significantly 
superior to placebo for this population.241  
In its next filing, which finally convinced the examiner, the applicant 
responded with a claim amendment and an argument pointing to a 
supplemental declaration from the same scientist. The amendment modified 
the preamble of the claim to “[a] method for treating Alzheimer’s disease 
comprising once daily administration of a modified release solid oral dosage 
form.”242 The declaration, crucially, “describe[d] that an oral dose of 20 mg 
memantine as immediate-release tablets given once daily to Alzheimer’s patients 
was not significantly different from placebo-treated patients”—a result over 
which a treatment with once-daily 28-mg memantine XR, which was better 
than the placebo according to a prior declaration, was an improvement.243 
 
 236. Non-Final Rejection at 3, U.S. Pat. App. Serial No. 11/155,330 (filed Nov. 1, 2010). 
 237. Susanne Hartmann & Hans Jörg Möbius, Tolerability of Memantine in Combination with 
Cholinesterase Inhibitors in Dementia Therapy, 18 INT’L CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 81, 85 (2003).  
 238. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPLICATION 
NUMBER: 22-525, CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND BIOPHARMACEUTICS REVIEW(S) 4–5 (2010), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2010/022525Orig1s000ClinPharmR.pdf 
[hereinafter CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND BIOPHARMACEUTICS REVIEW(S)]. 
 239. Non-Final Rejection at 3, U.S. Pat. App. Serial No. 11/155,330 (filed Nov. 1, 2010). 
 240. Response to Office Action at 8, U.S. Pat. App. Serial No. 11/155,330 (filed Dec. 16, 2010). 
 241. Final Rejection at 2–3, U.S. Pat. App. Serial No. 11/155,330 (filed Mar. 10, 2011). 
 242. Response to Final Office Action at 2, U.S. Pat. App. Serial No. 11/155,330 (filed  
Mar. 15, 2011) (emphasis added). 
 243. Id. at 7 (first emphasis added). 
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The applicant thus urged that the two declarations established that, as 
amended, “the claimed methods for treating Alzheimer’s disease comprising 
once daily administration of a modified release . . . form comprising about 28 
mg of memantine are surprisingly and unexpectedly effective.”244 The 
examiner then allowed the claims without comment.245  
It is worth appreciating what got the claims to allowance. The asserted 
unexpected result was the “improvement” of using a single daily 28-mg 
extended-release dose over a single daily 20-mg immediate-release dose, even 
though the FDA had not approved the latter therapy. Indeed, the FDA had 
approved IR memantine only for a twice-daily administration (as two 10 mg 
tablets).246 As a matter of establishing relative patient benefit, the correct 
comparator was of course the actual Namenda IR as approved and prescribed. 
If only one tablet of IR a day were sufficient to treat Alzheimer’s, that would 
mean that patients have been needlessly taking Namenda in two separate 10 
mg doses, instead of a single daily 20-mg dose at once.  
Nonetheless, this argument, coupled with the aforementioned 
amendment adding the phrase “once daily administration”—which is what 
Namenda XR was approved for247—sufficed to overcome the rejection. The 
patent’s allowance was followed by a soft switch away from IR, and then a hard 
switch, during the two years prior to the scheduled generic IR entry in early 
2015.248 The validity of the ‘009 and related Namenda XR patents has not yet 
 
 244. Id.  
 245. Notice of Allowance and Fees Due, U.S. Pat. App. Serial No. 11/155,330 (filed July 19, 2011). 
 246. See APPROVAL LABELING TEXT: NDA 21-487, at 4 (2003), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ 
drugsatfda_docs/label/2003/021487lbl.pdf; Approval Letter from Robert Temple, Dir., Ctr. for Drug 
Evaluation & Research, to Doreen V. Morgan, Doctor of Pharm. Forest Labs., Inc. (Oct. 16, 2003), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2003/21-487_Namenda_Approv.pdf.  
 247. See CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND BIOPHARMACEUTICS REVIEW(S), supra note 238, at 3. 
The “once daily” limitation does not give generics a meaningful “design-around” opening 
because they cannot deviate from the dosing approved for the brand under the statutory and 
regulatory requirements for ANDA approvals. For example, the generics could not lawfully 
market XR memantine accompanied by instructions telling patients to take two 28-mg tablets at 
once every two days, as opposed to a single 28-mg tablet every day. See 21 C.F.R. 
§ 314.127(a)(4)(i) (2018). 
 248. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 648 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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been fully tested in litigation: Some of the early infringement actions in which 
they were asserted settled,249 as has a more recently filed case.250 
3. Beyond Namenda  
Perhaps the most notable upshot of the Namenda XR prosecution is that 
the examiner’s decision to grant the ‘009 patent to Forest, odd though it may 
seem from the perspective of a general audience, is not clearly251 incorrect 
under substantive patent law. When a publication describing the product, 
rather than the product itself, is offered as the primary prior art reference, 
some Federal Circuit authority supports the notion that the formal 
unexpected results comparison should generally take place between the new 
product embodying the desired claim and the bare content of the 
reference.252 When this is the focus, the difference between real-world utilities 
of the new and old inventions, as reflected in their respective commercial 
embodiments and other extra-documentary sources, might not come 
through.253  
Indeed, the examiner’s office actions and the Namenda XR patent 
prosecutor’s framing of the unexpected results argument focused on the 
prior art publication, Hartmann, rather than on the prior IR product.254 
Hartmann did not attach any significance to the fact that the treatments it 
disclosed involved multiple daily administrations, which is a feature of the 
 
 249. See, e.g., Stipulation and Order at 4, Forest Labs., LLC v. Amneal Pharm. LLC, C.A. No. 
15-756 (LPS) (D. Del. Aug. 31, 2016), ECF No. 102. Under the settlement, if the FDA approves 
Amneal’s ANDA, Amneal may launch its generic product on January 1, 2025. See id.; see also Carly 
Helfand, Allergan Sews Up a Namenda XR Cushion with Amneal Patent Settlement, FIERCEPHARMA 
(Sept. 10, 2015, 8:58 AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/sales-and-marketing/allergan-sews-
up-a-namenda-xr-cushion-amneal-patent-settlement (describing a settlement with another 
defendant in this case). Such settlements have sometimes been challenged on antitrust grounds. 
See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 140–41 (2013).  
 250. See, e.g., Stipulation to Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
41(A)(2) at 3, Allergan Sales, LLC v. Macleods Pharm., Ltd, C.A. No. 17-672 (LPS) (D. Del. Apr. 
3, 2018), ECF No. 38. 
 251. “Obviously” might have been a better adverb choice, but that word was not used for 
understandable reasons.  
 252. See, e.g., Cadence Pharm. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc., 780 F.3d 1364, 1374–76 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (upholding validity under § 103 based in part on an indirect comparison of results 
reported in the prior art patent with the testimony regarding results achieved by the subject 
matter of the patent-in-suit); see also Millennium Pharm., Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 862 F.3d 1356, 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Unexpected results are shown in comparison to what was known, not what was 
unknown. . . . [Plaintiff] was not required to create the glycerol ester, when the product had not 
been created in the prior art.” (citations omitted)); In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 
391–92 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (concluding that the applicant “has not effectively argued that these 
particular [desired] claims differ from what is disclosed in” the prior art reference and thus failed 
to establish unexpected results).  
 253. Cf. In re Hoch, 428 F.2d 1341, 1343–44 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (focusing on real-world utilities 
of claimed compounds as compared to those in the prior art). 
 254. See supra notes 237–39 and accompanying text. 
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reference that could perhaps give the prior artisan a reason to believe that a 
single daily 20-mg IR dose would have treated Alzheimer’s just as well.255 
Based on this line of reasoning, the fact that a single 20-mg IR dose does not 
work, but a single 20-mg XR dose is actually effective, could perhaps be fairly 
characterized as surprising. Thus, the focus on what is actually described in 
the particular publication chosen as the closest prior art, as opposed to the 
underlying product, has the potential to supplant the full picture of clinically 
relevant data in the unexpected results inquiry.256  
Perhaps more troubling still, there is also precedent for the notion that 
scientific validity of the underlying data, whatever the basis for comparison, 
does not really matter in the unexpected results inquiry. In Janssen 
Pharmaceuticals v. Watson Laboratories, a district court noted that “[d]efendants 
have not persuaded this Court that a patentee faced with a validity challenge 
must provide evidence of unexpected results that passes muster under 
undefined high standards of scientific validity” and, further, faulted the 
defendant for “trying to insert a scientific validity requirement into Federal 
Circuit law.”257 As to the defendants’ argument that “1) the applicant 
‘obtained allowance of the [asserted patent] solely on assertions of 
unexpected results;’ 2) the applicant relied on [a table containing a flawed 
cross-study comparison] to persuade the examiner of the unexpected results; 
and 3) [the table] does not constitute scientifically valid proof of unexpected 
results,”258 the trial court responded in part with the following point: “[T]here 
appears to be hidden in this argument an attempt to shift the burden of proof 
at this juncture onto Plaintiffs.”259  
The AstraZeneca case does offer a counterpoint to these examples. To 
support non-obviousness of claims covering Seroquel XR, the sponsor 
provided a credible product-to-product comparison and even FDA-vetted pre-
approval260 data illustrating an advantage of XR over IR with respect to 
 
 255. See Hartmann & Möbius, supra note 237. 
 256. This, to be sure, is a strange result when the prior art reference discloses a product that 
has been approved for use under a particular indication. 
 257. Janssen Pharm., Inc., v. Watson Labs., Inc., No. 08-5103 (SRC), 2012 WL 3990221,  
at *18–19 (D.N.J. Sept. 11, 2012), appeal dismissed, No. 12-1693 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 28, 2013). But see 
Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4803941, at *27–39 
(E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) (Bryson, J.) (adopting a contrary approach), aff’d per curiam, 742 F. 
App’x 511 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also Duramed Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Labs., Inc., No. 3:08-cv-0116 
(LRH-RAM), 2011 WL 2446578, at *6 (D. Nev. June 16, 2011) (“[T]here is insufficient evidence 
before the court that [the claimed drug] was better than other drugs on the market, including its 
own product . . . , at preventing breakthrough bleeding. This is evidenced by the fact that the FDA 
did not allow Duramed to market this proclaimed benefit.”), aff’d per curiam, 438 F. App’x 898  
(Fed. Cir. 2011).  
 258. Janssen Pharm., 2012 WL 3990221, at *20 (citation omitted). 
 259. Id.; see supra note 109 and accompanying text (explaining that issued claims must be 
proved invalid by clear and convincing evidence in district court).  
 260. Consistent with general usage in this field, the terms “pre-approval” and “pre-market” 
(or “pre-marketing”) are used interchangeably in this Article. In theory, however, a sponsor could 
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titration—even though, formally, the closest prior art reference of record was 
the prior art IR patent, not the product.261 Besides the intuition that it just 
seems wrong to turn a blind eye to product-to-product comparison evidence, 
when it is available, to establish unexpected results, there is authority behind 
a product-focused analysis of unexpected results as well.262 For example, as 
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals explained in In re Payne, “[a] prima 
facie case of obviousness based on structural similarity is rebuttable by proof 
that the claimed compounds possess unexpectedly advantageous or superior 
properties. Direct or indirect comparative testing between the claimed 
compounds and the closest prior art may be necessary.”263 The Payne court 
went on to review the PTO’s evaluation of the applicant-submitted data on 
prior art compounds and those embodying the claims, including an 
evaluation of the compounds’ relative utilities for their intended purpose 
—“activity against aphid and housefly.”264 
Nonetheless, the Namenda prosecution history and the seemingly more 
permissive265 line of authority that it reflects illustrate the larger point that 
 
develop data after approval, but before marketing. The goal of this Article’s proposal is to have 
the FDA examine comparative data, so “pre-approval” is the technically correct term.  
 261. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP v. Anchen Pharm., Inc., Nos. 10-cv-1835 (JAP)(TJB), 2012 WL 
1065458, at *38–44 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2012) (additional docket numbers omitted), aff’d per curiam, 
498 F. App’x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 262. See, e.g., In re Efthymiopoulos, 839 F.3d 1375, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (focusing on 
the lack of real-world significance of the proffered unexpected results data in concluding that 
this evidence should be discounted); Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 739 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (focusing on differences in tolerability of claimed and prior art drug products 
as marketed); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (requiring an applicant 
wishing to establish unexpected results to generate experimental data relating to products 
disclosed by the prior art when used for their intended purpose); cf. Allergan, 2017 WL 4803941, 
at *28 (“[A] clinician might be concerned about bare results, even when they have not been 
subjected to statistical analysis, and may take action based on those bare results in the absence of 
the availability of more concrete confirmation that those results are meaningful. But subjective 
impressions created by bare results are not the appropriate measure by which to compare the 
efficacy of two different doses of an active ingredient in a testing environment.”). 
 263. In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303, 315–16 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (citations omitted). The phrase 
“prima facie” refers here to the framework of the non-obviousness inquiry during patent 
prosecution. The applicant can rebut the PTO’s prima facie showing of “structural obviousness” 
of the claimed compound with evidence of unexpected results. See id. at 314–16. 
 264. Id. at 316; cf. McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. L. Perrigo Co., 337 F.3d 1362, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(“[T]he [district] court found that the results of clinical studies adduced by McNeil were 
inconsistent, not shown to be reproducible, and did not include comparative data vis-à-vis 
placebos or other antidiarrheal/antiflatulent combinations necessary to demonstrate 
unexpected or synergistic effects.”); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“In 
the absence of evidence to show that the properties of the compounds differed in such an 
appreciable degree that the difference was really unexpected, we do not think that the Board 
erred in its determination that appellant’s evidence was insufficient to rebut the prima facie case. 
The fact that amitriptyline and imipramine, respectively, helped some patients and not others 
does not appear significant.”). 
 265. Permissive, that is, with respect to the types of comparisons that the applicant can make 
to support an argument for non-obviousness.  
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patent law does not uniformly provide the incentive to generate comparative 
data useful to market participants, nor, indeed, do decision-makers 
consistently base patentability decisions on such data in the context of 
pharmaceutical product changes. Although this sort of information is often 
considered in patent cases, it does not always consist of “real-world” (i.e., 
product-relevant and clinically relevant) data, and the submissions that do 
come in are scrutinized by institutions—the PTO and courts—whose 
expertise is not focused on clinical trials anyhow. The Namenda XR patent 
prosecution and the Janssen case reflect a state of affairs that is arguably worse 
than the alternative approach under which comparative drug utility were 
simply irrelevant for patentability. Instead of adhering to a simple rule that 
“patented doesn’t mean better” and sending the clear “buyer-beware” 
message that this rule would imply, we allow government imprimatur to be 
attached to comparative assertions of dubious relevance to medical care and 
sometimes of dubious scientific validity, full stop.266  
There is a governmental agency, the FDA, that has the expertise to 
scrutinize comparative data that may have clinical relevance, but under the 
current legal regime this agency does not get to use it unless special 
circumstances apply or the sponsor, such as AstraZeneca with its XR/IR 
titration comparison, decides on its own to go beyond the basic drug approval 
requirements. While 21 U.S.C. § 372(d), the FDA-PTO cooperation provision 
discussed in the Introduction,267 could be a vehicle for getting the FDA 
involved in looking at comparative results on the patentability side, this 
solution does not seem altogether satisfying. In prosecution, the data can be 
of intrinsically limited quality given the early stage of product development 
during that time,268 precluding a robust comparative utility analysis even if the 
FDA were helping the PTO with the examination. During litigation, when 
more developed data is more likely to be available, § 372(d) does not apply, 
and courts must rely on party experts to evaluate this information in the 
shadow of the presumption of patent validity269—assuming, again, that 
applicable precedent even requires that the patentee make the proper 
product-to-product comparison and introduce unexpected results data that is 
scientifically robust.  
 
 266. See infra note 326 and accompanying text (discussing unjustified perceptions of 
superiority of drugs based on the existence of underlying patents). 
 267. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text; see also Darrow, supra note 47, at 401–03 
(noting the fact that this subsection is never utilized). I thank Professor Jonathan Darrow for 
helpful discussions of this provision. 
 268. See Darrow, supra note 47, at 403 (“[E]ven if the USPTO was to consistently supplement 
its own expertise by exercising its right under § 372(d), the evidence needed to ascertain a drug’s 
true efficacy in humans is not usually available at the time of patenting, which occurs relatively 
early in the research and development process. The assistance that the FDA would be able to 
provide would therefore be limited.”); Eisenberg, supra note 48, at 395–96.  
 269. Cf. supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing the option to challenge brand 
patents in the PTAB).  
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In spite of the various legal and institutional limitations, the proffered 
comparative utility assertions that the PTO and courts do see can have a 
critical impact on patentability and, as a result, can in effect enable the 
sponsor to market the follow-on drug exclusively.270 This regulatory lacuna is 
partly responsible for generating perverse incentives for patent-driven 
product hopping onto new drug formulations that lack demonstrated clinical 
differences from the old. Although one possible fix might be to overhaul 
substantive patent law and equip the PTO with the tools to induce the 
development of comparative clinical trial data, my sense is that such massive 
systemic change would be very difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish. Such 
reform would require effectively remaking the PTO in the FDA’s image and, 
perhaps, a major course-correction in the doctrine of unexpected results.271 
In addition, even if logistically possible, such reform of patent law and 
institutions writ large might simply might not be, perhaps somewhat 
ironically, worth the associated switching costs. This is because the product 
hopping problem has largely arisen due to, and reflects, the unique regulatory 
features of the pharmaceutical industry, which include pre-approval, the 
ANDA pathway, and generic substitution.272 Thus, it stands to reason to fix the 
 
 270. Interestingly, India appears to have adopted the approach that makes comparative 
efficacy a requirement of patentability, with its courts holding that a modification of a known 
chemical compound for which an improvement in efficacy is not shown is obvious as a matter of 
that country’s patent law. Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 1 (India). See generally 
Jodie Liu, Note, Compulsory Licensing and Anti-Evergreening: Interpreting the TRIPS Flexibilities in 
Sections 84 and 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 207 (2015) (exploring the 
compatibility between international treaties and the law of pharmaceutical non-obviousness in 
India); see also Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent 
System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 549–60 (2007) 
(analyzing the patent regime instituted in India beginning in 2005). Putting to one side the issue 
of practical and institutional constraints (e.g., availability of data and the limits of the PTO and 
courts) that make this approach difficult to execute in practice, I emphasize here that this 
Article’s proposal for comparative analysis at the FDA differs from India’s in another crucial 
respect: It requires a comparison with a product that was actually approved and marketed by the 
same sponsor, as opposed to a prior art disclosure that does not refer to an approved drug. For 
critiques of India’s approach, see Holman et al., supra note 150, at 140–41; Kevin Tarsa, Comment, 
Novartis AG v. Union of India: Why the Court’s Narrow Interpretation of Enhanced Efficacy Threatens 
Domestic and Foreign Drug Development, 39 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. E. SUPP. 40, 48–52 (2016). 
 271. See Darrow, supra note 47, at 403 (“[T]he PTO cannot act as an effective gatekeeper 
because the utility and non-obviousness doctrines are not up to the task, because the agency lacks 
appropriate health-related expertise, and because the USPTO ‘gate’ is too far upstream in the 
drug development process.”).  
 272. To be sure, the general problem of patented innovation that may be used strategically 
to impede competition has been identified in other contexts. See, e.g., Carlos Acuña-Quiroga, 
Predatory Innovation: A Step Beyond? (Understanding Competition in High-Technology Markets), 15 INT’L 
REV. L. COMPUT. & TECH. 7 (2001) (discussing the practice of anti-competitive innovation in the 
high-technology industry). See generally Bernard Chao, Horizontal Innovation and Interface Patents, 
2016 WIS. L. REV. 287 (arguing that anticompetitive product changes accompanied by patenting 
occur in industries other than pharmaceuticals); Price, supra note 41 (more generally exploring the 
problem of potentially harmful novelty). Nonetheless, other industries are missing the regulatory 
features, such as generic substitution, that make the product hopping problem particularly salient 
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problem with a regulatory solution that is also pharma-specific.273 
Accordingly, the approach I adopt in this Article leaves patent law alone and 
directly enlists the FDA’s expertise to undertake a comparative analysis of the 
utility of related drug products independently from the PTO and courts.  
To complete the Namenda story, it should be noted that the sponsor did 
perform some comparative work, though it was not helpful in differentiating 
XR from IR. While conducting safety and effectiveness studies needed to 
obtain approval for Namenda XR, Forest established that the so-called peak 
serum concentration of memantine from the proposed dose of XR was 1.5 
times greater than that from the approved dose of IR.274 But that assessment 
was only a shortcut to showing that XR was safe based on the proxy of high IR 
doses, which gave the same peak serum concentration as the proposed XR 
dosage, that have been successfully tested for safety.275  
Thus, at the time of the switch, there was “no study addressing the 
comparative efficacy” of IR and XR,276 and specifically “the clinical impact of 
[XR’s distinct] pharmacokinetic properties is not known since it has not been 
studied in clinical trials.”277 Moreover, a post-marketing study found 
“conflicting” evidence for the assertion that switching to a once-daily regimen 
in a related therapy involving a combination of memantine with another drug 
would “increase treatment adherence and persistence[,] . . . meaning that the 
added cost of switching patients from generic options . . . may not always be 
justified.”278 This conclusion calls to mind an observation made by Blue Cross 
Blue Shield in a comment after a recent public FDA hearing: “There are 
anecdotal signs that reformulated products may positively impact adherence 
and that reformulations may improve patient outcomes, but payers need data 
 
in the pharmaceutical sector, and they are also less susceptible to the market deficiencies addressed 
in Part IV.  
 273. But see generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?,  
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002) (contending that patent law already has industry-specific 
rules, particularly in areas such as non-obviousness of chemical composition claims).  
 274. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPLICATION 
NUMBER: 22-525, SUMMARY REVIEW 3–4 (2010), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_ 
docs/nda/2010/022525Orig1s000SumR.pdf.  
 275. See id. at 4–5. In addition, the sponsor presented some “food effect” data, but only with 
respect to the lack of impact of food on bioavailability of memantine, as opposed to the relative 
efficacy of XR versus IR. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
APPLICATION NUMBER: 22-525, MEDICAL REVIEW(S) at 8, 56, 89 (2010), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ 
drugsatfda_docs/nda/2010/022525Orig1s000MedR.pdf. Certain comparative pharmacokinetics 
data mirroring that submitted to the FDA was also described in the patents covering Namenda 
XR. See U.S. Patent No. 8,039,009 col. 14 l. 60 – col. 20 l. 7 (filed June 16, 2005).  
 276. Dosing for Patients Currently Taking Namenda, NAMENDA XR, http://www.namendaxrhcp.com/ 
patients-currently-taking-namenda.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2018).  
 277. Deardorff & Grossberg, supra note 14, at 3276.  
 278. Id. at 3267. Professors Deardorff and Grossberg also make clear that “[o]ne economic 
analysis that has not been performed is the comparison of memantine ER and memantine IR in 
combination with [other drugs] since no studies have been performed comparing the two drugs.” 
Id. at 3276. 
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that demonstrates improved adherence or other product benefits over 
existing therapies.”279 Needless to say, the data presented to the PTO during 
the prosecution of the Namenda XR patents does not speak to these issues.  
In the ideal world, the Namenda strategy would be punished by the 
market. Although patent law, the primary driver of innovation in this area, 
does not always pass judgment on the relative quality of inventions, consumers 
certainly can. Various features of pharmaceutical markets, however, make 
rational decision-making difficult. Dr. Kessler voiced a concern with this 
dynamic in 1993, when he noted that some switches to “controlled release 
ma[de] little sense” and were instead driven “not [by] convenience or 
compliance but economics”280—that is, brand companies’ desire to charge 
higher drug prices thanks to follow-on patent protection. This is indeed what 
happened with Namenda XR, as significant numbers of prescribers made the 
transition away from IR, even before the hard switch, and apparently without 
evidence that would support this change.281 The Part that follows describes 
some of the market pathologies that make strategic product hops possible 
even in soft switch scenarios. 
IV. PRODUCT HOPPING AND PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET DEFECTS 
Informational inefficiencies in the market for prescription drugs have 
been well-documented,282 but are worth recapping here to underscore the 
need for the generation and disclosure of comparative data in the product 
switch context and to highlight its potential utility for this relatively well-
defined information gap scenario. The causes of inefficiencies can be divided 
roughly into three categories. The first set of limitations has to do with 
economic misalignments that can lead to acceptance of more expensive 
 
 279. Comment Letter from Kris Haltmeyer, Vice President, Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 
Office of Policy & Representation, BlueCross BlueShield Ass’n, to Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, Food 
& Drug Admin. 3 (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2017-N-
3615-0087; see also Matthew E. Falagas et al., Compliance with Once-Daily Versus Twice or Thrice-Daily 
Administration of Antibiotic Regimens: A Meta-Analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials, 10 PLOS ONE 
e0116207, Jan. 5, 2015, at 11 (concluding that, “considering the limitations surrounding this 
meta-analysis[,] once-daily antibiotic treatment might be associated with higher compliance than 
treatment administered multiple times daily in specific populations, for specific sites of infections 
and specific classes of antibiotics”). A point of note on the Falagas study is that the FDA does 
require proof of non-inferiority for approval of antibiotics. See generally NON-INFERIORITY CLINICAL 
TRIALS TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 58, at 1 (proffering guidelines for “the 
appropriate use of non-inferiority . . . study designs to provide evidence of the effectiveness of a 
drug or biologic”). 
 280. Kessler, supra note 68, at 437.  
 281. See supra notes 276–79 and accompanying text. 
 282. See, e.g., Micah L. Berman, Manipulative Marketing and the First Amendment, 103 GEO. L.J. 497, 
536–38 (2015); Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 6, at 181–89; Darrow, supra note 47, at 364–85; see 
also JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 763 (3d ed. 2015) (“The pharmaceutical 
industry is innovative, and its products technologically sophisticated—two features that add 
complexities to the economic and legal analyses demanded by the antitrust law.”). 
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products without a full inquiry into whether there is adequate evidence 
supporting the switch. The second concerns patent-driven structural 
limitations, already alluded to earlier in the Article, that limit meaningful 
competition over follow-on forms of a particular drug.283 The third relates to 
cognitive and practical constraints, intensified by vigorous advertising and the 
“credence-good” nature of pharmaceuticals, on rational decision-making in 
this market. These features of the market work together to contribute to the 
underproduction of socially valuable comparative data and can lead to 
strategic product hops.284  
A. ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 
Analysis of economic limitations relevant to product hopping begins with 
the insight of “price disconnect.”285 When a physician prescribes a drug, the 
patient rarely pays the full cost of the drug out of pocket. Instead, a third-party 
payer, such as the patient’s insurer, largely covers the expense in the usual 
case.286 The physician, of course, does not pay for the drug either—and, in 
the absence of a clear signal of the merits or demerits of the new and more 
expensive version, may in fact be motivated to prescribe it out of the belief 
that the modification represents the state of the art, provides greater patient 
benefit, and perhaps minimizes the risk of a malpractice suit.287 Thus, because 
it is often the case that neither doctors nor patients “feel” drug price 
 
 283. See supra notes 160–70 and accompanying text. 
 284. Cf. M. Gregg Bloche, The Emergent Logic of Health Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 389, 445 (2009) 
(arguing that “[r]esearch into the comparative efficacy of tests and treatments is a classic public 
good”); Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 55, at 1952 (explaining why comparative effectiveness 
research is “highly nonexcludable” and therefore under-incentivized by tools like patents). 
 285. Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 6, at 179–80; see David H. Kreling, Market for 
Pharmaceuticals, in PHARMACEUTICAL PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 121, at 281, 302 (“The demand 
for pharmaceuticals is not determined by the consumer, but directed by prescribers, and the 
demand is inelastic with respect to price.”); see also id. at 299 (“A lack of available comparative 
value information and a low awareness of drug cost levels by physicians also contribute to reduce 
the role that price plays in physician prescribing decisions.”). 
 286. Carrier, supra note 25, at 1017. 
 287. See Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation 
Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 207 (“[P]hysicians, 
and plans, that deliver care in a parsimonious fashion may be deemed to deviate from the custom-
based standard of care and may, on that basis, be held liable in tort.”); see also Bloche, supra note 
284, at 464 (“If there are multiple therapeutic options and the one chosen turns out badly, the 
plaintiff can find a physician-expert witness who would have opted for one of the other options.” 
(footnotes omitted)); Korobkin, supra note 55, at 541–42 (discussing “defensive medicine”); 
Richard S. Saver, Health Care Reform’s Wild Card: The Uncertain Effectiveness of Comparative 
Effectiveness Research, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2147, 2196–98 (2011) (explaining that the law of medical 
malpractice can interfere with the practice of evidence-based medicine); cf. Sheeley v. Mem’l 
Hosp., 710 A.2d 161, 166–67 (R.I. 1998) (holding that the standard of care in medical 
malpractice cases should be determined by national custom).  
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changes,288 one court explained in an ongoing antitrust product hopping case 
that “the ordinary market forces that would allow consumers to consider price 
when selecting a product are derailed.”289 Indeed, the widely enacted generic 
substitution laws reflect the existence of the price disconnect problem even 
in a context in which the competing suppliers offer products that are basically 
identical,290 suggesting that the problem is likely to be greater when drug 
products actually differ. Although proposals to control health care spending 
from the demand (i.e., patient and prescriber) side have been made291 and 
the Affordable Care Act includes provisions that might further this goal,292 the 
problem of price disconnect has proven difficult to address as a general 
matter. 
On the payer side, incentives appear to be in place to control costs, but 
they too can be dampened by informational gaps and other forces. Professor 
Russell Korobkin explained that “[t]his dearth of information makes it 
extremely difficult for any insurer interested in marketing a policy that covers 
treatments that satisfy a cost-effectiveness standard to identify ex ante which 
treatments are, in fact, cost-effective.”293 In addition, government-based 
payers are sometimes legally forbidden from refusing to reimburse physician-
prescribed treatments,294 and legal constraints can limit private payers as 
 
 288. See Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 6, at 169–70, 179–80; Jessie Cheng, Note, An Antitrust 
Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1509–10 (2008). 
See generally Douglas Lundin, Moral Hazard in Physician Prescription Behavior, 19 J. HEALTH ECON. 639 
(2000) (analyzing how the lack of financial pressure can influence physicians’ prescribing decisions). 
Nonetheless, these effects might be alleviated with “consumer-driven health care” models. See Wendy 
Netter Epstein, Nudging Patient Decision-Making, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1274–92 (2017). 
 289. In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and Naloxone) Antitrust Litig.,  
64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 683–84 (E.D. Pa. 2014).  
 290. Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 6, at 204 (“The price disconnect is the economic 
premise around which all states and the federal government have for the past forty years built a 
robust generic-substitution regulatory regime.”).  
 291. See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Controlling Health Care Spending: More Patient “Skin in the 
Game?”, 13 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 348, 352–57 (2016); see also Epstein, supra note 288, at 1292–98 
(providing an overview of how default choices may influence patients’ decisions); Rachel E. 
Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2307, 2348–51 (2018) (discussing an approach 
that could empower the FDA to drive the production and disclosure of information useful in 
promoting evidence-based care and coverage decisions).  
 292. See David Orentlicher, Cost Containment and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,  
6 FIU L. REV. 67, 72–77 (2010) (addressing some of these provisions). 
 293. Korobkin, supra note 55, at 551; see also Darrow, supra note 47, at 375–77 (discussing 
patients’ failure to function as gatekeepers against ineffective drugs). 
 294. See generally Sachs, supra note 291 (explaining that the current health care regulatory 
regime generates unnecessarily high costs). Notably, however, Massachusetts is considering 
adopting a “closed formulary” approach to Medicaid reimbursements that would take cost-
effectiveness of drugs into account. Nicholas Bagley & Rachel Sachs, Massachusetts Wants to Drive 
Down Medicaid Drug Costs: Why Is the Administration so Nervous?, HEALTH AFF.: HEALTH AFF. BLOG 
(Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180404.93363/full (evaluating 
whether “beneficiaries . . . could be denied access to expensive therapies” if the state were “to 
exclude certain brand-name drugs from Medicaid”); see also Rachel Sachs et al., Value-Based Pricing 
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well.295 As a result, “health insurers now generally pay for any treatment 
recommended by a treating physician that offers the potential for any positive 
clinical benefit unless explicitly excluded from the contractual scope of 
coverage.”296 Summarizing this state of affairs in health care coverage as a 
whole, Professor Wendy Netter Epstein noted that “[u]nnecessary care is 
consumed because doctors prescribe it, patients consent to it, and payors pay 
for it.”297 
Insurance companies, to be sure, typically use the services of so-called 
Pharmacy Benefit Managers (“PBMs”), which may be able to elicit 
comparative drug data from manufacturers by relying on the threat of 
exclusion of drugs from formularies—lists of drugs approved for 
reimbursement.298 In addition, PBMs can create formulary “tiers,” which are 
structured so as to pass some of the cost of a more expensive drug option, if 
selected, onto patients.299 But PBMs have also been criticized for entering into 
deals with drug makers with the effect of reducing generic penetration.300 As 
Professors Jonathan Darrow and Aaron Kesselheim have noted, the 
prescription drug market is characterized by “[p]ricing [that] is obscured by 
a labyrinthine system of rebates, spreads, discounts, coupons, and 
nontransparent business arrangements, particularly between pharmacy 
benefit managers and manufacturers.”301 As a result, the efforts of PBMs have 
 
for Pharmaceuticals in the Trump Administration, HEALTH AFF.: HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Apr. 27, 2017), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170427.059813/full (discussing value-based 
pricing, which makes sales revenue dependent on prescription drug effectiveness rather than 
volume sold). 
 295. See Korobkin, supra note 55, at 546–50. 
 296. Id. at 547. 
 297. Wendy Netter Epstein, The Health Insurer Nudge, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 593, 596 (2018); see 
also Korobkin, supra note 55, at 541–43 (noting provider incentives that contribute to 
unnecessary health care delivery); Saver, supra note 287 at 2170–75 (contending that medicine 
involves a much greater degree of uncertainty than most laypeople realize, and this contributes 
to unnecessary health care expenditures). 
 298. Stephen Fink & Mark J. Lewis, The Myth of ‘Price Disconnects’ in US Pharma Markets, 
LAW360 (May 17, 2016, 11:39 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/796876/the-myth-of-
price-disconnects-in-us-pharma-markets; see also ACAD. OF MANAGED CARE PHARMACY, THE AMCP 
FORMAT FOR FORMULARY SUBMISSIONS: VERSION 4.0 (2016), http://www.amcp.org/FormatV4 
(providing guidance for formulary placement and coverage support decisions); Dave Nellesen, 
AMCP Format Expands Evidence Requirements for US Payers, ANALYSIS GROUP, http://www.analysis 
group.com/amcp-format-expands-evidence-requirements-us-payers (last visited Dec. 15, 2018) 
(describing evidence requirements for supporting formulary placements). 
 299. Fink & Lewis, supra note 298. 
 300. See Michael Hiltzik, How ‘Price-Cutting’ Middlemen Are Making Crucial Drugs Vastly More 
Expensive, L.A. TIMES (June 9, 2017, 12:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-
hiltzik-pbm-drugs-20170611-story.html; Charles Ornstein & Katie Thomas, Take the Generic, 
Patients Are Told. Until They Are Not., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
08/06/health/prescription-drugs-brand-name-generic.html. 
 301. Jonathan J. Darrow & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Promoting Competition to Address 
Pharmaceutical Prices, HEALTH AFF. (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/ 
hpb20180116.967310/full; see also Joseph S. Ross & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Prescription-Drug 
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not consistently contributed to the production of pre-market information 
useful for differentiating between new and old versions of drugs.302  
Other strategies for creating pressures on drug prices from the demand 
side include step therapy, which requires that the patient be prescribed the 
cheaper drug option first and only be allowed to move on to the more 
expensive one if the former proves ineffective, and prior authorization, which 
mandates that a physician receive an approval from the payer before 
prescribing a particular drug.303 Nonetheless, leaving aside the fact that these 
measures cannot generally be taken by public payers,304 it is not clear whether 
step therapy or prior authorization have contributed extensively to the 
generation of validated, meaningful305 pre-market comparative data that 
could be helpful in differentiating the benefits of related drug products at the 
physician adoption stage.306 Although these measures have surely aided in the 
 
Coupons—No Such Thing as a Free Lunch, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1188, 1188 (2013) (explaining 
“drug coupons’ effect on health care costs”). 
 302. See generally Corinna Sorenson et al., Advancing Value Assessment in the United States: A 
Multistakeholder Perspective, 20 VALUE IN HEALTH 299, 300 (2017) (noting that, in spite of cost 
pressures, data on the “comparative net health benefit[s]” of various drugs is largely “insufficient”); 
see also id. at 305 (concluding that “consideration of observational data in value assessments of 
asthma therapies could capture the preferences and outcomes of important patient subgroups, such 
as smokers and patients with serious comorbidities and/or adherence problems, that are not often 
studied in premarket clinical trials”); Robin Feldman, Perverse Incentives: Why Everyone Prefers High Drug 
Prices—Except for Those Who Pay the Bills, HARV. J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 54), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3162432 (“[A]lthough we might hope that the insurer would push back 
on behavior that entrenches higher-priced drugs, the incentives that are misaligned and the 
information that might drive them in that direction is incomplete.”). 
 303. See Fink & Lewis, supra note 298; Shepherd, supra note 26, at 691–92. 
 304. See Sachs, supra note 291, at 2309 (“[F]ederal law requires Medicare and Medicaid to 
cover most, and in many cases all, FDA-approved drugs.”); see also Henry Waxman et al., Getting to 
the Root of High Prescription Drug Prices: Drivers and Potential Solutions, COMMONWEALTH FUND (July 
10, 2017), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund-reports/2017/jul/getting-
root-high-prescription-drug-prices-drivers-and-potential (arguing, among other things, for reforms 
in reimbursement approaches by public payers).  
 305. Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical Product Information Incentives and the Transparency Paradox,  
82 IND. L.J. 623, 635–36 (2007) (“Companies may disclose clinical information directly through 
a variety of means including: websites, annual reports, or letters to physicians. . . . Of course, the 
extent to which this may result in the selective disclosure of favorable information is an issue of 
concern for both the regulatory and financial communities. Further, the results of voluntarily 
disclosed studies are usually briefly summarized at best and one cannot realistically conduct an 
independent evaluation of the information.” (citations omitted)). 
 306. See Nikolas H. Goldberg et al., Availability of Comparative Efficacy Data at the Time of Drug 
Approval in the United States, 305 JAMA 1786, 1788–89 (2011) (finding, in a study of newly 
approved drugs containing new molecular entities, that comparative effectiveness information at 
the time of approval was absent for a significant number of new drug products, and even when 
present, the information was not always accessible). The authors conclude that “[s]trategies are 
needed to enhance the accessibility of, and ultimately the use of, this information, particularly in 
the early marketing experience, when comparative effectiveness data from other sources are 
scarce or nonexistent.” Id. at 1789. There is no suggestion that the situation with respect to 
comparative data availability is better for “hopped” drug products as opposed to new active-
ingredient products that the authors examined. Cf. Downing et al., supra note 59, at 373–75. The 
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generation of post-approval comparative effectiveness information, which has 
the advantage of being drawn from actual clinical experiences rather than 
from clinical trials,307 the importance of pre-market data should not be 
minimized.308 Such data can provide concrete evidence for whether a more 
expensive drug is actually worth switching to, help shape downstream 
comparative research,309 and, ultimately, guide the market to rationally accept 
or reject drug modifications in combination with any available post-marketing 
information, which may have gaps of its own.310 
B. STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS 
As discussed in Part II, competition for follow-on innovation between the 
inventor of the pioneering drug and other firms can often be limited because 
of broad primary patents, undisclosed know-how, and the brand’s head start 
advantages.311 Thus, there may be no one on the supply side to push the brand 
 
number determined in the Goldberg et al. study, moreover, includes new drugs for whose 
approval the FDA requires an active comparator. Goldberg et al., supra, at 1787–88; see also 
Sebastian Schneeweiss et al., Assessing the Comparative Effectiveness of Newly Marketed Medications: 
Methodological Challenges and Implications for Drug Development, 90 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY  
& THERAPEUTICS 777, 777 (2011); infra note 481 and accompanying text (describing non-
inferiority trials required for approval of anti-infectives).  
 307. See Ryan Abbott & Ian Ayres, Evidence and Extrapolation: Mechanisms for Regulating Off-
Label Uses of Drugs and Devices, 64 DUKE L.J. 377, 396 (2014) (recounting the expansion of post-
marketing commitments legally required of pharmaceutical companies). But cf. Joshua Cohen et 
al., Compared to US Practice, Evidence-Based Reviews in Europe Appear to Lead to Lower Prices for Some 
Drugs, 32 HEALTH AFF. 762, 765–68 (2013) (noting that Europe is ahead of the U.S. in terms of 
post-marketing comparative drug evidence development); see also PHRMA FOUND. & ACAD. 
MANAGED CARE PHARMACY, COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS AND PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES 
RESEARCH: ENHANCING UPTAKE AND USE BY PATIENTS, CLINICIANS AND PAYERS: CONFERENCE 
SUMMARY 2 (2017), http://www.phrmafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/CER-
Conference-Summary.pdf (discussing gaps in comparative drug information). 
 308. See infra notes 395–407 and accompanying text; see also Kazuo Iijima et al., Time Series 
Analysis of the Effectiveness and Safety of Capsule Endoscopy Between the Premarketing and Postmarketing 
Settings: A Meta-Analysis, 11 PLOS ONE e0153662, June 1, 2016, at 1, 2 (cataloguing some 
advantages of post- over pre-marketing comparative studies but ultimately describing them  
as “complement[ary]”).  
 309. See Alexander & Stafford, supra note 55, at 2488; see also Schneeweiss et al., supra note 306, 
at 784 (“Although the goal of [comparative effectiveness research]—to understand the relative 
effectiveness of medical products in routine care—implies evaluation before market entry, parts 
of the process can be initiated prior to approval.”); cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price, II, 
Promoting Health Care Innovation on the Demand Side, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 3, 16–18 (2017) (positing 
why such information is often underproduced).  
 310. Although pre-approval data is generally of more limited value than the real-world 
information developed after clinical practice starts, there can be an important feedback 
mechanism between the two. For example, pre-marketing comparative efficacy studies on ADHD 
drugs in Europe have yielded critical data points that could be supplemented in the course of 
clinical practice. Florence T. Bourgeois et al., Premarket Safety and Efficacy Studies for ADHD Medications 
in Children, 9 PLOS ONE e102249, July 9, 2014, at 1, 2–8; see also supra note 57 and accompanying 
text (noting that the FDA’s drug approval standard does not require an active comparator).  
 311. See supra text accompanying notes 160–70. 
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to build a case driven by pre-market data for why patients and prescribers 
should make the switch to the new form of the drug.312 Moreover, as a 
practical matter, robust advocacy for prescribers and patients to stay with (or 
return to) the original form after expiration of the primary patent is also 
infrequently encountered given the previously described generic business 
model shaped by substitution laws.313 The brand, therefore, is normally free 
to promote the modification as vigorously as possible while staying within the 
boundaries of legality without fear of refutation from competitors.314 While 
inter-brand competition could potentially serve as a check, evidence 
developed in some of the antitrust cases involving product hopping has shown 
that the original and the so-called “hopped” product can be a market unto 
themselves, without reasonable alternatives for treating a particular condition 
by a drug with a different active pharmaceutical ingredient.315  
To further understand the problem, some basic background on drug 
promotion and advertising is helpful.316 Like general drug promotion, 
comparative drug advertising involving printed materials may be subject to 
the statutory prohibition on “labeling [that is false or misleading in any 
particular.”317 An FDA regulation interpreting this and related provisions 
 
 312. Cf. supra notes 168, 171 and accompanying text (discussing some exceptions).  
 313. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.  
 314. The First Amendment significantly limits the ability of the FDA (or other government 
agencies) to control such advertising. See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168–69 
(2d Cir. 2012); see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011) (“Speech in aid of 
pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the 
First Amendment.”); Alan Bennett et al., Back to First Principles: A New Model for the Regulation of 
Drug Promotion, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 168, 171 (2015) (noting that courts have “indicated that 
content- and speaker-based restrictions on drug manufacturer speech are subject to ‘heightened 
scrutiny’ under the First Amendment”); Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. Redish, Off-Label 
Prescription Advertising, the FDA and the First Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech 
Protection, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 315 (2011) (analyzing the protections that prescription drug 
advertising is entitled to under the First Amendment). For a discussion of implications of this 
case law for FDA approval practices, see Patricia J. Zettler, The Indirect Consequences of Expanded 
Off-Label Promotion, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1053, 1067–76 (2017). For criticism of this line of cases and 
suggestions for reform, see Christopher Robertson, When Truth Cannot Be Presumed: The Regulation 
of Drug Promotion Under an Expanding First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 545, 553–58 (2014); Joshua 
M. Sharfstein & Alta Charo, The Promotion of Medical Products in the 21st Century: Off-Label Marketing 
and First Amendment Concerns, 314 JAMA 1795, 1795–96 (2015); Randall S. Stafford, Regulating 
Off-Label Drug Use—Rethinking the Role of the FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008) 
(“Although off-label prescribing—the prescription of a medication in a manner different from 
that approved by the FDA—is legal and common, it is often done in the absence of adequate 
supporting data.”). 
 315. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 658–60 (2d Cir. 2015);  
In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 
679–84 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
 316. See generally Alan Lyles, Pharmaceutical Promotion in the United States, in PHARMACEUTICAL 
PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 121, at 231 (describing current pharmaceutical promotion practices). 
 317. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a)(1) (2018); see also id. § 331(a) (defining “[t]he introduction or 
delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, tobacco product, or 
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forbids “drug comparison that represents or suggests that a drug is safer or 
more effective than another drug in some particular when it has not been 
demonstrated to be safer or more effective in such particular by substantial 
evidence or substantial clinical experience.”318 By its terms, however, this 
regulation does not prohibit non-comparative advertising, or even 
comparative advertising that does not address safety or efficacy.319 Thus, 
Forest’s ad campaign touting Namenda XR without directly claiming 
superiority to IR, conducted through both direct-to-consumer television 
spots320 and multi-page spreads in medical trade journals,321 was lawful. In 
 
cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded” as one of the prohibited acts under this subsection); 
United States v. Harkonen, No. C 08-00164 MHP, 2009 WL 1578712, at *9, *13 (N.D. Cal.  
June 4, 2009) (finding a press release to constitute a form of drug labeling, and thus evidence of 
“misbranding”). See generally Nathan Cortez, The Statutory Case Against Off-Label Promotion,  
83 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 124 (2016) (surveying the statutory framework governing misbranding 
claims). False Claims Act liability is possible in these scenarios as well. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729; 
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2003–04 (2016).  
 318. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6)(ii) (2018); see also id. § 201.57(c)(2)(iii) (“Any statements [on 
product labeling] comparing the safety or effectiveness of the drug with other agents for the same 
indication must, except for biological products, be supported by substantial evidence derived 
from adequate and well-controlled studies as defined in § 314.126(b) of this chapter unless this 
requirement is waived under § 201.58 or § 314.126(c) of this chapter.”).  
 319. See David A. Kessler et al., Therapeutic-Class Wars—Drug Promotion in a Competitive 
Marketplace, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1350, 1351–52 (1994); see also Darrow, supra note 47, at 368–69 
(“[T]he void of non-biased information is often filled by drug company ‘detailers,’ who 
personally visit physicians for the primary purpose of influencing prescribing decisions.” 
(footnote omitted)); id. at 369 (“Many people (including [many] physicians) think that newer 
drugs are better. While that’s a natural assumption to make, it’s not true. Studies consistently find 
that many older medicines are as good as—and in some cases better than—newer medicines.” 
(quoting Evaluating Statin Drugs to Treat: High Cholesterol and Heart Disease, CONSUMER REPS. 
HEALTH BEST BUY DRUGS 1, 21 (2012), http://www.consumerreports.org/health/resources/ 
pdf/best-buy-drugs/StatinsUpdate-FINAL.pdf)); cf. James J. Dettore et al., Branding Lessons from 
Consumer Marketing, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, May 2001, at 48–49 (discussing the important 
role of direct-to-consumer marketing and branding in the pharmaceutical industry).  
 320. Namenda XR, Namenda XR TV Commercial, “Be a Guardian,” ISPOT.TV (2015), 
https://www.ispot.tv/ad/7F3x/namenda-xr-be-a-guardian. Empirical work has shown that 
patient demand can drive prescribing decisions. See Rebecca K. Schwartz et al., Physician 
Motivations for Nonscientific Drug Prescribing, 28 SOC. SCI. & MED. 577, 579 (1989) (“Patient 
demand was the most commonly cited motivation for prescribing the target drugs . . . .”); 
Steenburg, supra note 221, at 299 (“[D]irect-to-consumer . . . advertising and other increasingly 
sophisticated marketing strategies often result in swift transitions from small, controlled trials to 
widespread use . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see also Andrea Coscelli, The Importance of Doctors’ and 
Patients’ Preferences in the Prescription Decision, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 349, 367–68 (2000) (finding that 
“persistence” in doctor and patient prescription preferences can have an effect on the aggregate 
market for prescription drugs); Dettore et al., supra note 319, at 49–50; Ramkumar Janakiraman 
et al., Physicians’ Persistence and Its Implications for Their Response to Promotion of Prescription Drugs,  
54 MGMT. SCI. 1080, 1081 (2008) (“Our model results indicate significant levels of persistence 
in drug choice. . . . 60% of the physicians are classified as persistent, with the remaining 34% 
classified as nonpersistent.”). 
 321. See DRUG TOPICS, Aug. 2013, at 2–4, http://images2.advanstar.com/pixelmags/drug-
topics/pdf/2013-08.pdf. The ad does include a disclaimer, in relatively small print, indicating 
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addition, it was no violation of statute or any FDA regulation for Forest to 
make statements in press releases like the following: “[P]atient and caregiver 
response to the NAMENDA XR® product has been exceptionally positive, 
with caregivers and physicians clearly recognizing the benefits of the single 
daily dosing regimen.”322 While these ads and statements do not mention any 
evidence, such assertions can create something of a snowball effect of 
arguably unjustified switches.323  
Although advertising can in theory be scrutinized from the demand side, 
a point that I will address further in the next Section, competition on the 
supply side can be crucial for highlighting comparative advantages and 
disadvantages of related drug products for prescribers and patients. Similarly, 
pressures from competitors can serve as a third-party check on 
communications between manufacturers and payers, whose permissible scope 
has recently been expanded under the 21st Century Cures Act.324 But because 
such competition is rare,325 market participants may be impeded in their 
ability to identify what may be a largely strategic product hop. Worse yet, the 
very existence of a patent on a new form of a drug can create an unjustified 
 
that no comparative study was performed between IR and XR. Id. at 2; see also Shepherd, supra 
note 26, at 697 & n.222. 
 322. Emily Wasserman, Forest Laboratories Announces Intention to Continue Marketing Both NAMENDA® 
Tablets and Once-Daily NAMENDA XR® Into the Fall of 2014, FIERCEPHARMA, (June 11, 2014, 7:20 AM), 
http://www.fiercepharma.com/marketing/forest-laboratories-announces-intention-to-continue-
marketing-both-namenda%C2%AE-tablets-and.  
 323. Indeed, even the soft switch was estimated to have led to a transition of a significant 
number of prescribers and patients to XR. See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC,  
787 F.3d 638, 647–48 (2d Cir. 2015). Partly for the reason that such ads induce unjustified 
switches to more costly drugs, the American Medical Association has called for a ban of direct-to-
consumer drug ads. See AMA Calls for Ban on DTC Ads of Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices, AM. 
MED. ASS’N (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.ama-assn.org/content/ama-calls-ban-direct-consumer-
advertising-prescription-drugs-and-medical-devices; see also supra note 287 and accompanying text 
(explaining how physician risk-averseness, particularly in the face of potential malpractice suits, 
can drive prescribing decisions).  
 324. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3037, 130 Stat. 1033, 1105 (2016); 
see also 21 U.S.C. § 352(a)(2)(A) (2018) (“[T]he term ‘health care economic information’ means 
any analysis (including the clinical data, inputs, clinical or other assumptions, methods, results, 
and other components underlying or comprising the analysis) that identifies, measures, or 
describes the economic consequences, which may be based on the separate or aggregated clinical 
consequences of the represented health outcomes, of the use of a drug. Such analysis may be 
comparative to the use of another drug, to another health care intervention, or to no 
intervention.”). See generally Sam F. Halabi, Off-Label Marketing’s Audiences: The 21st Century Cures 
Act and the Relaxation of Standards for Evidence-Based Therapeutic and Cost-Comparative Claims,  
44 AM. J.L. & MED. 181 (2018) (discussing an expansion in the scope of permissible 
manufacturer-payer communications allowed by 21st Century Cures Act); Peter J. Neumann et 
al., The FDA’s Regulation of Health Economic Information, 19 HEALTH AFF. 129 (2000) (addressing 
the statutory regime relating to communication of health care economic information prior to the 
passage of the 21st Century Cures Act, which amended the FDCA).  
 325. See supra notes 312–15 and accompanying text. 
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perception that the new form is better, despite a lack of evidence.326 These 
dynamics can contribute to the underproduction of valuable comparative 
information, lead to unnecessary and costly switches, and ultimately diminish 
incentives to make improved products. 
C. COGNITIVE CONSTRAINTS 
Well-documented cognitive constraints, combined with various pressures 
on prescribers, can reinforce these effects. Returning to the advertising 
example, it may well be accurate that some caregivers prefer Namenda XR to 
IR even though evidence does not support the switch,327 but busy physicians328 
might not closely scrutinize the ad and erroneously come to believe that XR 
actually works better, or has replaced IR as the standard of care.329 The print 
ad did state in relatively small font that “[t]here is no study addressing the 
comparative efficacy” of Namenda XR and IR, but medical care providers do 
not always notice such disclaimers.330  
For example, a recent study of perceptions of a print ad suggesting an 
“alternative” treatment found that only 44.9% of the physicians surveyed 
noticed the “context statement” declaring that “[t]he products in this price 
comparison may or may not be equally effective or safe.”331 In contrast, a 
significantly larger percentage, 76%, noticed the price comparison that the 
advertiser intended for them to notice.332 The study’s authors concluded that 
“[t]he context statement did not affect evaluations of the price-comparison 
claim’s importance or accuracy and did not have the intended effects on 
 
 326. See Darrow, supra note 47, at 385–87 (describing the “patent halo”); cf. Evans, supra note 
57, at 491 (“Today’s drug labeling tells only what is known about a drug’s risks and benefits but 
does not give a sense of all that is still unknown. This has contributed to a culture of mass drug 
marketing and consumption in which people are eager to get the latest drug, often believing that 
it must be better and safer than older drugs when in fact, such comparative data rarely exist.” (citing 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDICAL TREATMENTS 4 
(2007), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8891/12-18-ComparativeEffectiveness.pdf)). See 
generally Mansfield et al., supra note 14 (discussing unjustified perceptions of superiority of certain 
types of new drug versions).   
 327. See Deardorff & Grossberg, supra note 14, at 3269–76. 
 328. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, First Amendment Overprotection of “Alternative Facts”: The Case of 
Cognitive Biases with Pharmaceutical Marketing, 94 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 25), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3152645 (“[A]lthough doctors are trained in science, as busy 
individuals, they often don’t read more than abstracts, which have been found to be inaccurate.”). 
 329. See supra note 287 and accompanying text (explaining that, based on malpractice 
concerns and other factors, the real or perceived customary approach for treating certain 
conditions can drive prescribing decisions). See generally David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, It Was 
on Fire When I Lay Down on It: Why Medical Malpractice Reform Can’t Fix Healthcare, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 556 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2017) (discussing the influence 
of malpractice law on medical care and the challenge of reform).  
 330. See supra note 321; see also Kevin R. Betts et al., Physician Response to Contextualized Price-
Comparison Claims in Prescription Drug Advertising, 10 J. COMM. HEALTHCARE 195, 203–04 (2017).  
 331. Betts, supra 330, at 200. 
 332. Id. at 196, 202.  
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perceptions of uncertainty about drug interchangeability.”333 Indeed, “a 
realistic context statement to a physician-targeted prescription drug ad did 
not generate sufficient awareness of claim caveats to differentiate price-
comparison response of those exposed to the context statement from those 
who were not.”334 Another study showed that journal advertisements and 
other forms of marketing have a greater effect on physician prescribing 
decisions than evidence in scientific articles.335 These findings are consistent 
with broader claims that so-called “schemas,” or biases, and other cognitive 
limitations—in addition to time constraints—can interfere with sound 
medical decision-making in the face of drug advertising.336  
Although examples of limitations on human ability to scrutinize 
advertising messages can certainly be found outside the prescription drug 
context, pharmaceutical markets can make for a particularly challenging 
environment in which to make rational decisions. Drugs are a paradigmatic 
example of so-called “credence goods,” or products whose utility and quality 
consumers can have difficulty assessing, even after consumption.337 By their 
nature, credence goods present the possibility of significant information 
asymmetries between manufacturers and even sophisticated medical 
professionals—let alone patients.338 The information gap, after all, is one of 
the reasons for the existence of the FDA and the pre-marketing approval 
process.339 Thus, when the other defects in this market are combined with 
 
 333. Id. at 195.  
 334. Id.  
 335. Pierre Azoulay, Do Pharmaceutical Sales Respond to Scientific Evidence?, 11 J. ECON. & MGMT. 
STRATEGY 551, 586 (2002) (“I find that marketing had a more pronounced direct effect on 
demand than science, but the latter was still statistically and economically significant.”). 
 336. See Ho, supra note 328. See generally Cynthia M. Ho, Drugged Out: How Cognitive Bias Hurts 
Drug Innovation, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 419 (2014) (uncovering schemas in another context in 
the pharmaceutical arena). 
 337. Daniel Carpenter, Confidence Games: How Does Regulation Constitute Markets?, in 
GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 164, 173–81 (Edward J. 
Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010); see also id. at 165 (“Evidence from the most rigorous and 
historically contextual studies suggests that institutions of entry and approval regulation have 
arisen in markets characterized by learning constraints, including credence good markets and 
markets with appreciable information asymmetries. In the absence of regulation, as well as in the 
presence of weak regulation, these markets are characterized by equilibrium fraud and “lemons 
problems.” (citing George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488–500 (1970))); Ariel Katz, Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation 
and Regulation in the Drug Industry, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 11–13 (2007). 
 338. Katz, supra note 337, at 27–28. 
 339. See generally CARPENTER, supra note 94 (discussing pharmaceutical regulation by the 
FDA). Indeed, addressing this market failure in information production is a standard economic 
justification for FDA regulation. See, e.g., Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 55, at 1956–57; see also 
Cahoy, supra note 305, at 627 (“An individual’s decision regarding the safety profile of a 
particular product can be manipulated, though, by controlling the information the individual 
receives.”). See generally Eisenberg, supra note 100 (discussing the role of the FDA in driving 
pharmaceutical innovation).  
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powerful advertising and acknowledged cognitive constraints, the lack of 
transparency with respect to marginal benefits of the new drug version relative 
to the one that is already being used can cause considerable difficulties for 
the participants in this market. 
The market, to be clear, has not collapsed. The Seroquel example 
illustrates that, in spite of these defects, drug modifications can lead to real 
improvements in patient care.340 Moreover, in switching from IR to XR, 
AstraZeneca generated some pre-market comparative data on titration—and 
was apparently also required to conduct post-approval comparative safety 
trials in that particular case.341 Other examples when a drug change offered 
an improvement in the overall quality of care, an advantage for a particular 
patient subpopulation, or at least a demonstrably different therapeutic profile 
backed up by data developed before approval, can be readily found.342 
Nonetheless, antitrust litigation reveals that strategic switches also happen 
with some frequency. The fact, for example, that Actavis lost in the Second 
Circuit tells the story: Comparative evidence establishing some difference or 
advantage of Namenda XR over IR, if it existed, would have defeated a 
monopolization claim by supplying a non-pretextual “procompetitive 
justification” for the change.343 
To reduce the incidence of such cases, a mechanism for forcing and 
transferring information is needed. I describe a proposal for implementing 
this goal, relying on the FDA as an information intermediary,344 in the Part 
that follows. Notably, firms that already undertake changes to newly patented 
products that are actually supported by pre-market comparative data are 
unlikely to be negatively affected by the proposal and, as I explain in Part VI, 
 
 340. See supra notes 217–23 and accompanying text. 
 341. See AstraZeneca Pharm. LP v. Anchen Pharm., Inc., Nos. 10-cv-1835 (JAP)(TJB), 2012 
WL 1065458, at *55 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2012) (additional docket numbers omitted), aff’d per curiam, 
498 F. App’x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 342. See, e.g., Bourgeois et al., supra note 310, at 5–7; Johan C.F. van Luijn et al., Superior 
Efficacy of New Medicines?, 66 EUR. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 445, 445–46 (2010).  
 343. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 658–60 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 344. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Lecture, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information 
Dissemination: How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 
477, 488–90 (2003); Amy Kapczynski, Dangerous Times: The FDA’s Role in Information Production, 
Past and Future, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2357, 2357–59 (2018); see also Laakmann, supra note 100, at 
147–48, 158–62 (discussing the institutional role of the FDA as an information intermediary); 
Anna B. Laakmann, The New Genomic Semicommons, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1001, 1038 (2015) (“The 
FDA further acts as an information intermediary by using its labeling authority to certify the 
credibility of drug and device manufacturers’ marketing claims. In addition to specifying the type 
and amount of data that manufacturers must generate before they can communicate with 
patients and physicians about intended uses of their products, the FDA filters how interpretations 
of that data are conveyed in product labels.” (citing Eisenberg, supra note 100, at 370–72)). But 
see Richard A. Epstein, Against Permititis: Why Voluntary Organizations Should Regulate the Use of 
Cancer Drugs, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1, 31–34 (2009) (questioning the FDA’s information-forcing role 
and suggesting reliance on private institutions to generate health care information).  
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will probably be helped by it in some ways.345 The challenge, of course, is to 
the firms that do not. While such firms could still sell the modified version 
—the idea is not to withhold approval when the data does not exist or has not 
been provided to the FDA346—they would be subjected to certain 
disadvantages. The proposal, then, may end up disincentivizing the 
development and marketing of drug modifications that,347 despite the lack of 
supporting comparative evidence at the time of approval, might have 
advantageous properties, in general or for some group of patients, that come 
to light only after some period of use. More globally, the proposal might drive 
down the amount of research devoted to cumulative innovation in the 
pharmaceutical space, and thereby reduce the number of drug options 
available on the market.348 
While I address the question of potential effects on cumulative 
innovation in Part VI, I emphasize here that firms that decide to forgo the 
costs of developing comparative data could still market the modified product 
and potentially achieve some degree of success. Thus, doctors could legally 
prescribe the new versions349 and justify insurance coverage in various ways: 
Perhaps, the other options have failed and this is the only alternative that 
remains, or there is particularized evidence that the follow-on form would 
work better for a specific patient—for example, an extremely forgetful 
individual for whom a lower pill burden would be critical no matter what the 
countervailing considerations might be.350 The goal of this proposal is only to 
make clear to the market that, before approval, the sponsor developed no 
FDA-verified comparative data relevant to prescribing decisions so that 
 
 345. See infra text accompanying notes 494–501. 
 346. See John Vernon et al., Fewer Drugs, Shorter Lives, Less Prosperity: The Impact of Comparative 
Effectiveness Research on Health and Wealth, 45 DRUG INFO. J. 699, 701 (2011). See generally Scott 
Gottlieb, The FDA Should Not Mandate Comparative-Effectiveness Trials, AEI HEALTH POL’Y OUTLOOK 
(June 2011), http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/HPO-2011-05-g.pdf (arguing 
against implementing CER by demanding proof of comparative effectiveness to obtain FDA 
approval). But cf. supra note 55 and accompanying text (exploring the possibility of using 
comparative effectiveness as a condition of drug approval).  
 347. This point assumes that a patent on the modification can still be acquired, but the stick 
proposed in Part IV would serve as enough of a counter-incentive to discourage investment into 
the modification. Cf. Shepherd, supra note 26, at 702–06 (discussing potentially negative effects 
on innovation brought on by the antitrust product hopping case law). 
 348. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION STIFLES 
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 57 (2006); see also Richard A. Epstein, Why America Does Not Have a 
Second Drug Problem, in INNOVATION AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON 
THE VIRTUES OF PROFIT 100, 117 (H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. & Jeremy R. Garrett eds., 2008) (“In 
cases of ‘ordinary’ markets, we welcome new entry as a way to expand consumer choice. There is 
no reason not to do the same here. The FDA should not be turned into an arbiter of 
marketability.”); Ross D. Petty, Limiting Product Choice: Innovation, Market Evolution, and Antitrust, 
21 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 269, 273 (2002) (“[D]ynamic innovation is crucial for maximizing 
consumer choice among products and services over time.”). 
 349. See supra notes 314–23 and accompanying text (describing allowable forms of drug advertising). 
 350. Korobkin, supra note 55, at 570 (discussing “[t]he problem of individual variation”).  
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physicians, patients, and payers can make decisions with this information in 
hand.351 The approach will not fix all the defects in this market, but the 
knowledge that the new version might not be a demonstrated “state of the art” 
product after all may ameliorate some of their consequences,352 such as 
unnecessary switches and unjustified spending on higher-priced drugs.353  
V. INDUCING SUBMISSION OF DRUG-COMPARISON DATA TO THE FDA  
As sketched out in the Introduction, the central feature of this Article’s 
proposal is an information-transferring mechanism through a drug’s labeling, 
and particularly via the printed material that comes with the drug as the 
package insert.354 The insert constitutes a centralized repository of 
information that officials at the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research have vetted and required the sponsor to include with the drug as 
marketed for the benefit of prescribers, users, and payers.355  
Currently, material on the insert includes notations such as the drug’s 
approved indication, dosing, side effects, contraindications, patient 
counseling information, summaries of the clinical studies conducted during 
the approval process, and so on.356 The labeling is not always read as carefully 
as one might hope, but the FDA has taken measures—such as adopting the 
so-called “Physician Labeling Rule”357—in an effort to make these inserts 
somewhat more user-friendly. Moreover, if the labeling is to include new kinds 
of information such as comparative data, prescribers can be alerted about it 
through physician education campaigns. The FDA has conducted such 
campaigns in the past in other contexts, including as part of an effort to 
 
 351. Or, if the sponsor did develop such data, these market participants would proceed with 
knowledge of what the data shows.  
 352. One specific mechanism for ameliorating market defects is for payers to cover the 
cheaper form unless an incremental improvement is shown for the more expensive one. See Scott 
D. Halpern et al., Harnessing the Power of Default Options to Improve Health Care, 357 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1340, 1340 (2007).  
 353. And, further downstream, these dynamics could lead to evidence-driven medical 
innovation. See infra text accompanying notes 366–71, 408–20.  
 354. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (2018) (describing the content of the labeling that must 
accompany prescription drug products).  
 355. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (2018); Labeling Development Team, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER
/ucm443026.htm (last updated Sept. 27, 2018). 
 356. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57. 
 357. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH (CDER) & CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION 
& RESEARCH (CBER), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY: LABELING FOR HUMAN PRESCRIPTION DRUG AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS—IMPLEMENTING 
THE PLR CONTENT AND FORMAT REQUIREMENTS 1–2 (2013), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM075082.pdf. 
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inform physicians about cost-saving prescribing options.358 Finally, even if 
clinicians fail to examine the disclosures on the inserts,359 payers can point to 
it in making coverage decisions. The Sections that follow explain precisely 
what types of data the FDA would seek under this Article’s proposal, describe 
the sticks the agency could rely on to elicit the data from sponsors, and note 
which kinds of drug modifications would fall under the proposed regime, 
providing implementation details as needed. These Sections also explicate the 
benefits of the proposal.  
A. THE THRESHOLD STANDARD AND THE FDA’S TASK 
1. Theorizing Drug Comparisons 
Before setting forth the sticks the FDA could use to nudge companies 
into the development of comparative data, it is essential to define the nature 
of the data that the agency should be seeking and the sorts of information 
that would go on the insert. At the outset, it bears emphasizing that the 
concepts of drug safety and effectiveness cannot be pinned down with 
precision in an absolute sense. Although FDA approval of a drug requires 
“substantial evidence” of safety and effectiveness,360 the decision whether a 
product should be allowed on the market given its benefits and risks is 
ultimately a judgment call that the FDA must make based on this evidence.361  
Comparative drug analysis is even more difficult to perform because the 
comparisons can take place across a number of parameters.362 Between two or 
more drugs used to treat the same condition, relative safety or efficacy can 
vary depending on, for example, the sub-population of the patients under 
treatment.363 Two drug products that have different side effects are not readily 
 
 358. Scott Gottlieb & Leah Christl, FDA Taking New Steps to Better Inform Physicians About 
Biosimilars through Education About These Potentially Cost-Saving Options, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
(Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/FDAVoices/ucm612008.htm. 
 359. See Evans, supra note 57, at 508 (“Communicating risk-benefit information will not 
improve public health, unless the information actually is applied at the point when physicians 
prescribe drugs. Labeling changes repeatedly have been shown, in empirical studies, to have little 
impact on physicians’ prescribing behavior.” (first citing Walter Smalley et al., Contraindicated Use 
of Cisapride: Impact of Food and Drug Administration Regulatory Action, 284 JAMA 3036, 3038 (2000); 
then citing Raymond L. Woosley & Glenn Rice, A New System for Moving Drugs to Market, 21 ISSUES 
SCI. & TECH. 63 (2005))). Nonetheless, the cited studies precede the introduction of the Physician 
Labeling Rule. See Karen B. Feibus, FDA’s Proposed Rule for Pregnancy and Lactation Labeling: 
Improving Maternal Child Health Through Well-Informed Medicine Use, 4 J. MED. TOXICOLOGY 284, 
284 (2008) (“With development and implementation of the Physician Labeling Rule (PLR), FDA 
transformed the prescription drug label into a better communication tool in which information 
is better organized, clearly presented, and more easily located.”). 
 360. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). 
 361. See, e.g., Cahoy, supra note 305, at 627–28. 
 362. Bloche, supra note 284, at 446 (“Selection of outcome measures for such [comparative] 
studies is fraught with normative questions that lack agreed-on answers.”). 
 363. See, e.g., Roger Chou et al., Comparative Efficacy and Safety of Long-Acting Oral Opioids for 
Chronic Non-Cancer Pain: A Systematic Review, 26 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 1026, 1028, 1042 (2003). 
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comparable because such things can be basically incommensurable, and, even 
in theory, it may be difficult to make an absolute judgment as to which is 
“better” between two drugs, one of which is the safer and the other, more 
effective.364 Finally, how should one value improved convenience or 
adherence to a medication made possible, for example, by a different dosing 
schedule or a new drug delivery system? The sheer complexity of human 
health and the number of possible considerations involved in a choice 
between drug options make conclusive comparisons between two (or more) 
different drugs difficult.365 Nonetheless, although data that can enable 
definitive comparative judgments even between closely related drug products 
can be difficult to generate, the relevant public can still benefit from knowing 
for sure that no such data is available, that some data exists but is inconclusive 
in some respects, or that the evidence shows promise for health outcome 
improvements, but only for particular populations or in certain treatment 
settings. In particular, when one deals with closely related drug products, the 
number of potential axes of difference should be reduced, making a 
comparison more manageable than between drugs with different active 
pharmaceutical ingredients. 
Indeed, even without the theoretical possibility of a decisive comparative 
judgment between two drug versions, relevant data that can help physicians 
make informed, evidence-based decisions with respect to which drug form to 
choose in a particular scenario can still be developed.366 Consider again the 
example of Seroquel and the pre-market evidence of more rapid quetiapine 
titration with XR as opposed to IR: If a patient comes in with an acute episode 
of bipolar depression, getting to the maximum approved dose as soon as 
possible may be a critical priority, justifying the use of XR instead of IR.367 
Perhaps because of similar dynamics with other drugs, Dr. Kessler explained 
the value of examining the correlation between “blood levels of drug over 
time with the clinical outcomes”368 when a drug is converted from IR to XR, 
and highlighted the “need [for] clinical results in a variety of populations” 
taking XR products.369 Facilitation of tailored treatment decisions is a 
significant benefit even in cases where the data does not demonstrate that the 
new product is, to give an example of a standard that the FDA actually uses in 
another context, “clinically superior”—however that standard is to be 
 
 364. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (noting terminological differences between 
“efficacy” and “effectiveness”).  
 365. See Saver, supra note 287, at 2170–75. 
 366. See Cramer & Saks, supra note 67, at 483–84 (discussing potential axes of improvement 
for extended-release versus immediate-release drug products having the same active 
pharmaceutical ingredient). 
 367. See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text.  
 368. Kessler, supra note 68, at 440. 
 369. Id.  
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operationalized.370 Finally, because drugs are typically modified with 
particular purposes in mind, and a specific modification type (e.g., switch to 
XR) should normally lead to a limited number of expected effects in the 
functioning of the active pharmaceutical ingredient, researchers can readily 
form hypotheses based on which differences between the versions would be 
framed, tested, and evaluated.371 
2. The Proposed Standard and How to Meet It 
Since the concept of comparative efficacy is quite indeterminate 
—perhaps the better term is “clinical distinctiveness” given the challenge of 
absolute comparisons—the standard is best left open-ended. Thus, I frame 
the proposed standard as “data relevant to the relative performance of new 
product versions.”372 Although a permissive-seeming standard, it is still a 
substantial shift from what is currently done. Given the present default of 
proof of safety and effectiveness over a placebo,373 the paradigm of using the 
previous drug as a so-called “active comparator” when a modification takes 
place might get firms to think in terms of documented differences in clinical 
value, rather than only in terms of what can be patented.374 This standard 
would also untie the hands of the FDA, whose officials have shown an interest 
in undertaking such inquiries.375  
A significant number of companies already develop comparative data 
voluntarily376 or are required to do so by the FDA in certain special 
circumstances.377 A general authority for the FDA to request and analyze 
 
 370. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(c), (e) (2018) (requiring a showing of clinical superiority at the 
approval stage before recognizing regulatory exclusivity for a so-called “orphan drug”); see also id. 
§ 360cc(c)(2) (defining a “clinically superior” drug as one that “provides a significant therapeutic 
advantage over and above an already approved or licensed drug in terms of greater efficacy, 
greater safety, or by providing a major contribution to patient care”).  
 371. See, e.g., In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1062, 1068–69 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (describing a 
formulation that causes multiple peaks of blood concentration of the active pharmaceutical 
ingredient, an unexpected result that beneficially prevents patients from building tolerance to the 
drug); see also supra notes 204–23 and accompanying text (analyzing the unexpected results doctrine).  
 372. More rigorous standards are possible. See, e.g., supra note 370 and accompanying text; 
infra notes 482–83 and accompanying text (providing an example of a setting in which the FDA 
must use the “clinically superior” standard). Nonetheless, given the already significant shift 
toward comparative analysis proposed here and the difficulty of establishing superiority, a more 
permissive standard is appropriate. In Part VI, I discuss the objection that the standard could be 
readily gamed by sponsors.  
 373. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b) (2018). Sometimes, to be sure, availability of a new and 
clearly better drug could render the risk-benefit profile of an already-approved drug no longer 
acceptable, causing its withdrawal. See, e.g., infra notes 462–64 and accompanying text (providing 
a recent example of this scenario). 
 374. Cf. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2)(iv) (describing the option of using an “active control” to 
obtain new drug approval). 
 375. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.  
 376. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.  
 377. See NON-INFERIORITY CLINICAL TRIALS TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 58, at 7.  
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comparative drug information, however, could further curb strategic behavior 
and channel firms toward evidence-based drug modifications. In addition, it 
is important to grant the FDA the power to evaluate comparative data before 
marketing because, after approval, the agency loses a measure of control over 
both the sponsor and the product.378  
The FDA’s task would be to determine whether the information that the 
sponsor submitted meets the proposed standard and to work with the firm to 
draft conclusions that the data supports under the traditional “substantial 
evidence” standard.379 While the entirety of the raw data would not be 
revealed to the public, a summary of the data and the corresponding 
conclusions would become part of the product’s labeling. If doubts 
concerning the information’s relevancy remain, FDA officials could request 
that the sponsor submit a clarifying explanation or, perhaps, further 
disclosures before settling on the labeling—just as the FDA does during the 
regular approval process.380 As with other FDA decisions, third parties (such 
as generic competitors) could weigh in by filing so-called citizen petitions 
aiming to persuade the agency that the labeling statements are not fully 
supported.381 And if the FDA concludes that a sponsor submitted no relevant 
information, the agency would then mandate that the firm indicate this fact 
on the labeling in a prominent way.  
If, for its part, the sponsor is dissatisfied with the FDA’s determination 
with respect to the content of the labeling, it could challenge the 
determination in court under the Administrative Procedure Act382—though, 
to be sure, courts tend to defer greatly to the FDA on such matters, and such 
challenges rarely succeed.383 Of course, the sponsor could also opt out of the 
 
 378. See Kevin Fain et al., Research Letter, The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act 
and Postmarketing Commitments, 310 JAMA 202 (2013) (finding reduced rates of compliance with 
FDA-required post-marketing studies, as opposed to pre-marketing studies); see also Cahoy, supra 
note 305, at 632–34, 667–71 (noting the FDA’s limited ability to control the sponsor and product 
after approval and marketing); Kapczynski, supra note 344, at 2369–74 (discussing the problem 
of “incomplete data” that thwarts accurate post-marketing drug comparisons). See generally 
Steenburg, supra note 221.  
 379. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2018); see also 21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (reiterating the statutory standard 
of “adequate and well-controlled studies” for providing the basis for information on the labeling). 
 380. See Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 95 (setting forth the FDA’s drug approval process). 
See generally Richard A. Merrill, Regulation of Drugs and Devices: An Evolution, 13 HEALTH AFF. 47 
(1994) (describing the “drug model” of FDA regulation). 
 381. See 21 C.F.R. § 10.30. Confidentiality of sponsor data, however, could be a barrier here, 
as demonstrated in the course of challenges to other FDA decisions. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, 
The FDA’s Plan B Fiasco: Lessons for Administrative Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 927, 972 (2014).  
 382. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 383. See Steenburg, supra note 221, at 334 (“Recognizing their own limitations, courts are 
unwilling to question the agency’s judgment as to the necessary standards for assessing safety and 
efficacy.”); see also, e.g., Cytori Therapeutics, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 715 F.3d 922, 927 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013) (“A court is ill-equipped to second-guess that kind of agency scientific judgment under 
the guise of the [Administrative Procedure Act’s] arbitrary and capricious standard.”).  
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system altogether and agree to the “no relevant comparative data was 
provided” notation at the outset. To reiterate, though, even if the firm chooses 
not to participate in the data submission regime or is dissatisfied with the 
content of the FDA-approved labeling, it is still free to market the product 
and to convince prescribers to utilize it in spite of the lack of comparative 
information. Just as it paves the way for advertising off-label uses generally (as 
long as truthful and non-misleading),384 the First Amendment would prohibit 
sanctions against some types of comparative assertions that find support 
outside the labeling proposed here.385 Still, as I explain further in the next 
Section, the proposed labeling could temper the effects of such advertising.  
Significantly, the proposal does not task the FDA with engaging in cost-
effectiveness evaluations, which would push beyond the agency’s core 
competency of analyzing scientific data and into territory which it has 
historically been reluctant to enter.386 Instead, the standard demands only 
that the agency process and evaluate the submitted data in its role as an 
information intermediary and leaves the corresponding financial judgement 
calls to payers and others. As further discussed in the Section that follows, 
though, disclosures of comparative clinical effectiveness (or lack thereof) can 
help health care providers and patients make informed decisions with respect 
to whether a particular treatment is worth the cost—specifically, whether the 
evidence suggests that the more expensive, on-patent version of the drug may 
be worth switching to. 
Consistent with the open-ended standard proposed here, data acceptable 
for meeting the proposed standard could come from a variety of study types. 
Data can of course be very costly to generate, with the randomized head-to-
head general safety and efficacy clinical trial being the expensive gold 
 
 384. Indeed, in a manner analogous to the advertising of “off-label” uses, which is protected 
by the First Amendment, see supra note 314 and accompanying text, the sponsor could legally 
make comparative claims supported by truthful and non-misleading information unexamined by 
the FDA. See generally Cortez, supra note 317 (evaluating the statutes governing acceptable claims 
made in the course of drug marketing). Interestingly, though, sponsors currently wishing to make 
comparative claims often have difficulty meeting the “substantial evidence or substantial clinical 
experience” standard mandated by 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6)(ii). Cf. Coleen Klasmeier, Congress 
Should Clarify the Circumstances Under Which Drug Makers Can Communicate Results on Comparative 
Effectiveness, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2220, 2221–23 (2012) (questioning the FDA’s enforcement of this 
standard). The proposed approach clears up this gray area because the FDA would have already 
weighed in on whether comparative claims are supported by substantial evidence. See supra note 
378 and accompanying text.  
 385. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 
(1976). For example, even if the package insert explicitly states that no relevant comparative data was 
provided to the FDA, sponsors may still legally share scientific articles with physicians that describe 
studies comparing different drug forms. See Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 314, at 322–23. 
 386. But see David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Risky Business: Should the FDA Pay Attention 
to Pharmaceutical Prices?, 11 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 754, 768–69 (2017) (making the case that the 
FDA should engage in economic cost-benefit analysis in some circumstances). 
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standard for comparisons.387 Nonetheless, the proposal allows for some 
relatively inexpensive ways by which firms can surpass the “relevant to the 
relative performance” hurdle. Although the FDA would apply the proposed 
standard on a case-by-case basis, studies that could allow the sponsor to satisfy 
the standard include: (1) for extended-release products and new dosage 
forms in particular, studies examining and documenting improvements in 
patient compliance, reduction in the prevalence of a signature side effect 
associated with the original drug, differences in the impact of food 
consumption from that on the prior form,388 titration rates,389 and so on;  
(2) for certain products that embody “purer” versions of previously approved 
drugs, to be further discussed below,390 studies designed to determine 
whether the drug is more efficacious at the same amount of the active 
ingredient or whether there is a side effect reduction; (3) studies showing that 
the new drug version meets the “change in safety, purity, or potency” standard 
used to compare so-called “biologic” products, also to be discussed further 
below;391 (4) so-called “indirect comparisons” via analysis of clinical trial data 
gathered separately for the original and modified products that tend to 
establish some therapeutic distinction between the two;392 (5) so-called “non-
inferiority” trials that the FDA currently requires for approval of new anti-
infective drugs;393 and (6) any other information that the FDA deems relevant 
to the question of drug comparison, such as data on relative efficacy of the 
 
 387. See, e.g., C. Peter N. Watson et al., A Qualitative Systematic Review of Head-to-Head 
Randomized Controlled Trials of Oral Analgesics in Neuropathic Pain, 15 PAIN RES. & MGMT. 147, 147 
(2010) (“Head-to-head randomized controlled trials . . . are critical in all areas of clinical 
medicine . . . .”).  
 388. See Kessler, supra note 68, at 438, 440. 
 389. See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text (discussing Seroquel XR). 
 390. See infra notes 445–49 and accompanying text (discussing enantiomers). 
 391. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(C)(ii)(II) (2018); see also infra notes 485–91 and accompanying 
text (discussing biologics). 
 392. Schneeweiss et al., supra note 306, at 786 (describing indirect comparisons of data from 
separate placebo-controlled randomized clinical trials as a route for establishing comparative 
efficacy). Indeed, if the sponsor seeks to show a difference between two drug versions via an 
indirect comparison, the placebo-controlled approval data from the first product’s approval can 
be used as the active control against which the approval data for the second product (likewise 
placebo-controlled) would be compared.  
 393. See generally NON-INFERIORITY CLINICAL TRIALS TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 
58 (discussing the agency’s standards for requiring non-inferiority trials). Note that, though only 
used for antibiotics, this Guidance proffers a general rationale for using active controls: 
“Caregivers, third party payers, and some regulatory authorities have increasingly placed an 
emphasis on the comparative effectiveness of treatments, leading to more studies that compare 
two treatments. Such studies can provide information about the clinical basis for comparative 
effectiveness claims, which may be helpful in assessing cost effectiveness of treatments. If a 
placebo group is included in addition to the active comparator, it becomes possible to judge 
whether the study could have distinguished treatments that differed substantially, e.g., active drug 
versus placebo.” Id. at 7. 
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two versions in particular sub-populations. The labeling would make clear 
what specific study was done and describe its limitations.  
B. THE PROMISE OF CLEAR LABELING, AND A FURTHER POTENTIAL STICK 
1. Possible Benefits of Clear Labeling 
Will clear labeling make a difference? Whatever the potential advantages 
of labeling, it will certainly not get rid of the price disconnect problem or 
eliminate schemas and other cognitive limitations of the market 
participants.394 In general, it is clear from many contexts that mandated 
disclosure is no panacea.395 Still, the labeling can harness the ability of medical 
professionals to act more effectively as “learned intermediaries” on behalf of 
their patients by cutting through the noise generated by advertising, which 
may currently be conducted in a way that is largely unchallenged.396 While 
mandated disclosure can fail “[w]hen simple data will not do the job, when 
considerable information is needed to make a good decision, and when 
experience is required to use information well,”397 an insert that summarizes 
the comparative studies in a user-friendly way—and is perhaps accompanied 
by the above-mentioned education campaigns398—can go a long way in 
nudging physicians toward sensible prescribing.399 This dynamic can be 
reinforced if professional norms help the physicians build the instinct of 
“labeling first” when confronted with comparative advertising.400 Finally, if 
 
 394. See supra Part IV. 
 395. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 647, 651 (2011). 
 396. See Russell G. Thornton, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Its Effects on Prescribing 
Physicians, 16 BAYLOR U. MED. CTR. PROC. 359, 359 (2003). The role of the learned intermediary 
doctrine is to shield manufacturers from tort claims based on inadequate warnings. Underlying 
that doctrine is the assumption that the prescriber is responsible for informing the patient of the 
risks and benefits of a drug. But see State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 
909–11 (W. Va. 2007) (declining to adopt the learned intermediary doctrine in part because of 
the proliferation of direct-to-consumer advertising).  
 397. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 395, at 746. 
 398. See supra notes 356–58 and accompanying text.  
 399. For skepticism, see Evans, supra note 57, at 508; supra note 359 and accompanying text. 
See also Darrow, supra note 47, at 368 (“Although drug labels are required to contain a section 
describing clinical trial results, this information is buried in section fourteen of the package 
insert, is often written in such a way that it is difficult for doctors (let alone patients) to 
understand, and is not standardized even among drugs within the same category, making 
assessments of comparative efficacy difficult or impossible.” (footnotes omitted)). Professor 
Darrow’s characterization, however, refers to the current approach to labeling—which does not 
include comparative information and thus forces physicians who wish to engage in comparative 
analysis to piece together data from different drug inserts and other sources.  
 400. See generally Ann Jacoby et al., A Qualitative Study to Explore Influences on General 
Practitioners’ Decisions to Prescribe New Drugs, 53 BRIT. J. GEN. PRAC. 120 (2003) (describing the role 
of professional norms in driving rational prescribing decisions). 
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nothing else, the labeling would serve as a very clear signal for payers401—and 
the decisions of the payers inclined to make side deals with manufacturers to 
continue selling higher-priced drugs may be viewed in a more skeptical 
light,402 perhaps leading to public pressure that would discourage such deals.  
Indeed, the complete absence of comparative data in particular could be 
highlighted in a highly conspicuous manner, similar to the “black box 
warning” one currently sees for particularly dangerous side effects of a 
drug.403 And while the labeling would not directly resolve the hard switch 
problem, one imagines that an antitrust case against firms that product-
hopped against the background of demonstrable absence of comparative data 
should be particularly straightforward to make out, likely resulting in the 
remedy of having both products on the market.404 With the new information 
on the insert, moreover, physicians may be convinced to make the reverse 
switch more readily if that becomes necessary.405 Therefore, the required 
labeling could ultimately help the market reward those sponsors who have 
made a credible case that the new version provides a therapeutic advantage 
over, or at least a useful distinction from, the original. Conversely, sponsors 
who have failed to submit relevant comparative data may fare less well in the 
now better-informed market for pharmaceutical drugs,406 particularly when 
the modified form is significantly more expensive due to patent protection. 
In sum, the proposed disclosures can help ensure that therapies are not 
 
 401. Cf. Liora Sukhatme, Note, Deterring Fraud: Mandatory Disclosure and the FDA Drug Approval 
Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1242 (2007) (explaining the importance of disclosure of drug-
related information for another class of individuals with a stake in the accuracy of clinical trial 
data—investors); see also supra notes 293–99 and accompanying text (discussing the complex role 
of payers in drug pricing). 
 402. See supra notes 300–01 and accompanying text. 
 403. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., A GUIDE TO DRUG SAFETY TERMS AT FDA 2 (2012), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/forconsumers/consumerupdates/ucm107976.pdf. Although the 
patient normally does not see the package insert until after he or she acquires a drug from the 
pharmacy, and black box warnings are generally meant for clinicians as learned intermediaries, 
not patients, the clinicians are actually required to discuss black box warnings with patients before 
prescribing the drug. See Becky Upham, What Is a Black Box Warning for a Drug?, EVERYDAY HEALTH, 
https://www.everydayhealth.com/fda/what-black-box-warning-drug (last updated June 26, 2018). 
In a similar way, the proposed labeling might initiate a conversation about possible reasons for the 
switch from one drug form to another between the doctor and the patient.  
 404. See infra text accompanying notes 519–21 (noting that antitrust actions against product 
hopping can still play a role even if this Article’s proposal is adopted).  
 405. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 656 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(explaining that unwillingness to switch back to the generic could be driven by both patient 
welfare concerns and by the lack of advertising by generics). 
 406. Holman et al., supra note 150, at 138 (“A critic of follow-on patents might argue that, 
even in cases in which the follow-on patent covers a trivial or illusory improvement, a drug 
company may promote the improved version and convince doctors to prescribe it in spite of it 
being more expensive than the original product and providing little, if any, additional benefit. If 
that were the case, it would not be the fault of the patent system; it would be a deficiency in the 
market that should be corrected.”).  
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“prematurely adopted, outpacing the generation of evidence necessary to 
define the boundaries of where a drug or device offers clinical benefit.”407 
In addition to the immediate value of fostering more rational selections 
between alternative drug forms, the proposed approach—if it succeeds in 
eliciting and transferring a substantial amount of comparative information 
between the versions—could have downstream benefits as well. Although pre-
marketing data can be of more limited value than the real-world data actually 
developed after clinical practice begins,408 there is an important feedback 
mechanism between the two.409 For example, pre-approval comparative 
efficacy studies of ADHD drugs in Europe have yielded important information 
that was supplemented in the course of clinical practice,410 and this dynamic 
has been observed in other instances.411 Thus, even when not definitive on 
the therapeutic effectiveness front, comparative studies performed by drug 
makers before marketing can serve as an impetus for future research and data 
analysis.412 In all, by “motivating the provision of information”413 in the drug-
comparison scenario, the FDA could help drive medical and scientific 
innovation in the pharmaceutical space.  
In particular, disclosures generated under the proposed regime can 
contribute to the program of comparative effectiveness research (“CER”), 
which has become a major national priority in the past decade. The statute 
that significantly broadened CER414 and brought it into the national spotlight, 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, allocated 1.1 billion 
dollars toward research conducted in the two years since the statute’s 
 
 407. Alexander & Stafford, supra note 55, at 2488; see Sorenson et al., supra note 55, at 514; 
see also Bethany Fox, Closing the Information Gap: Informing Better Medical Decisionmaking Through the 
Use of Post-Market Safety and Comparative Effectiveness Information, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 83, 83 
(2012) (“The statutory efficacy requirements for approval do not require a determination of the 
relative effectiveness of the product as compared with other treatment options, which results in 
a . . . dearth of premarket comparative information. Uncertainty regarding the risks and relative 
benefits of prescription drugs leaves physicians and patients in an information vacuum.”). 
 408. See Evans, supra note 57, at 470–75. 
 409. See supra notes 303–10 and accompanying text. 
 410. Bourgeois et al., supra note 310, at 5–7. 
 411. Brett T. Venker et al., Safety and Efficacy of New Anticoagulants for the Prevention of Venous 
Thromboembolism After Hip and Knee Arthroplasty: A Meta-Analysis, 32 J. ARTHROPLASTY 645, 651 
(2017); see Iijima et al., supra note 308, at 7–12; Y.K. Loke & C.S. Kwok, Dabigatran and 
Rivaroxaban for Prevention of Venous Thromboembolism—Systematic Review and Adjusted Indirect 
Comparison, 36 J. CLINICAL PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 111, 122 (2011); Schneeweiss et al., supra 
note 306, at 788 (“Robust [comparative effectiveness] results, produced as quickly as possible, 
have enormous importance for patients and payers.”); van Luijn et al., supra note 342, at 446–48.  
 412. Alexander & Stafford, supra note 55, at 2488. 
 413. Eisenberg, supra note 100, at 373.  
 414. Legislative efforts to install CER can be traced back to the 2003 Medicare Modernization 
Act, which created the first federal CER mandate. See CAROL M. ASHTON & NELDA P. WRAY, 
COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH: EVIDENCE, MEDICINE, AND POLICY 135 (2013). 
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passage.415 A later statute,416 the well-known Affordable Care Act, “established 
a permanent US CER entity called the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research 
Institute (PCORI) to guide the federal CER enterprise.”417 PCORI’s mandate 
is comparative clinical effectiveness, not cost-effectiveness,418 but Medicare 
administrators can consider its “CER findings for coverage decisions.”419 
Although the larger CER program, as administered through PCORI and 
elsewhere, is focused on post-marketing research, some commentators believe 
that a successful CER strategy requires production of “data prior to the 
widespread adoption of a drug or treatment.”420  
Unsurprisingly, CER has generated controversy, with some 
commentators expressing concern that studies conducted under the aegis of 
the program would lead to rationing of care,421 including denials of therapy 
options that are clinically justifiable but expensive. Although such critiques, 
while extremely weighty, are not insurmountable and have been addressed 
elsewhere,422 it is important to reiterate that wide-ranging adoption of CER at 
the FDA is not the goal of this proposal.423 The focus, instead, is strictly on 
follow-on versions of already-approved drugs coming from the same firm.424 
This emphasis is justified because the product hop pattern has demonstrated 
particular susceptibility to information asymmetries and resulting market 
 
 415. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 
177, 187–88 (2009); see also 42 U.S.C. § 299b-8 (2018) (creating a Federal Coordinating Council 
for Comparative Effectiveness Research and providing appropriations). 
 416. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L. 111-148, §§ 6301, 6302, 124 
Stat. 119, 727–47 (2010). 
 417. Riaz Ali et al., Comparative Effectiveness Research in the United States: A Catalyst for Innovation, 
4 AM. HEALTH & DRUG BENEFITS 68, 69 (2011).  
 418. Saver, supra note 287, at 2160. 
 419. Ali et al., supra note 417, at 71. 
 420. Alexander & Stafford, supra note 55, at 2488.  
 421. See, e.g., Scott Gottlieb, Congress Wants to Restrict Drug Access, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2009, 
12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123241385775896265; see also TOMAS J. PHILIPSON 
& ERIC SUN, BLUE PILL OR RED PILL: THE LIMITS OF COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 6 
(2011), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/fda_04.pdf (“As currently implemented, CER uses 
population-based measures of response to identify ‘winning’ treatments and shifts demand toward 
these treatments by affecting clinical decision making and reimbursement policies. That approach falls 
short of the goal of finding the best treatment for an individual patient and could actually reduce 
patient health if the ‘winning’ or optimal therapy varies significantly for each patient.”). 
 422. See, e.g., Jerry Avorn, Debate About Funding Comparative-Effectiveness Research, 360 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1927, 1928–29 (2009). 
 423. Cf. supra note 346 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of proposals to make 
comparative efficacy a condition of approval). 
 424. See Ghislandi, supra note 168, at 29 (concluding that follow-on product changes take 
place primarily within a single firm because “a firm, being able to strategically influence the 
market, could keep its market shares by patenting and launching a new product similar to the 
existing ones”); see also supra text accompanying note 172 (noting that questions with respect 
applying the proposed regime to various corporate forms, such as subsidiaries and spinouts, 
would need to be addressed under the “same firm” inquiry).  
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failures,425 creating a need for mechanisms that could sort strategic conduct 
from genuine innovation.426 Under this Article’s proposal, treatment options 
that are likely to be less favored are those for which the sponsor provided no 
comparison with the prior option at all, suggesting (price aside) that the 
patient might not draw an incremental benefit from the change. Thus, the 
data developed under the proposal is unlikely to present ethically complex 
care rationing scenarios.427 
2. The Orange Book Variation 
If the FDA’s proposed authority for comparative data analysis and the 
corresponding addition to the labeling prove inadequate in eliciting the 
generation and forcing the disclosure of such data, a more vigorous stick 
against product hopping is available. This measure concerns withholding the 
privilege of having a patent covering a drug product listed in the Orange Book 
from firms that fail to produce the evidence needed to meet the “relevant to 
the relative performance” threshold. As discussed in Part II, the Orange Book 
constitutes an important linking mechanism between pharmaceutical patents 
and FDA approval.428 To obtain an Orange Book listing, brand companies  
shall file with the [NDA] the patent number and the expiration date 
of any patent which claims the drug for which the applicant 
submitted the application . . . and with respect to which a claim of 
patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not 
licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of 
the drug.429  
To recap the patent litigation consequences of an Orange Book listing, the 
Patent Act deems the filing of an ANDA to market a generic version of a 
branded drug protected by one or more unexpired Orange Book-listed patents 
an act of patent infringement.430 To seek approval of an ANDA when such 
patents exist, the generic firm must file a Paragraph IV certification with the 
 
 425. See supra Part IV. 
 426. Wertheimer & Santella, supra note 65, at 7 (“[I]t is imperative to separate the 
constructive process of incremental innovation from transparent attempts to extend patent 
protection periods with minor modifications of little therapeutic advantage.”); Joanna Shepherd, 
The Prescription for Rising Drug Prices: Competition or Price Controls?, 27 HEALTH MATRIX 315, 345 
(2017) (addressing “sham innovation that does not justify shifts in marketing effort or redirecting 
consumers”); see also Mueller & Chisum, supra note 54, at 1106 n.12 (“Drawing the line between 
improper attempts at evergreening and legitimate incremental innovation is a broad and difficult 
problem in patent law . . . .”). 
 427. See generally Govind Persad, Priority Setting, Cost-Effectiveness, and the Affordable Care Act,  
41 AM. J.L. & MED. 119 (2015) (setting forth potential rationales behind decisions to restrict 
certain treatments under the Affordable Care Act).  
 428. See supra notes 105–10 and accompanying text. 
 429. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2018). 
 430. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2). 
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FDA, setting forth the basis as to why each patent is invalid or not infringed.431 
Once the brand initiates the patent suit typically triggered by such a filing, 
FDA approval of the ANDA is postponed for 30 months unless all of the 
asserted Orange Book patents are adjudged to be invalid or not infringed 
before that time.432 
The certification requirement and the 30-month stay of approval are 
significant regulatory benefits for brand companies that gain approvals of 
their NDAs, and they apply to both pioneering and follow-on drugs.433 To 
create a stronger form of inducement for comparative data generation, the 
FDA could, in addition to requiring the new labeling disclosures, be given the 
power to exclude patents of sponsors who fail to provide relevant data from 
the Orange Book.434 Although one way to implement the proposal is to deny a 
listing every time a firm fails to meet the proposed standard, a more flexible 
approach that takes into account the particular circumstances of the switch 
may enable the FDA to use delisting more effectively as a deterrent.435 Thus, 
in addition to being given the authority to demand the new labeling 
disclosures, the FDA could be granted a discretionary power to deny an Orange 
Book listing in cases where the sponsor did not even attempt to surpass the 
threshold, or where the timing of the potential switch is particularly suggestive 
 
 431. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). A different statutory provision applies to “use” 
patents. See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii).  
 432. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 433. See Bouchard et al., supra note 106 (explaining the value of the patent-regulatory linkage 
for firms marketing approved branded drugs); see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 30, at 709–12 
(cataloguing benefits of Orange Book listings to brand companies).  
 434. Cf. Eisenberg & Crane, supra note 33, at 218–20 (calling on the FDA to take on a greater 
role in managing Orange Book listings); Sherkow, supra note 33, at 214–15, 250–53 (arguing that 
the FDA should do more to police the Orange Book). Nonetheless, unlike these proposals, this 
Article does not task the FDA with enforcing any aspect of substantive patent law—another area 
the agency has been unwilling to enter. Instead, the proposal goes to the FDA’s core competency, 
which is the evaluation of safety and effectiveness of drugs. 
 435. There are, incidentally, already some existing instances of “discrimination” between 
patents in the context of the patent-FDA regulatory interface, and these provisions confirm that 
disparate treatment of primary and secondary patents is both precedented and legally cognizable. 
For example, only one Orange Book patent covering a drug is eligible for term extension to 
account for FDA delays, 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(4), and patents eligible for extension are limited to 
those on pioneering forms of drugs, id. § 156(a)(5). See Ouellette, supra note 152, at 306 (“Only 
one patent per drug may be extended, and extensions are granted only for ‘the first permitted 
commercial marketing or use of the product,’ meaning that a patent owner cannot extend a 
patent on a drug that is merely a new formulation of an old ‘product.’” (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(5))). Interestingly, though, patent extensions under this subsection 
have been allowed for so-called “prodrugs.” See Photocure ASA v. Kappos, 603 F.3d 1372, 1375 
(Fed. Cir. 2010); Ouellette, supra note 152, at 312 & n.84 (addressing the holding in Photocure 
ASA v. Kappos). For a further discussion of prodrugs, see Amy Kapczynski et al., Polymorphs and 
Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis of “Secondary” Pharmaceutical Patents, 7 PLOS ONE 
e49470, Dec. 5, 2012, at 5–8; infra note 448 and accompanying text. 
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of a strategic product hop.436 The delisting authority would be a marked 
regulatory shift carrying with it the potential of reducing the incidence of such 
conduct—and, conversely, encouraging the production of comparative data.  
Even without an Orange Book listing, to be sure, brand companies can sue 
generics for patent infringement under traditional theories of liability (i.e., 
outside the Hatch-Waxman framework) once the latter launch their ANDA-
approved products.437 The generics would thus be exposed to the risks of 
monetary damages and potentially an injunction against further marketing of 
their products.438 Nonetheless, at least approvals of the ANDAs will not be 
delayed by Paragraph IV certifications and 30-month stays and, given that 
courts do invalidate follow-on patents with some frequency,439 the risks may 
be worthwhile for the generics to take. In some cases, moreover, the FDA’s 
determination of no therapeutic difference between the original and follow-
on products may be deployed to counter a theory of non-obviousness based 
on unexpected results, or at least used as a basis for questioning the data 
submitted by the sponsor in court.440 In addition, even if found liable, generic 
companies may convince courts that an injunction is unwarranted because 
the equities—and particularly the public interest factor, based on the 
 
 436. Note that an exclusion of certain patents from the Orange Book does not violate the “anti-
discrimination” provision of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (“TRIPS”) Article 27.1, an international treaty that the United States has acceded to, 
because Orange Book listings are viewed as a regulatory benefit that is not a part of the regular bundle 
of rights that comes with a patent. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C art. 27, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197. Indeed, some TRIPS jurisdictions do not have an 
Orange Book equivalent. See generally Bouchard, supra note 106, at 174 (characterizing the “privileged 
models of therapeutic product development” that exist independent of international treaties). 
Moreover, although it should be noted that this Article’s proposal does not limit patent rights as 
such, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health supports the notion that 
enforcement of patent rights should be balanced against health-care concerns. See generally Amir 
Attaran, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Access to Pharmaceuticals, and 
Options Under WTO Law, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 859 (2002); WTO Panel Finds 
2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health Is an Agreement Between Members, 
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.keionline.org/28950. I thank Professor 
Janewa Osei-Tutu for suggesting that I make this point.  
 437. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)–(c); see aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 241 n.7  
(4th Cir. 2002) (“It is important to recognize that the . . . patentee can still pursue patent 
infringement suits against generic manufacturers. It is simply deprived of the opportunity to 
litigate its infringement claims under the shelter of the thirty-month stay.”). 
 438. See, e.g., AstraZeneca AB v. Apotex Corp., 782 F.3d 1324, 1329–32, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 439. See Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 51, at 327–28.  
 440. Cf. supra Section IV.B.2 (explaining that evidence that has not been vetted by the FDA and 
lacks clinical validity can influence non-obviousness determinations at the PTO or during litigation); 
see also Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, 66 DUKE L.J. 845, 907–11 (2017) 
(noting that information developed after the filing of a patent application sometimes brings to light 
the fact that the claims fail the enablement requirement of patentability). 
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deficient FDA submission441—may generally favor defendants in such 
circumstances. And while the availability of monetary damages for 
infringement might discourage such “at risk” launches,442 some generics 
could still be motivated to enter the market based on the probability of 
invalidation. Moreover, while generic firms may well balk at selling drug 
modifications for which the sponsor has demonstrated no provable difference 
from the old form, the proposal should at least facilitate generic sales of the 
off-patent product.  
C. CATEGORIES OF QUALIFYING DRUG CHANGES 
One critical task for the FDA under the proposed regime is to identify 
categories of drug changes that would be subject to the clear labeling 
requirement for dealing with potential product hops. While the 
determination is not straightforward one, it is encouraging that the FDA has 
already done some useful legwork by classifying New Drug Applications 
(“NDAs”) by product type. The different NDA product categories that the 
FDA recognizes include the “New Molecular Entity” category, which covers 
drugs having “an active ingredient that contains no active moiety that has 
been previously approved by [the FDA]” (Type 1); “New Active Ingredient” 
drugs, which involve relatively common chemical modifications of already-
approved molecular entities with the active moiety unchanged, such as 
formation of so-called “esters” or “salts” (Type 2); “New Dosage Form,” a 
category that may include drugs having a composition identical to that of an 
already approved drug product (Type 3); “New Combination,” chemical or 
physical, of two separate drugs—a category that, as relevant here, includes two 
drugs both of which have already been approved (Type 4); and “New 
Formulation,” a category that, as relevant here, includes a product that 
embodies “changes in inactive ingredients that require . . . clinical studies for 
approval,” a product that “contains an active ingredient or active moiety that 
 
 441. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. CIBA Vision Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 
1285, 1290–94 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (denying an injunction in a health care patent infringement 
case based in part on the public interest factor for whether to grand equitable relief). Because of 
the proposed de-linking from the Orange Book, the patentee would not have a remedy of an 
automatic injunction against ANDA approval under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(B), another 
important benefit of listing. See Braintree Labs., Inc. v. Novel Labs., Inc., 749 F.3d 1349, 1367 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (Moore, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile the injunction remedy [under 35 U.S.C. § 283] 
rests within the discretion of the district court, the order to delay the approval of the ANDA until 
patent expiration is not discretionary. [35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A),(B)]. . . . [T]his is exactly what 
the statutory language commands. The statute requires the court to delay approval until 
expiration of the patent, even if there is only a single infringement. And since the generic can’t 
launch without FDA approval, the statute creates a de facto injunction.”). 
 442. Cf. AstraZeneca, 782 F.3d at 1344 (discussing measurement of the “value of what was 
taken” in the determination of reasonable royalty damages in a Hatch-Waxman case). Another, 
even more powerful, option for the prevailing patentee is the lost profits measure of damages. 
See id. at 1334 n.3; David Manspeizer, The Law on Damages in Generic Drug Launches Remains Vague, 
N.Y. L.J., Jan. 6, 2014, at 2, https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202633987243.  
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has been previously approved or marketed in the United States only as part of 
a combination,” or a product that “contains a different strength of one or 
more active ingredients in a previously approved or marketed combination” 
(Type 5).443  
Therefore, in spite of relying on the “safe and effective” standard 
demonstrable over a placebo for most new approvals and carefully noting 
“[t]hese codes are not indicative of the extent of innovation or therapeutic 
value that a particular drug represents,”444 the FDA already acknowledges the 
reality that there are different kinds of drug inventions. While one of these 
categories, Type 1, calls out new molecular entities that cannot be fairly 
classified as new versions of known drugs, the rest of the recited categories 
(e.g., Types 3 and 5, which should cover newly approved extended-release 
and dosage-form drug products having known pharmaceutical ingredients) 
do not refer to products containing new molecules. NDA classification codes, 
therefore, provide an excellent starting point for an inclusive “product 
modification” class that would be subject to the proposed regime.  
In addition to the categories identified by the FDA as Types 2 through 5, 
experience has taught of other recurring patterns of drug changes that may 
be made for strategic reasons. One contentious area includes a product 
change from so-called “racemate” drugs to pure “enantiomers,” which—to 
simplify the chemistry significantly—entails taking a drug initially marketed 
as a mixture into two distinct, closely related molecules, separating the 
mixture into its individual components, and marketing one of them as a new 
drug.445 In the context of deciding whether to grant a regulatory new chemical 
entity exclusivity, the FDA has struggled with classifying enantiomers, with 
Congress ultimately stepping in with a compromise solution of empowering 
the agency to grant exclusivity where the pure enantiomer is approved for 
new indications in a different therapeutic class.446 The close chemical kinship 
between a racemate and one of its enantiomers, reinforced by decision-
 
 443. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POLICY AND PROCEDURES: OFFICE OF PHARMACEUTICAL 
QUALITY: NDA CLASSIFICATION CODES 2–5 (2015), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/aboutfda/ 
centersoffices/officeofmedicalproductsandtobacco/cder/manualofpoliciesprocedures/ucm47
0773.pdf. This manual also discusses other types of new drug products that are not relevant to 
the purposes of this Article’s proposal. Id. at 5–7. 
 444. Id. Conceptually similar to these categories might be chemical entities related to the 
original product, such as enantiomers and prodrugs, discussed below. See infra note 448; see also 
supra note 435 (referencing a term extension carve-out for patents covering new formulations). 
 445. See Kyle Faget, Comment, Why FDCA Section 505(U) Should Not Concern Us Greatly,  
15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 453, 454 (2009) (discussing the “limited effect [of 
§ 505(u)] on drug development incentives”); see also Lemley, supra note 207, at 1377–79, 1384–87 
(scrutinizing the patenting of enantiomers). See generally Darrow, supra note 168 (describing 
racemate drugs and enantiomers).  
 446. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(u) (2018); Faget, supra note 445, at 458–65; Aparna Nemlekar et 
al., FDA Is Evolving on Qualifications for ‘New Chemical Entity’, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (Sept. 7, 2016), 
http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications/fda-is-evolving-on-qualifications-for-new-chemical-entity-
2016-09-07. 
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makers’ unwillingness to treat purified enantiomers as full-on new molecular 
entities, suggests that such drug products should be treated as “modifications” 
of known drugs under this Article’s proposal, triggering a comparative 
inquiry.  
Moreover, as with extended-release formulations, the closest prior art to 
the enantiomer for patentability purposes is almost always its predecessor, the 
racemate, and unexpected results can play a similarly crucial role in the 
inquiry into whether the enantiomer overcomes the § 103 hurdle.447 The 
strong similarity between the racemate-enantiomer and original-
reformulation dynamics suggests that enantiomers should fall under the 
proposed regime. As with other modifications, the FDA’s power to examine 
the data critically would be a weighty stick in this context.448 To be sure, 
 
 447. See, e.g., Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293, 1301–03 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (discussing unexpected clinical properties of the claimed enantiomer in the 
context of § 103 analysis); see also UCB, Inc. v. Accord Healthcare, Inc., 890 F.3d 1313, 1318 
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (upholding the validity of an enantiomer patent where the specification stated 
“that ‘the R stereoisomer is unexpectedly more potent than the corresponding S stereoisomer 
and the racemic mixture.’” (citation omitted)). To be sure, sometimes weighing against non-
obviousness in enantiomer cases is the difficulty of enantiomer separation—which, combined 
with unexpected properties, could bolster the case for patentability. See, e.g., Sanofi-Synthelabo v. 
Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The district court found that this separation 
was not a simple or routine procedure and that success in separation, as well as the allocation of 
properties, was unpredictable.”); Forest Labs., Inc. v. Ivax Pharm., Inc., 501 F.3d 1263, 1269 
(Fed. Cir. 2007); Mansfield, supra note 14. Conversely, the challenges of making the claimed 
formulation in a useful form are sometimes introduced to bolster non-obviousness of patents on 
extended-release formulations. See, e.g., Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., No.  
14–882–LPS, 2017 WL 1199767, at *25 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2017) (noting an argument that the 
prior art compound “is highly soluble, making it difficult to slow its release”), aff’d on other grounds, 
903 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 448. Another common modification type is the formation of a so-called “prodrug,” a 
chemically modified version of the active drug that metabolizes to the active form of the drug. 
Such derivatives could improve the therapeutic efficacy of the drug product, and also its stability. 
See generally, e.g., Sherif I. Farag Badawy, Effect of Salt Form on Chemical Stability of an Ester Prodrug of 
a Glycoprotein IIb/IIIa Receptor Antagonist in Solid Dosage Forms, 223 INT’L J. PHARMACEUTICS 81 
(2001) (finding that a “salt form” modification has significant value for the pH stability of a drug). 
Arguments made in this Article about new formulations and enantiomers apply to prodrugs (as 
well as other modifications, such as new salt or crystalline forms of drugs), with the caveat that 
the discussion of manufacturing improvements in the paragraph that follows is also highly 
relevant to these products. See, e.g., Millennium Pharm., Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 862 F.3d 1356, 1362, 
1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding claimed ester prodrug non-obvious, as established through 
“unexpectedly superior stability, solubility, and dissolution” where prior art compound was 
denied FDA approval because of instability); In re Carabateas, 345 F.2d 1013, 1017–18 (C.C.P.A. 
1965) (holding claimed ester prodrug obvious in spite of some improved therapeutic 
properties); see also supra note 443 and accompanying text (discussing drugs products that fall 
under Type 2 in the FDA’s NDA classification scheme, including esters and salts, that sometimes 
function as prodrugs). Interestingly, the FDA already excludes metabolites—which can be 
thought of as a flip-side of prodrugs (as they are the active form of a drug into which the chemical 
ingested by patients metabolizes)—from the Orange Book. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2018) 
(“Process patents, patents claiming packaging, patents claiming metabolites, and patents 
claiming intermediates are not covered by this section, and information on these patents must 
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starting with the infamous example of thalidomide,449 instances of 
enantiomers that offer significant clinical advantages over racemates 
abound,450 and such advantages should usually be demonstrable in scenarios 
where they are actually present.  
An interesting example of a drug modification type that may not involve 
a clinical benefit, but could still be a bona fide upgrade, is a change that 
improves the drug’s manufacturing process, makes it easier to store the drug 
by increasing its shelf stability, and so on.451 For these sorts of changes, a 
separate “manufacturing improvement” category could be created, so that 
rather than submitting data tending to indicate a potential difference in 
clinical benefit between two drug forms, the sponsor would introduce 
evidence that shows improvements in handling and the like. Such 
information, though, does not traditionally go on the package insert (i.e., it 
is not a normal part of the labeling), and prescribers and patients are unlikely 
to care greatly about manufacturing changes in the clinical context anyway 
—unless, of course, the product is purer or somehow better for patients in 
 
not be submitted to FDA.”); Sherkow, supra note 33, at 216, 252–53 (discussing this provision 
and using it as an example of Orange Book policing that the FDA already performs); see also 
Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (defining 
metabolites and invalidating a metabolite patent); Mueller & Chisum, supra note 54, at 1147–54 
(using Schering v. Geneva as an example of the Federal Circuit’s efforts to combat evergreening). 
But see Holman et al., supra note 150, at 141–42 (providing an example of a patented metabolite 
that offered a significant therapeutic advantage over the original drug).  
 449. See generally Neil Vargesson, Thalidomide-Induced Teratogenesis: History and Mechanisms,  
105 BIRTH DEFECTS RES. (PART C) 140 (2015) (detailing the cause of widespread birth defects 
caused by thalidomide).  
 450. See generally, e.g., Auquier et al., supra note 14 (concluding that escitalopram, an 
enantiomer, was more effective than its racemate counterpart). 
 451. See generally W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491 (2014) (setting forth a framework for 
incentivizing improvements to drug manufacturing processes). For an example of an argument 
for patentability based mainly on unexpected non-therapeutic properties of a new salt 
compound, though one discounted by the Federal Circuit, see Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc.,  
480 F.3d 1348, 1368 (Fed. Cir.) (“[W]e hold that the optimization of the acid addition salt 
formulation for an active pharmaceutical ingredient would have been obvious where as here the 
acid addition salt formulation has no effect on the therapeutic effectiveness of the active 
ingredient and the prior art heavily suggests the particular anion used to form the salt.”), reh’g en 
banc denied, 488 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (mem.). But see Pfizer, 488 F.3d at 1382 (Lourie, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“[T]he panel improperly placed greater 
importance on the therapeutic value of a claimed compound over the value of its physical 
properties.”); id. at 1384 (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The panel 
also mistakenly determined that the superior properties of the besylate did not overcome a prima 
facie case of obviousness because they showed no superior therapeutic value—the maleate salt form 
of amlodipine worked just as well as the besylate form in clinical trials. Therapeutic value, 
however, is just one property of a pharmaceutical. Other properties, such as solubility, stability, 
hygroscopicity, and processability, must also play a role in the analysis of advantages.”); cf. Glaxo 
Grp. Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding that both unexpected 
bioavailability and stability of an amorphous form of a compound were evidence of unexpected 
results over the prior art). 
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other ways. Still, a clear “not proven different”-type notation may at least put 
the market participants, particularly payers, on notice that the change may be 
a strategic one. 
In addition, it should be noted that some patents directed to 
manufacturing or handling improvements are not listable in the Orange 
Book.452 While this regulatory feature may limit the appeal of a product 
hopping strategy using this method, it also means that delisting would 
obviously not be a stick in the FDA’s arsenal in these circumstances. Thus, to 
the extent that strategic product hopping based on purported manufacturing 
improvements is a concern, a different regime—perhaps one involving more 
vigorous antitrust enforcement—may be required.453  
One category of inventions that should be exempted from the ambit of 
the proposal, however, are newly discovered methods of use of known 
compounds.454 First, these inventions do not really involve a product change 
as such, and therefore do not fit into a product hopping model. Second, 
allegations of “sham” new indications are not often made and would be 
somewhat incoherent because they do not involve a change in the underlying 
product. Third, if anything, patents on new methods of use of known 
compounds can be difficult to enforce effectively because merely 
manufacturing the drug is not an act of direct patent infringement455—so 
generics must be pursued under “indirect infringement” theories, which are 
more difficult to prove up.456 The alternative, and a very impractical one, is to 
pursue prescribing physicians as direct infringers. Fourth, and finally, so-
called “repurposing” or development of new indications of known chemicals 
 
 452. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1) (2018) (excluding “[p]rocess patents, patents claiming 
packaging, patents claiming metabolites, and patents claiming intermediates” from the Orange Book). 
Many drug modifications that could in fact improve a drug’s manufacturing or handling features (e.g., 
shelf stability of the drug), such as crystalline (or polymorphic) forms, are listable, however. See, e.g., 
Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1285–94 (Fed. Cir. 2009); cf. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(2) 
(imposing unique test data requirements for Orange Book listings of polymorphs). 
 453. See supra notes 16–24 and accompanying text.  
 454. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.  
 455. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Rebecca 
S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 720, 721–22 (2005); 
Benjamin N. Roin, Solving the Problem of New Uses 31 (Oct. 14, 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://www.bu.edu/law/files/2016/10/Solving-the-Problem-of-New-Uses-Ben-n.-
Roin.pdf. But cf. Sam F. Halabi, The Drug Repurposing Ecosystem: Intellectual Property Incentives, Market 
Exclusivity, and the Future of “New” Medicines, 20 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1, 61–63 (2018) (contending 
that new pharmaceutical uses of known chemical compounds are often discovered without 
traditional incentives, such as patents and regulatory exclusivities).  
 456. See generally Dmitry Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, 70 VAND. L. 
REV. 565 (2017) (arguing that patent law sometimes imposes unduly elevated mens rea 
requirements for proving infringement of method claims); Erika Lietzan, Paper Promises for Drug 
Innovation, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3103293 
(contending that research into new uses of existing drugs is underincentivized). But cf., e.g., 
Sanofi v. Watson Labs. Inc., 875 F.3d 636, 644–46 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (upholding a finding of 
indirect infringement by a generic manufacturer in a Hatch-Waxman case).  
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has frequently led to highly significant health advances.457 In all, there are 
reasons to believe that new use inventions are under-incentivized under the 
current regime, and more importantly they are not normally understood as 
“product hops.” Thus, within the framework of this Article, a discovery of a 
new indication would be a “per se” clinical advance that easily satisfies the 
proposed relevancy standard—though for facility of administration it should 
be excluded from the scope of the proposal altogether.  
D. IMPLEMENTATION MECHANICS 
The FDA has not asserted a general authority to request data tending to 
show a distinction between new and already approved drug products, in 
product hopping cases or otherwise. Indeed, although FDA regulations allow 
sponsors to establish safety and efficacy of new drug products using active 
comparators, the agency has not attempted to make this method a general 
condition of approval.458 As suggested earlier, there are good reasons for this 
approach: If a drug product is determined to be safe and effective as a general 
matter, it seems extreme to deny the market an option to choose it 
altogether.459 Moreover, considering the FDA’s statutory mandate, a decision 
not to approve a product based on the fact that it is not proven to be 
therapeutically distinct from an existing product would present a conundrum 
for the agency. Because withholding approval means that the product failed 
to meet the safety and efficacy thresholds,460 such a decision would imply that 
the existing product, which is not demonstrably different from the one that 
has just been denied, is likewise not safe and effective and that its approval 
should also be withdrawn.461 This cannot be a sensible result. 
Nevertheless, the FDA has used evidence of a significantly improved safety 
and efficacy profile of a new product to withdraw approval for a previous 
version.462 The rationale in such cases is often that, given the availability of the 
 
 457. See, e.g., Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (upholding the validity of a method of use patent for treating the symptoms of HIV-AIDS). 
 458. Cf., e.g., Sorenson et al., supra note 55, at 300 (suggesting making comparative efficacy 
a condition of drug approval in Europe).  
 459. Cf. supra notes 346–49 and accompanying text (discussing these critiques). 
 460. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2018).  
 461. I thank Professor Patricia Zettler for suggesting that I make this point.  
 462. See, e.g., Determination that the OXYCONTIN (Oxycodone Hydrochloride) Drug 
Products Covered by New Drug Application 20–553 Were Withdrawn from Sale for Reasons of 
Safety or Effectiveness, 78 Fed. Reg. 23,273, 23,274 (Apr. 18, 2013) (“Original OxyContin has 
the same therapeutic benefits as reformulated OxyContin. Original OxyContin, however, poses 
an increased potential for abuse by certain routes of administration, when compared to 
reformulated OxyContin. Based on the totality of the data and information available to the 
Agency at this time, FDA concludes that the benefits of original OxyContin no longer outweigh 
its risks.”); Holman et al., supra note 150, at 141–42 (providing another example of withdrawal 
of a prior formulation); Patricia J. Zettler et al., Implementing a Public Health Perspective in FDA Drug 
Regulation, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 221, 228–39 (2018) (discussing the FDA’s withdrawal of 
approval for previously approved opioids due to safeguards in new formulas). 
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newly approved option, the risk-benefit calculus now militates against leaving 
the old product on the market at all.463 In addition, as the well-known example 
of opioid drugs lacking abuse-resistant forms illustrates, post-approval 
evidence concerning the original product can sometimes come to light to 
justify its withdrawal further.464 A perhaps cynical (though entirely plausible) 
take on this dynamic points out that companies have incentives to convince 
the FDA to pull an old product as part of a product hopping strategy—an 
outcome that would prevent generics from marketing the prior version 
altogether.465 While doing so without a good justification might amount to 
fraud—behavior that should be deterred by any number of legal regimes466 
—antitrust cases have revealed at least a milder variation of this strategy, which 
consists of disparagement of one’s prior product unaccompanied by an 
attempt to ask the FDA to withdraw approval.467  
The proposed framework, to be clear, does not concern withdrawals of 
the old product based on insufficient safety or efficacy, but rather assumes 
that both versions are allowed to be marketed. To situate the proposal further, 
the scheme falls between the extremes of requiring comparative data for 
approval and the current approach under which the FDA does not typically 
conduct any analysis of therapeutic distinctions between related drug 
products, even if the two have the same active pharmaceutical ingredient. On 
what basis, then, can the FDA implement the proposal? Although the FDCA 
does not currently vest the FDA with clear authority to solicit comparative data 
between drugs that meet the approval standard, history does show that the 
FDA has sometimes pushed the envelope on its statutory authority to pursue 
initiatives that it thought sensible. For example, confronted with widespread 
“off-label” use of drugs approved for adults in pediatric patients, the FDA in 
1997 promulgated the so-called Pediatric Rule.468 This rule, which the agency 
 
 463. See generally Zettler et al., supra note 462(explaining how this dynamic can aid the FDA 
in promoting public health).  
 464. See id. at 237. 
 465. Lars Noah, Product Hopping 2.0: Getting the FDA to Yank Your Original License Beats Stacking 
Patents, 19 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 161, 167–68 (2015). 
 466. Cf. Darrow, supra note 47, at 410–17 (analyzing the limits of fraud actions implicating 
FDA approvals). See generally Maria Elena Flacco et al., Head-to-Head Randomized Trials Are Mostly 
Industry Sponsored and Almost Always Favor the Industry Sponsor, 68 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 811 
(2015) (describing the incentives of pharmaceutical companies to discount unfavorable data). 
 467. See, e.g., In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., 
64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 682 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (discussing how disparagement of one’s product and 
perceived threat of withdrawal could convince both patients and doctors to switch to a company’s 
newer product and explaining how such a strategy could help support an antitrust claim). For an 
analysis of antitrust theories based on disparagement, see Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, 
Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 60–65. 
 468. See generally Michael S. Labson, Pediatric Priorities: Legislative and Regulatory Initiatives to 
Expand Research on the Use of Medicines in Pediatric Patients, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 34 (2002) 
(describing the historical development of the Pediatric Rule). I thank Professor Erika Lietzan for 
suggesting this example. 
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attempted to justify under various statutory anchors that included the FDCA’s 
labeling provisions, imposed certain clinical study requirements with respect 
to a drug’s pediatric uses even where the sponsor had not sought an approval 
for any pediatric indication for the drug.469 
Although a district court struck down the Pediatric Rule as in excess of 
the FDA’s statutory authority,470 Congress in 2003 codified certain features of 
the rule.471 This story is not unique: Other initiatives, such as the so-called 
Priority Review “of applications for drugs that, if approved, would be 
significant improvements in the safety or effectiveness of the treatment, 
diagnosis, or prevention of serious conditions when compared to standard 
applications,”472 were regulatory in origin but eventually garnered 
congressional ratification.473 While I do not wish to advocate for lawless 
regulatory action,474 one could argue nonetheless that it is not entirely 
inappropriate for an agency to test out a policy that has a plausible basis in 
the enabling statute, and may draw a response from stakeholders that is 
positive enough to lead to codification.475 Taking a page from its pre-statutory 
 
 469. See Ass’n of Am., Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 226 F. Supp. 
2d 204, 219–22 (D.D.C. 2002), appeal dismissed on stipulation, Order at 1, Nos. 02-5407, 03-5005, 
2003 WL 22972071, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 11, 2003). Prior to the dismissal, the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia ordered the parties to “address in their briefs the question how this 
court can enforce a rule that the agency has not sought to defend on appeal and that the 
governing statute does not compel.” Order at 1, Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Food 
& Drug Admin., Nos. 02-5407, 03-5005, 2003 WL 21384604, at *1 (D.C. Cir. May 28, 2003).  
 470. See Ass’n of Am., Physicians & Surgeons, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 211–22 (holding that the 
Pediatric Rule lacks support in any of the provisions of the FDCA relied upon by the FDA and is 
therefore beyond the agency’s jurisdiction).  
 471. See Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-155, 117 Stat. 1936, 1937–40 (2003). 
 472. Priority Review, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/ 
Fast/ucm405405.htm (last updated Jan. 4, 2018). See generally Erin E. Kepplinger, FDA’s Expedited 
Approval Mechanisms for New Drug Products, 34 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 15 (2015) (discussing the 
development and function of expedited approval mechanisms).  
 473. See Kepplinger, supra note 472, at 24–25; Eagle Pharm., Inc. v. Azar, Civ. No. 16-790 
(TJK), 2018 WL 3838265, at *2, *5–10 (D.D.C. June 8, 2018) (striking down an FDA regulation 
that imposed the “clinically superior” standard for orphan drug approvals without statutory 
support, while acknowledging that Congress later passed a statute codifying this standard), further 
proceedings, 2018 WL 3838223 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-5254 (D.C. Cir.  
Aug. 24, 2018); Depomed, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 66 F. Supp. 3d 217, 226, 
229 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 474. For a critical review of the FDA’s tendency to push the boundaries of its authority, see 
Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of Authority,  
1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 931–35. 
 475. As noted, the FDA has imposed specialized approval requirements (e.g., a showing of 
efficacy relative to an active comparator rather than placebo) for some types of drugs. See, e.g., 
NON-INFERIORITY CLINICAL TRIALS TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 58; see also Non-
Inferiority Clinical Trials to Establish Effectiveness: Guidance for Industry; Availability, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 78,605 (Nov. 8, 2016) (announcing the finalized non-inferiority Guidance); Draft Guidance 
for Industry on Non-Inferiority Clinical Trials; Availability, 75 Fed. Reg. 9228 (Mar. 1, 2010) 
(providing a draft non-inferiority Guidance). It is not clear how specifically the FDA has 
reconciled this Guidance with the language of the FDCA, but it does not seem to have 
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Pediatric Rule playbook, the FDA could argue that “adequate directions for 
use”476 must, in the product hopping context, include some information on 
what the drug switch would offer to patients or a statement that no distinction 
between the two forms has been demonstrated. Notably, although the 
decision striking down the Pediatric Rule took a particular issue with the fact 
that the Pediatric Rule required particular studies,477 no such mandate inheres 
in this Article’s proposal.  
An amendment to the FDCA would, of course, be a legally surefire 
—though a politically much more difficult—route to the proposal’s 
implementation. Moreover, the variation of the proposal vesting the FDA with 
the discretion to deny Orange Book listings to certain patents might be 
particularly prone to opposition (and, at the same time, less likely to find 
support in the current enabling statute).478 But to the extent that one 
roadblock might entail questions about the FDA’s experience with evaluating 
data purporting to show differences between drug products,479 the suggested 
amendment’s proponents could point to numerous examples of the FDA’s 
exercise of such authority. The aforementioned Priority Review program is 
 
encountered significant opposition from the industry. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Donald R. 
Jaffe, Dir., Worldwide Regulatory Strategy, Worldwide Regulatory Affairs & Quality Assurance, 
Pfizer Inc., to Div. of Dockets Mgmt. (HFA-305), Food & Drug Admin. (June 1, 2010), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2010-D-0075-0019 (providing suggestions for 
improving the Guidance). 
 476. 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1) (2018); cf. Ass’n of Am., Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. U.S. Food 
& Drug Admin., 226 F. Supp. 2d 204, 213–14 (D.D.C. 2002). The counterargument is that the sponsor 
is not seeking an indication for marketing comparative utility between two drug forms, however.  
 477. Ass’n of Am., Physicians & Surgeons, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 221. 
 478. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (referring to a listing requirement for “any patent which 
claims the drug for which the applicant submitted the application”). But see 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1) 
(2018) (excluding metabolites from Orange Book listings); see also id. § 314.53(b)(1)–(2) 
(requiring special test data “[f]or patents that claim only a polymorph”).  
 479. Indeed, even without a general requirement of comparative efficacy, such data is 
available as part of some approval packages—which means that the FDA sometimes analyzes data 
developed based on an active-comparator control. See Goldberg et al., supra note 306, at 1788 
(“[A]bout half of all new drugs approved in the United States since 2000 were compared with an 
alternative treatment prior to market authorization, and the results of this comparison were 
publicly available in the FDA approval packages.”). To be sure, the data set discussed in this study 
is for new molecular entity drugs. See also Downing et al., supra note 59, at 373–74 (“Comparative 
effectiveness information, which is not required as part of FDA approval and involves comparison 
of an intervention with an active control, was available for less than half of indications, consistent 
with prior research, but leaving uncertainty about the benefits and safety of these medications when 
compared with other available therapeutic agents.” (footnote omitted)); Gottlieb, supra note 356, 
at 5 (“[D]rug companies already take on the enormous investment in preapproval superiority trials 
to gain market access for their new drugs. . . . In cases where drug makers undertake comparative 
trials to help secure reimbursement, they are doing the studies before approval and submitting them 
as part of their FDA files so they have the information available at the time of approval.”). 
Nonetheless, it is clear that drug companies do not generate this information in a significant 
number of product hopping cases, perhaps in part because of the market failures outlined in Part 
IV. In addition, there may be concerns with the quality and independent scrutiny of the voluntarily 
generated information. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.  
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one example.480 Another is the FDA’s requirement of non-inferiority trials for 
approvals of certain classes of drugs, such as antibiotics. As the term suggests, 
such studies are designed to show that the proposed drug is at least no worse 
than some option that is already on the market.481 Moreover, the FDA applies 
comparative standards in several other contexts involving drug products, 
including the “clinically superior” standard under the Orphan Drug Act482 
and the “meaningful therapeutic benefit” standard under the Pediatric 
Research Equity Act.483 Finally, the FDA’s regulations explicitly contemplate 
approvals based on an active comparator as a control.484 These precedents can 
serve as platforms on which the FDA can build in further developing its 
product comparison expertise.  
Still another example of the FDA’s product comparison authority is 
worth highlighting. The provision of interest appears in the Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act (“BPCIA”), the statutory framework that 
roughly parallels the Hatch-Waxman scheme for small molecules but in the 
context of biologics,485 or large-molecule drugs.486 Like Hatch-Waxman, the 
BPCIA is concerned in part with both rewarding innovation and enabling 
 
 480. See supra notes 472–73 and accompanying text. 
 481. See NON-INFERIORITY CLINICAL TRIALS TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 58; see 
also Zachary Brennan, When Can Non-Inferiority Trials Establish Efficacy? FDA Explains with Guidance, 
REG. AFF. PROFS. SOC’Y (Nov. 7, 2016), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2016/11/ 
07/26134/When-can-Non-Inferiority-Trials-Establish-Efficacy-FDA-Explains-With-Guidance. But 
cf. Gottlieb, supra note 346, at 2–5 (describing potential challenges in the conduct of non-
inferiority trials and some approaches to dealing with them). For another helpful discussion of 
non-inferiority trials, see generally Sandeep K. Gupta, Non-Inferiority Clinical Trials: Practical Issues 
and Current Regulatory Perspective, 43 INDIAN J. PHARMACOLOGY 371, 371 (2011) (evaluating 
practical distinctions “between non-inferiority and superiority trials”).  
 482. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(c), (e) (2018). 
 483. Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-155, § 2(c), 117 Stat. 1936, 1940 
(2003) (“(1) [I]f approved, the drug or biological product would represent a significant 
improvement in the treatment, diagnosis, or prevention of a disease, compared with marketed 
products adequately labeled for that use in the relevant pediatric population; or (2) the drug or 
biological product is in a class of products or for an indication for which there is a need for 
additional options.”); see also Labson, supra note 468, at 54 (explaining that “[i]mprovement over 
existing products” under the “meaningful therapeutic benefit” standard for waiver of pediatric 
trials under the Pediatric Rule “would be demonstrated by 1) evidence of increased effectiveness 
in treatment, prevention, or diagnosis of disease, 2) elimination or substantial reduction of a 
treatment-limiting drug reaction, 3) documented enhancement of patient compliance, or  
4) evidence of safety and effectiveness in a new subpopulation”). 
 484. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2)(iv) (2018); supra note 479 and accompanying text. 
 485. The parallels are, to be sure, rough—there are many significant differences between the 
Hatch-Waxman and the BPCIA, ranging from the length of the brand’s regulatory exclusivity 
period to the conduct of patent litigation between brands and biosimilar applicants. See, e.g., 
Heled, supra note 82, at 436–43. See generally Krista Hessler Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative 
History of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671 (2010) 
(discussing the events leading up to the passage of the Biologics Price Competition and 
Innovation Act and explaining its provisions). 
 486. See, e.g., Karshtedt, supra note 160, at 136–37; Bryan A. Liang, Regulating Follow-On 
Biologics, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 369 (2007). 
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competition by new entrants, who can market so-called “biosimilar” drugs 
without having to conduct extensive clinical trials that the brand must engage 
in to earn a pioneering drug’s approval.487 When a sponsor of a biologic 
product applies for a regulatory exclusivity to support a variation of a prior 
product that the sponsor is already marketing, the FDA must determine 
whether the structural change “result[s] in a change in safety, purity, or 
potency” relative to the predecessor product.488 In a Guidance for 
interpreting this subsection, the FDA explained that “[i]f the modified 
product affects the same molecular target as the previously licensed product, 
its sponsor should provide data to show that the changes in structure result in 
a change in safety, purity, or potency of the modified product when compared 
to the previously licensed product.”489 Similar to this Article’s proposal,490 this 
provision empowers the FDA to scrutinize differences between related 
products developed by the same firm and has been characterized by several 
commentators as a deterrent against strategic product changes.491  
 
 487. See generally Carver et al., supra note 485 (providing an overview of the BCPIA’s history). 
 488. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(C)(ii)(II) (2018). This statute also forbids granting separate 
exclusivity to the same firm when “a change (not including a modification to the structure of the 
biological product) . . . results in a new indication, route of administration, dosing schedule, 
dosage form, delivery system, delivery device, or strength.” Id. § 262(k)(7)(C)(ii)(I).  
 489. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: REFERENCE PRODUCT EXCLUSIVITY 
FOR BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS FILED UNDER SECTION 351(A) OF THE PHS ACT 7 (2014), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidan
ces/UCM407844.pdf; see also James E. Valentine & James C. Shehan, FDA’s New Biosimilars 
Guidance Has Sponsors Provide Information to Win Reference Product Exclusivity; Liberal Criteria Opens 
the Door to More Exclusivities Being Awarded, FDA LAW BLOG (Aug. 9, 2014), www.fdalawblog.net/ 
fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2014/08/fdas-new-biosimilars-guidance-has-sponsors-provide-
information-to-win-reference-product-exclusivity-.html (discussing this Guidance). 
 490. Cf. Erika Lietzan, The Uncharted Waters of Competition and Innovation in Biological Medicines, 
44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 883, 938–41 (2017) (criticizing the BPCIA’s potential, based on the 
provisions of § 262(k)(7)(C)(ii), to discourage post-approval innovation by firms that have a 
biologic product on the market).  
 491. See Janet Freilich, Patent Infringement in the Context of Follow-On Biologics, 16 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 9, 23 (2012) (“[T]he BPCIA includes an ‘anti-evergreening’ provision: a list of 
improvements in a drug that do not qualify for an exclusivity period—an effort to reduce the 
strategic small improvements made by producers of small molecule drugs in an attempt to extend 
their market monopoly.”); id. at 11 n.7 (stating that “the BPCIA contains anti-evergreening 
provisions intended to curb some of the strategic patenting seen in generic drugs”); Kurt R. Karst, 
BPCIA’s Principal Authors Seek to Clarify Congressional Intent with Respect to 12-Year Exclusivity Period; 
PhRMA/BIO Request “Umbrella Exclusivity,” FDA LAW BLOG (Jan. 5, 2011), www.fdalawblog.net/ 
2011/01/bpcias-principal-authors-seek-to-clarify-congressional-intent-with-respect-to-12-year-
exclusivity-pe (“[Section] 351(k)(7)(C) is intended to prevent evergreening by excluding most 
product changes from qualifying for a new 12-year exclusivity period.”); Heled, supra note 82,  
at 463–64 (“BPCIA accounts for the risk of abuse of statutory exclusivities by specifically and 
explicitly disallowing grants of market and data exclusivities under certain circumstances. . . . Patent 
law, on the other hand, does not seem to have the same kind of safeguards against abuse.”);  
see also Carver et al., supra note 485, at 764–66, 791–96 (chronicling the BPCIA evergreening 
debate). “Evergreening” is a term (often thought of as pejorative) that refers generally to strategies 
that brand companies use to maintain exclusivities for their products. See supra note 64 and 
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Thus, the FDA must already compare drug products under various 
standards and does so in several instances with Congress’s explicit 
imprimatur. In addition to demonstrating Congress’s confidence in the FDA’s 
ability to deal with this kind of a task, these precedents constitute agency 
expertise that could be of benefit to the setting of this Article’s proposal. 
Perhaps more to the point, Congress has already recognized the reality of 
product hopping, though only in the context of biologics. The proposal 
described here, then, adopts a related approach for small-molecule drugs.  
VI. OBJECTIONS 
This Part briefly considers some anticipated objections to the proposal, 
including both that it goes too far and not far enough. Potential concerns are 
that the scheme set forth in this Article would diminish incentives for 
pharmaceutical innovation, would be avoided by sponsors or easily gamed, or 
would overwhelm the FDA in various ways. I address these objections in turn 
in the paragraphs that follow.  
The first set of objections is rooted in the worry that the proposal would 
discourage cumulative pharmaceutical innovation, or even drug development 
generally. It may be argued that, faced with the Hobson’s choice of generating 
costly data or becoming subject to the scarlet letter of “not proven different,” 
pharmaceutical companies would just opt out of the drug modification 
business altogether. This result would be a loss for human health, as it has 
been observed that some of the most effective drug products on the market 
are “tweaks” of those that are already known.492 A further objection is that, 
given the relatively abbreviated period of useful exclusivity that brand 
companies receive given the typically long approval times for pioneering 
drugs, brand pharmaceutical firms need the “secondary exclusivity” for 
hopped drug forms to recoup their research and development outlays.493  
Several responses are possible to these objections. Data can of course be 
costly to generate, but the proposed standard provides for some relatively 
inexpensive ways, such as indirect comparisons, by which firms can meet the 
 
accompanying text; see also Robin Feldman, May Your Drug Price Be Ever Green (UC Hasting 
Research Paper No. 256, 2018) (manuscript at 11), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3061567 
(“[M]any drugs with high prices have been available far longer than the 20-year term of a patent, 
and the modern drug approval system is designed to encourage generic versions of drugs after 
that time.”); Prajapati & Dureja, supra note 215 (analyzing product lifecycle management); Song 
& Han, supra note 96 (cataloguing strategic behaviors in the pharmaceutical industry); Valoir, 
supra note 44 (discussing follow-on patenting and other exclusivity “extension” strategies). For 
an overview of evergreening in a small-molecule context, see generally THOMAS, supra note 64. 
 492. Indeed, Professor Benjamin Roin has argued that, because many incremental innovations 
in the pharmaceutical space are in fact unpatentable, we have seen underinvestment into research 
involving drug products that have high potential to improve human health. See generally Roin, supra 
note 136. 
 493. See supra notes 138–42 and accompanying text. 
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“relevancy” threshold.494 Accordingly, if the new version of the drug actually 
has something provably different to offer, sponsors could avoid the “not 
proven different” designation without financially crushing pre-approval 
efforts. In addition, firms meeting the standard would attain a number of 
added benefits that should boost incentives for follow-on research. Thus, the 
FDA’s imprimatur would enable vigorous advertising of a drug’s comparative 
benefit over the prior drug product495 (and perhaps a more surefire way to 
convince payers to cover the new one)496 and should likely shield the firm 
from facing antitrust liability in a case of a hard switch.497 Moreover, as the 
Seroquel case illustrates, comparative data developed in the process may even 
bolster the case for validity of the patents protecting the improved drug.498 As 
to the further objection, to the extent that maintenance of exclusivity through 
secondary patenting and product hopping is needed to provide an adequate 
period of protection for pioneering products,499 the solution is to lengthen 
the pioneering patent term to account for regulatory delay500 rather than 
encourage strategic behavior of the sort observed with Namenda.501 
A second set of objections concerns possibilities that firms would 
continue to develop drug modifications, but either refuse to opt into the 
scheme (i.e., by not developing any comparative data) or game it by 
demonstrating therapeutic distinctiveness based on some minor parameter.502 
 
 494. See supra notes 387–94 and accompanying text.  
 495. Thus, with the comparative information on the insert, drug firms could advertise the 
advantages of the drug to clinicians without the concern of facing a lawsuit for misbranding. See 
supra notes 317–18, 384–85 and accompanying text. 
 496. Cf. Gottlieb, supra note 346, at 5–6 (describing the challenges facing drug makers in 
convincing payers to cover new drugs). 
 497. See supra notes 342–43 and accompanying text.  
 498. See supra notes 217–23 and accompanying text. 
 499. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. Of course, although a product hop 
accompanied by secondary patenting can enable the manufacturer to maintain control over the 
market, the exclusivity is not really being extended because the primary patents have expired. Cf. 
Jonathan J. Darrow, Debunking the “Evergreening” Patents Myth, 131 HARV. L. REC. 6, 6 (2010) 
(explaining that patenting modifications to a product covered by a pioneering patent does not 
“extend” the term of that patent). 
 500. See Josh Bloom, Should Patents on Pharmaceuticals Be Extended to Encourage Innovation? Yes: 
Innovation Demands It, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424 
052970204542404577156993191655000. See generally Erika Lietzan, The History and Political 
Economy of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, 49 SETON HALL L. REV. 53 (2018) (maintaining that the 
purported compromise of the Hatch-Waxman Act was actually a bad deal for brand companies). 
 501. See supra notes 16–24 and accompanying text. 
 502. Commentators have expressed concern that sponsors’ control of the relevant 
information might enable them to succeed before the FDA by manipulating clinical trial results. 
See Flacco et al., supra note 466, at 815–18; see also Thomas O. McGarity, Beyond Buckman: 
Wrongful Manipulation of the Regulatory Process in the Law of Torts, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 549, 559 
(2002) (“When the onus is on the regulatee to provide data establishing that its product is ‘safe 
and effective’ . . . , the temptation is strong for a company to discount data indicating that the 
product may not meet the statutory test.”). Still, the advantage of this Article’s proposal over what 
is done currently is that comparative claims would no longer go completely unvetted. As to the 
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To develop the former objection, one would maintain that, besides costs of 
information generation and transfer, there are other powerful disincentives 
for firms to perform comparative analysis between their own products. One, 
gathering data involving an already-approved product could uncover facts 
exposing the sponsor to tort liability,503 so long as the tort claims are not 
preempted by federal law or FDA regulations.504 Two, comparative analysis 
might show that the new product is unquestionably inferior, putting the 
sponsor in a tough spot.505 Three, although the fact that firms sometimes 
already compare their own products voluntarily suggests that concerns about 
unearthing negative information do not prevail in every case,506 the objector 
would maintain that the extant proposal would not alter the general cost-
benefit calculus in this industry. 
To address these concerns, I note that the market could well view a firm’s 
refusal to opt into the proposed scheme as a signal that something is wrong 
with its products—either old, new, or both. Given the relative permissiveness 
of the standard and, particularly in the case of the proposal’s Orange Book 
variation, the significance of the benefit being withdrawn,507 firms that fail to 
show meaningful differences between their products to the FDA would need 
 
problem of firms’ presentation of inaccurate information to the FDA, claims against 
pharmaceutical companies based on “fraud-on-the-FDA” theories have ended in mixed results. 
See, e.g., Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 96–98 (2d Cir. 2006) (allowing such 
claims under Michigan law), aff’d by an equally divided court sub nom. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 
552 U.S. 440 (2008) (per curiam). But see Lofton v. McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharm.,  
672 F.3d 372, 379–80 (5th Cir. 2012) (disagreeing with the reasoning of Desiano and holding fraud-
on-the-FDA claims under Texas law are preempted by an FDA regulation). See generally Darrow, supra 
note 47, at 410–17 (explaining the limits of fraud actions implicating FDA approvals). 
 503. Cahoy, supra note 305, at 625–26 (“Because greater transparency generally means 
greater tort exposure, companies may make the logical choice to simply diminish the source of 
liability. In other words, companies may reduce the amount of information they create (e.g., by 
conducting fewer voluntary clinical trials).”); Allan M. Joseph, Kid Tested, FDA Approved: Examining 
Pediatric Drug Testing, 72 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 543, 548 (2017) (“Manufacturers are often reluctant 
to perform additional trials of any sort after approval because such trials ‘pose a risk of exposing 
previously unrecognized toxicities, thereby reducing rather than expanding product demand.’” 
(quoting Eisenberg, supra note 455, at 720)).  
 504. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577–81 (2009); see also Jodie M. Gross & Judi 
Abbott Curry, The Federal Preemption Debate in Pharmaceutical Labeling Product Liability Actions,  
43 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 35, 36–37 (2007) (analyzing deference to the FDA’s approach 
to preemption); cf. Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures,  
58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2128–30 (2009) (scrutinizing the FDA’s strategies for having required drug 
labeling preempt state law tort claims).  
 505. See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 309, at 18 (“[C]omparative effectiveness research runs 
the risk of showing that a new drug is worse than existing treatments. Since placebo-controlled 
trials are generally enough to win regulatory approval, drug companies may decide not to take 
the risk of demonstrating inferiority rather than superiority for the patent-protected product.”); 
D.N. Lathyris et al., Industry Sponsorship and Selection of Comparators in Randomized Clinical Trials, 
40 EUR. J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 172, 172 (2010). 
 506. See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text; see also supra note 479 and accompanying 
text (explaining that comparative data is sometimes available in approval packages). 
 507. See supra notes 433–35 and accompanying text. 
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to counteract the negative inferences likely to arise from their decisions. In 
order to do so, those firms may therefore still need to reveal some comparative 
information to other market participants. Although this route would sidestep 
the FDA’s examination of the data, the ultimate result would still entail 
potentially useful disclosures, which is the overarching goal of the proposal. 
While concerns may arise about the quality of the data generated in these 
circumstances, the fact that the sponsor had the “FDA-vetting” option that it 
decided to forgo should at least lead payers, prescribers, and patients to 
discount the information accordingly.  
As to the “gaming” aspect of the objection, the relevancy standard is 
undoubtedly permissive, though one that is deliberately so given the major 
shift in the FDA’s role proposed here and the concern that a more rigorous 
standard, such as clinical superiority, could have a severely negative impact on 
drug development. In any event, if one is proceeding from the assumption 
that pharmaceutical firms are prone to gaming the regulatory system already, 
they are currently much more likely to escape consequences for such conduct 
if only one government agency, the PTO, ever gets to rely on comparative data 
as a possible factor in setting the brand company’s level of incentive.508  
As noted throughout this Article, the FDA has more experience with 
examining clinical trial data than the PTO, and wields the power (that the 
PTO lacks) to elicit information from sponsors beyond that which is 
submitted initially.509 Moreover, the FDA has the necessary expertise to 
examine the data and work with sponsors to limit comparative assertions to 
what the evidence actually supports.510 The FDA’s involvement ensures that if 
the firm conducted the bare minimum of experimentation to meet the 
proposed threshold of “data relevant to the relative performance of new 
product versions,” then market participants would know that this was indeed 
the extent of scientific work that the sponsor carried out.  
Significantly, an approach that seeks to characterize precisely the nature 
of the asserted therapeutic improvement, or at least a distinction, from an 
earlier drug version shifts the incentive structure for follow-on 
pharmaceutical innovation away from that fostered by the current, patent-
dominated regime, which entails an all-or-nothing decision on patentability. 
And while the PTO has a role to play in tailoring the brand’s right by 
determining the permissible scope of the patent claim in view of the prior art 
and other requirements of the Patent Act, the Namenda XR example shows 
that (putative) patentability does not always correspond to any actual benefit 
offered by the modification.511 Thus, while the standard could be gamed 
 
 508. See supra notes 267–70 and accompanying text. 
 509. See supra notes 372–80 and accompanying text. 
 510. See supra note 306 and accompanying text. 
 511. See supra Section III.B.2. I say “putative” because the validity of some of the Namenda 
XR patents has not yet been fully tested post-issuance. 
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—and, if the result is to maintain Orange Book listings, the payoff of such a 
strategy would be considerable512—the proposal would still succeed in at least 
forcing the transfer of some relevant information on what the drug change 
would offer.  
A third set of objections relates to the FDA’s various institutional 
limitations as potential roadblocks to this proposal’s successful 
implementation. For example, even if the FDA has the technical expertise to 
conduct the necessary analysis, it might not have the budget or the time to do 
it properly.513 Combining those concerns with the agency’s well-known 
aversion to risk,514 one might predict that the FDA would tend to conclude as 
a matter of course that no relevant difference was established for many of the 
comparative submissions it receives. And if the answer to the budgetary 
concern is to fund the initiative through user fees,515 perhaps the FDA would 
then become more susceptible to capture and thus tilt toward the sponsors, 
issuing determinations that portray the modifications in an unduly favorable 
light.516 Finally, the objector would note that even with its newfound power to 
elicit the generation and disclosure of comparative information, the FDA 
cannot do anything about hard switches.517  
Such objections are valid, but not insurmountable. Although it is true 
that the new authority would increase pressures on the FDA’s resources, some 
of the added expense could be covered by outlays from the funds budgeted 
 
 512. See supra notes 433–35 and accompanying text. 
 513. See, e.g., Ron Nixon, Funding Gap Hinders Law for Ensuring Food Safety, N.Y. TIMES  
(Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/us/food-safety-laws-funding-is-far-below-
estimated-requirement.html. 
 514. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 344, at 12 (“The harms that are caused by particular 
therapeutic agents—such as thalidomide, which causes major limb deformities—attract immense 
political pressures to ban these dangerous products from the marketplace. Overall, the result is 
a strong bias to overweigh Type I error [of erroneous approval] relative to the quiet harms that 
arise when individuals die for want of therapeutic agents that languish unapproved within the 
FDA.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 515. See Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491–505 (1992) 
(codified as 21 U.S.C. §§ 379g–h (2018)). 
 516. See, e.g., Cahoy, supra note 305, at 670 (“[T]he [Institute of Medicine] Report noted 
that the agency’s heavy reliance on user-fees for funding exacerbates the concern regarding 
industry influence.” (citing INSTITUTE OF MED. NAT’L ACADS., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: 
PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 73 (2007))); Dogan & Lemley, supra 
note 30, at 689–90, 699. See generally James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second Century: 
Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939 (2008) 
(providing examples of the FDA’s political capture). But see generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating 
Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010) (proposing 
various mechanisms for shielding agencies from undue influence); see also id. at 47 & n.178 
(contending that “the FDA is relatively more independent than other executive agencies, with its 
heads often advocating for drug regulation regardless of the position of their appointing 
president,” but noting concerns with capture (footnote omitted)).  
 517. See supra notes 403–04 and accompanying text. 
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for CER.518 The use of CER funding could be defended because pre-approval 
comparative analysis can dovetail with the CER conducted after the drug is 
marketed, driving drug adoption choices and supplying information for 
future research and thus justifying CER coverage. Even if the CER budget is 
unavailable for implementing the proposal, perhaps its costs would still be 
reasonable because comparative analysis would occur contemporaneously 
with, and rely on some of the same data as, regular (i.e., placebo-based) drug 
approval—as when the sponsor opts for the indirect comparison method. 
Finally, risk-averseness might not be a barrier to correct decision-making by 
the FDA here because the proposed determinations do not come with the 
same kind of pressure as the decision whether the product actually goes on 
the market. 
As for hard switches, the FDA certainly has little power to stop them. If a 
company voluntarily decides to discontinue an approved product, it is not 
clear if the agency could do anything to keep that product on the market. As 
noted earlier, withholding product approval based on the lack of a 
demonstrable difference from an already approved product is not a viable 
strategy given the FDA’s enabling statute, nor is it likely to be sound policy.519 
While antitrust actions remain as a weapon against hard switches with no 
demonstrated difference,520 the major concern here again comes down to 
gaming. Firms might do just enough to get over the relevancy hump 
—perhaps enabling them to avoid an antitrust action based on a flimsy 
procompetitive justification—and then pull the original product prior to 
expiration of the pioneering patents. Even if the FDA’s involvement fixes the 
information gap, physicians would have no choice but to switch if there is no 
original product. Whether, after those patents do expire, a switch back is 
plausible is an open question to which the answer depends on the specifics of 
the situation, including the nature of the condition being treated, patient 
characteristics, and the therapeutic difference between the drugs that has 
been established by the sponsor. At the very least, though, market participants 
should have a much better sense than before of the costs and benefits of this 
step—one of the goals of the proposal. And, in contrast to what happened 
with Namenda, one might actually see switches to drug products that are 
provably different, and perhaps better, than the original.  
 
 518. See supra notes 410–14 and accompanying text.  
 519. See supra notes 458–61 and accompanying text. 
 520. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 30, at 711–17 (providing a framework for antitrust 
analysis of this conduct); see also Comment Letter from Ameet Sarpatwari et al., to Div. of Dockets 
Mgmt., Food & Drug Admin. (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-
2017-N-3615-0064 (suggesting that the FDA refer problematic product hops to the Federal 
Trade Commission).  
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VII. CONCLUSION  
Not all pharmaceutical products are alike. Some are completely new 
drugs, while others are incremental modifications of drugs already on the 
market. Both have value in their own right, but the goals with the latter are 
often much clearer: To better the pioneering drug in some specific 
dimension, such as improving patient compliance or reducing side effects. 
Sometimes, however, product changes coupled with follow-on patents can 
embody a strategy that is focused mainly on attempting to maintain the 
brand’s exclusivity rather than on advancing the quality of patient care and 
human health.521 The proposal in this Article enlists the FDA in the effort to 
encourage the latter—which, after all, is why the pharmaceutical industry 
exists in the first place. 
 
 
 521. Professors Yaniv Heled, Liza Vertinsky, and Cassady Brewer have recently made a 
proposal for a fundamental change along these lines. They argue that “companies involved in the 
provision of healthcare products and services should be incentivized or even required to assume 
alternative business forms that would both enable and require them to consider the needs of a 
broader range of stakeholders and the public interest in addition to shareholder value.” Yaniv Heled 
et al., Why Healthcare Companies Should Be(come) Benefit Corporations, 60 B.C. L. REV. 73, 74 (2019). 
